《 1. Introduction 》
This case started from a shell script spotted in the victim's node, credit to: 0xrb. At first look I read it as one more Chinese miner style uninstaller or downloader, the kind I have seen many times around the VShell, Kinsing and SystemTen campaigns. It is not. The script is a multi platform installer (stager), and the binary it delivers is a Rust beacon implant that I could not find in any public threat report at the time of writing.
I wrote four reverse engineering notes, one forensics analysis note and two OSINT investigation notes during the analysis of this case. In this post I put them side by side, keep only what the sample and the cited sources can prove, and drop the guesses. Every finding carries a confidence label. Predictions are not part of this report. I also keep the forensic evidence analysis (the actor's execution) and the malware analysis (scripts and binaries) in separate sections, so they do not mix, for the purpose of further investigation.
I would like to note that this is one of the earliest publicly documented LoongArch64 RAT implementations, identified within the EasyShell multi-platform Rust implant family.
■ 1.1 Executive summary
| Item | Summary |
|---|---|
| At a glance | A shell stager served from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 drops a payload named polkitd on Linux (5 CPU targets) and macOS (Intel, Apple Silicon). The Linux i386 payload (l32) is a Rust HTTPS beacon implant. Its own build paths name the framework EasyShell (easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core). |
| Name used in this post | Linux/EasyShell (alias ESCH), after the author build string easyshell-http-beacon-implant.
I am confident the malware is a new strain based on the way it built, coding environment trace and based on Rust programming language used, yet it seems inspired with a lot of influence from similar threats we already know under the same ecosystems. |
| What EasyShell is | A Chinese red team C2 framework with versioned releases, HTTP/DNS/KCP listeners, a trial program and a paid member circle, promoted through WeChat security channels next to the tools of the GitHub developer handle doki-byte High. The l32 strings fit that framework (chapter 14). |
| Aim | Hands-on access: shell, file theft, credential plugins, SOCKS and relay pivot High. No monetisation code. Operator intent unknown (18.1). macOS support is explained in 18.2. |
| Initial access | Not observed. The C2 was found during the October 2026 vulnerability wave (PHP2Shell and others), but no evidence ties the campaign start to it Unverified (20.1). |
| Status | Static analysis of all seven payloads (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and the stager text. No sample was executed. |
| Payload set | All seven builds share one configuration: same C2, same 32-byte value, same constant Confirmed. Config stamped into prebuilt templates High. The macOS client adds silent screenshots and an AppleScript mouse check; Macs are in scope High (chapters 15, 18.3). |
| Family call | Payload: EasyShell Rust implant Confirmed. Not VShell Confirmed. Stager layout shares the public VShell stager template High. No Kinsing or SystemTen link Confirmed. |
| Origin markers | USTC cargo mirror, zh-CN first in Accept-Language, Simplified Chinese operator strings, Chinese comments in the stager Confirmed. They describe the build environment of the tool. Since the tool is handed out to trial and paying users, they do not identify the operator of this C2. |
| C2 / staging | hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (AS36352, prefix 192[.]3.28[.]0/22, US). Same host serves the stager, the payloads and the implant beacon Confirmed. |
| If you only do one thing | Look for a process named like a kernel thread ([kworker/0:0], [rcu_sched], ...) that has a real /proc/<pid>/exe, and for HTTPS POSTs to /api/v2/sync carrying X-Client-Id. |
■ 1.2 Key points for busy readers
Short version of what each artifact does. Every point links to the chapter with the evidence. The executive summary in 1.1 is the one summary of the report; later chapters link back to it instead of repeating it.
- It is an installer, not an uninstaller: Linux and macOS, root or user [ch. 2: Threat information and the stager scheme]
- Finds a writable system bin directory with the
writeablexprobe (public VShell stager template) [ch. 3: Stager template versus public VShell reports] - Picks one of seven payloads by OS and CPU: Linux x86, x86_64, ARM, ARM64, LoongArch; macOS Intel and Apple Silicon [ch. 2: Threat information and the stager scheme]
- Downloads from C2 IP
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443with curl, wget or python, TLS checks off [ch. 12: Infrastructure used by the attacker] - Saves the payload as
polkitd(fake system daemon name) [ch. 2: Threat information and the stager scheme] - macOS: hides the file, removes quarantine, ad-hoc signs it (Gatekeeper handling) [ch. 2: Threat information and the stager scheme]
- What it is: statically linked Rust implant, built after 2026-04-14, framework name EasyShell in its own build paths [ch. 4: Binary information and major functionality] [ch. 5: Build provenance left in the binary] with the following hashes (below), and for your convenience I will snip analysis code of
l32binary file.
$ date Fri Nov 20 22:52:03 JST 2026 $ $ rahash2 -a sha1 * a32: 0x00000000-0x0033252f sha1: 8b3d1d3ee8e3500c7115bba939e047450a0783ac a64: 0x00000000-0x00394c8f sha1: c1e9edbdc877a9365343dc0dfad9d1660073750a darwin_amd64: 0x00000000-0x003e255f sha1: c1762547592e298cabc0e90309180fa79247ebd3 darwin_arm64: 0x00000000-0x0034edbf sha1: 7e827b3a7ba5e5064018244cbf594d47a34aefae l128: 0x00000000-0x0037de1f sha1: 550bec09b879e0c8e07a9d58909e1fb5a4ac0c74 l32: 0x00000000-0x0039841b sha1: 1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe l64: 0x00000000-0x0046af07 sha1: 547cc85bc060b6ebf220fbb82146476627150856 $
- C2:
192[.]3.31[.]148on tcp/8443, AS36352 ColoCrossing (HostPapa), US [ch. 12: Infrastructure used by the attacker] - Configuration: builder-patched
!ES/slots, C2 URL, keys, User-Agent, sandbox profile [ch. 6: Configuration block and the !ES slots] - Protocol: HTTPS POST
/api/v2/sync,X-Client-Idheader, Windows Chrome 131 UA, zh-CN Accept-Language [ch. 7: C2, protocol and network indicators] - Encryption and obfuscation: TLS (rustls), XOR 0x5A string pool, hashed relay-hop key label, 32-byte config value [ch. 8: XOR 0x5A string protection] [ch. 13: The 32-character constant]
- RAT remote commands: PTY shell, plugin and script execution, file upload/download, folder zip, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, outbound proxy, screenshot, process list and kill, self delete [ch. 11: Full list of impl-core modules] [ch. 6: Configuration block and the !ES slots]
- Plugins: credential dumping, token elevation, browser passwords and file search are not built in; they come from the "Extensions" plugin set [ch. 8: XOR 0x5A string protection]
- Anti-sandbox: DMI, hypervisor names, mouse activity, CPU, RAM, uptime checks [ch. 9: Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks]
- Stealth: kernel-thread process name table present (
[kworker/0:0]style, selection logic not traced), no shell history [ch. 9: Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks] - Overall implant design (diagram) [ch. 10: Implant overall design]
- Framework identification: client of the EasyShell red team C2 framework; operator unknown [ch. 14: EasyShell public footprint versus this build] [ch. 17: Cross review of the analyst notes and final call]
- Not VShell, not a miner, no Kinsing or SystemTen code [ch. 17: Cross review of the analyst notes and final call]
- Payload set: all seven builds analysed, one shared config stamped into prebuilt templates; the macOS client takes silent screenshots and checks the mouse [ch. 15: Payload set compared: all seven builds]
- How a Mac gets infected, step by step [ch. 18: CTI: Threat model]
- Aim: hands-on access, credential collection and pivoting; intent and operator unknown [ch. 18: CTI: Threat model]
- Why macOS too: generic framework one-liner and/or developer and admin Macs; vectors that reach both Linux and macOS [ch. 18: CTI: Threat model] [ch. 23: CTI: Targeted vulnerabilities and weaknesses]
- The compromised host where the stager of this case was re-run (history line 333) was a central multi-tenant C2 server housing six co-located Android and iOS malware frameworks (including Fisher C2 and Caishen iOS C2 V2). [ch. 29: Inside the victim node: hot forensics]
- The attacker used forged JWTs and direct SQLite/MySQL queries to enumerate and hijack active Android and iOS victim botnets. [ch. 29: Inside the victim node: hot forensics]
- Full source code, APK builders, and iOS exploit chains were archived and exfiltrated before the attacker wiped staging files to free disk space. [ch. 29: Inside the victim node: hot forensics]
- The attacker deployed
ripgrepto systematically carve cryptocurrency seeds, EVM private keys, GitHub tokens, and SSH credentials from raw database tables and victim backups. [ch. 29: Inside the victim node: hot forensics]
- Busy reader: 1.1 and 1.2.
- Responder on shift: ch. 28 (quick card), then ch. 25.
- Incident responder and SOC: ch. 24 to ch. 27, then ch. 29.
- CTI analyst: ch. 18 to ch. 23; the October 2026 vulnerability wave hypothesis is tested in 20.1 (not supported so far).
- Student and reverser: ch. 4 to ch. 15, with the text evidence in Appendix A.
■ 1.3 Version
Current version v11 (2026-11-21). The full revision history is in Appendix B.
■ 1.4 OPSEC note
IP addresses and URLs are masked (w[.]x.y[.]z, hxxps) and not linkable. The stager and any code that can be abused are shown as images only. Lab hosts, user names and analysis infrastructure are not shown. Credentials, device identifiers and victim addresses found in the chapter 29 evidence are masked.
■ 1.5 How to read this post
| Label | Meaning in this post |
|---|---|
| Confirmed | Proven by the sample bytes, the disassembly, the stager text, or a source page read for this post. |
| High | Strong evidence from the sample plus at least one public source, small room for another reading. |
| Medium | Consistent with the evidence, but another explanation is still possible. |
| Partly | Part of the claim holds, part does not. |
| Not supported | The sample or the cited source says otherwise, or the claim is an inference presented as a fact. |
| Unverified | Could not be checked from the material in hand. |
All disassembly views are produced from a static listing (llvm-objdump -d -M intel) with string references resolved by my own script against the i386 GOT base (ebx = 0x083dff88). They are laid out in radare2 style (pd, px, iI, iS) so students can reproduce them with r2 on the same offsets.
- A screenshot of a script is evidence of the stager only. The family call must come from the payload, not from the downloader layout.
- Write confidence next to each finding. It stops a first impression from turning into a conclusion.
《 2. Threat information and the stager scheme 》
![[ITW] stager script with original Chinese comments and English translation (view-only image) [ITW] stager script with original Chinese comments and English translation (view-only image)](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMkWkDMDgi2Js8k-Dol_ZZ9cxGmZEvPOHRM0XBlmngnJ1cs9e8Wli21HmtU5IhmrJKaA-BpfV5wabSpuXwEjiscBNTgciyW-RTSEkGl-ACOt-2soXMZrRCp0av-0oh6DhrhBbI-8x0HarFyObzk3oXbnQOVe0rITX3uM5-QC2CfV12AeSczn1ICw1AdSE/s1600/image.png)
Evidence: the original screenshot of the stager as served by the C2. The IP is masked in the image; nothing else is edited. The Chinese comments are the author originals (translated in the transcription above). The capture ends at the execute-permission line.
![[ITW] original C2 stager screenshot, IP masked (view-only image) [ITW] original C2 stager screenshot, IP masked (view-only image)](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWq2uVVyvxEZ3mrO-trTACYfMjoMjh7NjwC4EJlsbmjDgDXzNvUVlpUXHBpqosR_TGNbSwoikVhX3hlst6NaidTLs6H36xlhN9ckxsRCva7CddaBkR2q3UGNUkoytGEVtT_hKZuDDkUZKpr6cuCn_zPFxawA85OTTz6_fldgRaWVmablhNm3xE-fy-bQE/s1600/image.png)
■ 2.1 What each block does
| Lines | Behaviour | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| 1 to 8 | Extends PATH, then tests write access by touching and deleting writeablex in /usr/local/bin, /usr/libexec, /usr/bin. The working directory ends in the last writable one (as root: /usr/bin), otherwise /tmp. | Confirmed |
| 10 to 16 | Seven payload URLs on one host: /file/darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64, l64, l32, a32, a64, l128. | Confirmed |
| 18 to 19 | Payload file name is fixed: polkitd. Any old copy is deleted first. This is the only "removal" in the script. | Confirmed |
| 21 to 45 | Selects the payload by uname -s and uname -m. l128 maps to loongarch64. | Confirmed |
| 46 to 48 | Download chain curl, wget, python3, python2, all with TLS verification off. | Confirmed |
| 23 to 27, 53 to 67 | macOS only: stores in ~/Library/Caches, chflags hidden, xattr -c (drops com.apple.quarantine), ad-hoc codesign when Xcode CLT exists. | Confirmed |
So the answer to the first question of this case is simple: it is not a macOS uninstaller. It installs, on both macOS and Linux.
■ 2.2 Chinese terms in the stager comments (glossary)
The stager comments are written in Simplified Chinese. The table lists every term used in them with pinyin and the meaning in this context, so readers can recognise the same wording in other samples. Line numbers refer to the stager image above.
| Chinese | Pinyin | English (in this context) | Stager line |
|---|---|---|---|
| 优先 | yōuxiān | prefer, give priority to | 24 |
| 用户级 | yònghù jí | user-level | 24 |
| 缓存目录 | huǎncún mùlù | cache directory | 24 |
| 无需 | wúxū | no need for (here: no root needed) | 24 |
| 默认隐藏 | mòrèn yǐncáng | hidden by default | 24 |
| 失败再退 | shībài zài tuì | if that fails, fall back to | 24 |
| 清掉 | qīng diào | clear out, wipe | 55 |
| 所有扩展属性 | suǒyǒu kuòzhǎn shǔxìng | all extended attributes (xattr) | 55 |
| 含 | hán | including | 55 |
| 下载 | xiàzài | download | 55 |
| 本来不带 | běnlái bù dài | does not carry in the first place | 55 |
| 隔离属性 | gélí shǔxìng | quarantine attribute (com.apple.quarantine) | 55 |
| 这行是兜底 | zhè háng shì dōudǐ | this line is the fallback / safety net | 57 |
| 保证 | bǎozhèng | to make sure | 57 |
| 即使 | jíshǐ | even if | 57 |
| 浏览器 | liúlǎnqì | web browser | 57 |
| 隔空投送 | gékōng tóusòng | AirDrop (Apple term in Chinese UI) | 57 |
| 放过来 | fàng guòlái | dropped / sent over | 57 |
| 直接跑 | zhíjiē pǎo | run directly | 57 |
| 已装 | yǐ zhuāng | already installed | 60 |
| 顺手补一次 | shùnshǒu bǔ yī cì | add it once while at it | 60 |
| 签名 | qiānmíng | signature (code signing) | 60 |
| 要求 | yāoqiú | requires | 60 |
| 可执行文件 | kě zhíxíng wénjiàn | executable file | 60 |
| 有效签名 | yǒuxiào qiānmíng | valid signature | 60 |
| 这步 | zhè bù | this step | 62 |
| 都跑得起来 | dōu pǎo de qǐlái | can all run | 62 |
| 没装 | méi zhuāng | not installed | 62 |
| 直接跳过 | zhíjiē tiàoguò | skip straight past it | 62 |
| 不会弹 | bú huì tán | will not pop up | 62 |
| 安装提示框 | ānzhuāng tíshì kuàng | install prompt dialog | 62 |
| 黑吃黑 | hēi chī hēi | "black eats black": criminals preying on criminals (not in the stager, used in chapter 29) | n/a |
- Read
rmlines in context. Here they only clean the probe files and a previous payload copy. - Gatekeeper handling in a downloader (hide, strip quarantine, ad-hoc sign) is a strong macOS hunting point by itself.
《 3. Stager template versus public VShell reports 》
The opening block (PATH extension plus the writeablex probe) is described in Trellix research on VShell, and a December 2025 incident write-up shows the same probe lines with l64/l32/a64/a32 variables on port 8443. NVISO documents the same short architecture labels in its VShell detection rules, plus d64/m64 for Darwin.
| Element | Public VShell material | This stager |
|---|---|---|
| writeablex probe | Yes (Trellix, incident write-up) | Yes |
| l64 / l32 / a64 / a32 labels | Yes (incident write-up, NVISO rules) | Yes |
| Download URL form | ?h=..&p=..&t=..&a=l64&stage=true (incident write-up) | /file/<arch> |
| Darwin label | d64 / m64 (NVISO rules) | darwin_amd64 / darwin_arm64 |
| LoongArch | Not documented | l128 |
| Payload name | Random hex name (incident write-up) | Fixed polkitd |
| macOS Gatekeeper steps | Not documented | Yes |
Verdict: the stager shares the public VShell stager template High. The /file/ routes, the Darwin names, l128 and the macOS steps are not in the public VShell material I could check Confirmed. The template alone does not name the payload family, and chapter 4 shows the payload is not VShell. Whether this stager is generated by the EasyShell server itself is not proven: the l32 implant speaks of "listener payloads", but the /file/ routes and the stager text are not inside l32 Unverified.
- Downloader templates are copied between toolkits. Treat a template match as a link to a layout, not to a malware family.
《 4. Binary information and major functionality 》
.comment: Rust 1.95.0 (2026-04-14) built on Ubuntu 22.04..text about 2.4 MB, .rodata about 640 KB.The l32 file is the payload of the stager: it is the object served at /file/l32, it is saved as polkitd, and its embedded C2 is the same host and port Confirmed. It is a statically linked Rust binary (3,769,372 bytes), built after 14 April 2026 Confirmed. VShell clients are Go programs, so this payload is not a VShell client Confirmed. Six more builds from the same server (x86-64, LoongArch, ARM and macOS) are compared in chapter 15.
Major functionality, detailed in chapters 6 to 11: tagged config slots patched by a builder, HTTPS beacon to /api/v2/sync, XOR 0x5A string pool, kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox checks, PTY shell, plugin execution, chunked file transfer, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, screenshot helper and self delete.
- The
.commentsection survives stripping. Compiler and Rust versions there give you a lower bound for the build date.
《 5. Build provenance left in the binary 》
crates/ prefix plus mirrors.ustc.edu.cn come from the build host cargo setup.| Marker | Value | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Framework / crate names | easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core (27 module paths) | Confirmed |
| Crate source | Every dependency fetched through mirrors.ustc.edu.cn (USTC cargo mirror) | Confirmed |
| Operator text | Simplified Chinese messages (chapter 8 and 14) | Confirmed |
| Request header | Accept-Language zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 | Confirmed |
| Go component | Operator hint Run build-client.ps1, go build, redeploy client and transport labels Rust, Go, Go tcp | Confirmed (strings), the Go part itself is not in hand |
These are environment markers of the developer. They show a Chinese language build environment High. They do not identify a person or a named threat group, and I do not attribute this case to any group.
- Cargo writes the registry path into panic metadata. A mirror name in that path tells you how the build host was configured.
《 6. Configuration block and the !ES slots 》
The builder patches fixed slots tagged !ES/<n>/<TAG>/. Tags present in l32: PASS, PROXY, SBOX, BURI, UAGT, WAIT, JITR, CTYP, HDRS Confirmed. A slot that still shows its tag followed by underscores is unpatched. Next to them, a space padded block holds the live values.

/api/v2/sync, the SBOX and UAGT slots, a binary blob, 3000, 8, CTYP and HDRS into one structure. C2 masked.
| Field | Value in l32 | What is proven |
|---|---|---|
| C2 base | hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 | Loaded by the config builder Confirmed |
| Sync path | /api/v2/sync | Loaded by the config builder Confirmed |
| 32-byte value | LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo= (hex 2d8ea70c...cec8de5a) | Stored and loaded Confirmed. Role (public key or symmetric key) Unverified |
| User-Agent | Built-in default, slot unpatched | Confirmed |
| Sandbox profile (SBOX) | Unpatched; code checks for a { JSON start | Confirmed |
3000 and 8 | Literal defaults in the table | Stored Confirmed. Meaning (interval, jitter) Unverified |
| Tag to value mapping | For example BURI = C2 URL | Unverified (the URL is not inside the BURI slot) |
- When a config uses tagged placeholder slots, compare a patched and an unpatched slot. The padding style tells you which values the operator really set.
- Do not name a value by its neighbour. Here the C2 URL is loaded by code, not by a tag, so the tag meaning stays unverified.
《 7. C2, protocol and network indicators 》

Client-Id / X-Client-Id header names, the zh-CN Accept-Language value, and the "beacon first POST timeout" path.| Indicator | Value | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Transport | HTTPS via reqwest + rustls to hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 | Confirmed |
| Method / path | POST /api/v2/sync | Confirmed |
| Client header | X-Client-Id (also Client-Id, client-id) | Confirmed |
| Body | JSON envelope with keys from the HDRS template (requestHeaders, responseHeaders, actionKey, payloadKey, ...) | Confirmed (strings) / exact layout Unverified |
| User-Agent | Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) ... Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 | Confirmed |
| Accept-Language | zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 | Confirmed |
| Sleep | Sleep and jitter messages, 200 ms fast poll mode | Confirmed (strings) |
| Other transports of the framework | Operator text: the cascade bridge supports only TCP/WebSocket transport, "current HTTP transport unavailable" | Confirmed (strings). This build is the HTTP one. |
- A Windows browser User-Agent sent by a Linux process is a mismatch you can hunt on any proxy log.
《 8. XOR 0x5A string protection 》
Part of the string pool is stored XOR encoded with one byte, 0x5A. Spaces become z (0x20 ^ 0x5A = 0x7A), which is why the encoded pool looks like ?(z 3*z noise Confirmed.

Operator messages (Simplified Chinese, translated) say that token elevation, credential dumping (via Mimikatz), browser password theft and sensitive file search are not built into this implant and are offered through an "Extensions" plugin set Confirmed. ConPTY strings for Windows 10 1809 / Server 2019 sit in the same pool, so the framework has a Windows side Confirmed. The Windows implant itself is not in hand.
The same caller copies 32 raw bytes from 0x082afdc0 together with the decoded label es-hop-wire-v1 into a routine with 0x80 padding and a 64-byte block length, the shape of SHA-256 finalisation. This is consistent with a key derivation for the relay hop protocol Medium.
- Single-byte XOR leaves the text length unchanged and turns spaces into one repeated byte. Count the most frequent byte in a "random" string pool before you reach for a debugger.
《 9. Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks 》
The names belong to procname.rs. Real kernel threads have no user space executable, so any of these names with a valid /proc/<pid>/exe link is a strong host indicator Confirmed. The selection logic was not traced in this static pass Unverified.

sandbox_guard.rs: DMI vendor files, hypervisor names, systemd virtualization variable, resource limits and mouse activity on /dev/input/mice.The interactive shell prepares its environment with HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0 and set +H so shell history is not kept Confirmed.
- A sandbox that has no mouse and a small
/tmpis easy to detect. Give your dynamic lab realistic resources if you want to see the beacon run.
《 10. Implant overall design 》
The diagram below is drawn only from what the stager text and the l32 binary show. Each box is a module or a string set confirmed in chapters 2 to 9; flows marked between the implant and the C2 come from the config builder and the beacon references.
+------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | stager (sh / bash) | /file/<arch> | C2 + staging host | | writeablex probe |<----------------| hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 | | uname -s / uname -m | | /file/darwin_amd64 darwin_arm64 | | curl,wget,python3,py2 | | /file/l64 l32 a32 a64 l128 | +-----------+------------+ +----------------+-----------------+ | save as polkitd ^ | (macOS: hide, xattr -c, codesign) | v | +-----------+----------------------------------+ | | polkitd Rust EasyShell impl-core | | |----------------------------------------------| | POST /api/v2/sync | config !ES/<n>/<TAG>/ slots, C2 URL, | | X-Client-Id + JSON | 32-byte base64 value | | UA Chrome/131 (Win) | strings XOR 0x5A protected pool | | Accept-Language zh-CN | stealth procname [kworker/0:0] ... | | | guard sandbox_guard: DMI, VM names, | | | mouse, cpu/ram/uptime/tmp | | | uplink es-beacon-uplink ----------------|------------+ | sleep + jitter, 200ms fast poll | +-----------+----------------------------------+ | tasks from C2 (wire_dispatch, wire_chunk) v +-----------+------------------+ +------------------------------+ | task dispatcher |---------->| interactive PTY shell | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| plugin / script execution | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| file upload / download / zip | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| SOCKS5 + relay hops | | | | es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| outbound proxy | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| screenshot sidecar | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| process list / kill | | | +------------------------------+ | |---------->| delete self | +------------------------------+ +------------------------------+ not built in, "Extensions" set: privesc, Mimikatz, browser creds
- Draw the design from confirmed parts only. A box you cannot point to in the binary does not belong in the diagram.
《 11. Full list of impl-core modules 》
| Module path | Function (from module name and nearby strings) | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| interactive.rs | PTY shell (openpty, /bin/bash -il, zsh -i, /bin/sh) | Confirmed |
| plugin_exec/unix.rs, execute_gate.rs | Receives and runs native binaries and scripts ("[*] spawning native binary in isolated child") | Confirmed |
| download_xfer.rs, upload_worker.rs, folder_zip.rs, wire_chunk.rs | File transfer in chunks, folder archiving with a 4 GiB limit | Confirmed |
| socks_tunnel/* | SOCKS5 start/stop, multiplexed tunnels, relay hops (es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND), listen and forward labels | Confirmed |
| outbound_proxy.rs | Outbound via tcp/http/https/socks4/socks4a/socks5/socks5h proxy | Confirmed |
| screenshot_sidecar.rs | Screenshot through a helper; Linux path refuses without a display | Confirmed |
| svc_ops.rs, sysinfo.rs | Process list (Process Name, PPID, PID, Arch, User), kill, host info | Confirmed |
| delete_self.rs | Self delete (delete-self-1) | Confirmed |
| sandbox_guard.rs, sandbox_user.rs | Anti-VM and user presence checks (chapter 9) | Confirmed |
| crypto.rs | Uses AES, curve25519, SHA-2 crates; exact scheme | Unverified |
| (command marker) | !inj: platform string next to the PROXY slot: an injection command exists in the command set; what it does on Linux was not traced | Confirmed (string) / behaviour Unverified |
No mining code, no wallet, no stratum strings, no competitor killer, no spreader and no persistence routine were found in l32 Confirmed. This is a remote access implant, not a miner.
- Rust panic metadata keeps module file paths even in stripped builds. Use them as a free table of contents for the binary.
《 12. Infrastructure used by the attacker 》
One IP is used by the attacker in this case: it serves the stager, the seven payloads and the beacon. The other rows are context from the public record, with reverse DNS, ASN, prefix, AS name and country in the same line format.
192[.]3.31[.]148 | (PTR not collected) |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US | 192[.]3.31[.]219 | 192-3-31-219-host.colocrossing[.]com. |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US | 192[.]3.211[.]176 | (PTR not collected) |36352 | (not collected) | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US | 119[.]45.243[.]154 | (PTR not collected) |45090 | 119[.]45.0[.]0/16 | TENCENT-NET-AP | CN |
| IP (masked) | Role | Relation to this case | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 192[.]3.31[.]148 | Stager host, payload host and beacon C2 on tcp/8443 | This case | Confirmed |
| 192[.]3.211[.]176 | Reported by an OSINT note as a ThreatFox VShell C2 on tcp/19999, first seen 2026-04-15 | Same provider only. Entry not read for this post; a provider match is not an operator link | Unverified |
| 119[.]45.243[.]154 | December 2025 incident write-up: same writeablex stager template on tcp/8443 | Template context, different provider and time | Confirmed (write-up) / link Not supported |
- A shared ASN or a shared /22 is hosting context, not attribution. A shared TLS certificate, a shared URL route or a shared payload hash is a real link.
- Write the prefix next to the IP. Abuse reports and blocklists work on prefixes, and the prefix tells you whom to contact.
《 13. The 32-character constant 》
The string 8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw is a hard-coded constant used by one lazy initialiser Confirmed. It is not stored in the !ES/1/PASS/ slot; that slot holds no value in this build Confirmed. Its role (password, pre-shared key or other) is Unverified. Treat it as a sample-specific string for retro-hunting, not as a credential.
- Check where a value lives before you name it. A string near a slot tag is not automatically that slot value.
《 14. EasyShell public footprint versus this build 》
The OSINT notes pointed to a Chinese red team C2 framework called EasyShell. I read what was reachable and compared it with the l32 strings. Only what both sides show is used below.
■ 14.1 What the public pages show
| Statement | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| EasyShell is a red team C2 tool released in numbered versions; v1.9 fixed a heartbeat bug that made HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions unstable, fixed Linux builds made on a new Ubuntu that ran badly on old CentOS, and reworked the client | gm7.org v1.9 note, cn-sec.com mirror | Confirmed |
| Earlier release notes listed with it: v1.8 "client rebuilt, smaller size, better AV evasion" and v1.7 | Same v1.9 note | Confirmed |
| v1.9 demo covers client generation, screen monitoring and an autostart test | Same v1.9 note | Confirmed (claim in the note) |
| New versions go to a paid member circle together with the morelian WebShell manager and an AV evasion build of EasyTools; old versions are given on request | Same v1.9 note | Confirmed |
| Trial program for normal users: previous version only, one device for two days, reset by points | gm7.org trial note | Confirmed |
GitHub handle doki-byte publishes EasyTools and other offensive tooling | github.com/doki-byte | Confirmed |
EasyShell comes from the same developer ecosystem as doki-byte (tools bundled in the same member offer) | v1.9 note plus GitHub profile | High |
A README in a doki-byte/EasyShell repository credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt Strike as design references | OSINT note B; page not reachable for this post | Unverified |
■ 14.2 Match against l32
| Framework feature (public) | Seen in l32 | Confidence of match |
|---|---|---|
| Name EasyShell | easyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slots, ESCH prefix | Confirmed |
| Several listener transports (HTTP, DNS, KCP, plus TCP/WebSocket per OSINT note B) | Operator text naming TCP/WebSocket and HTTP transports; "redeploy latest listener payload"; this build is the HTTP one; no KCP and no DNS listener code | High |
| Client rebuilt and made smaller (v1.8) | Rust client, 3.77 MB static i386, built after 2026-04-14; Go client hint "go build, redeploy client" still present | Medium (language of v1.8 not stated in the page I read) |
| Linux build compatibility fix (v1.9) | l32 is statically linked, GCC 11.4 on Ubuntu 22.04 | Medium |
| Plugins outside the core | "Extensions" plugin set for elevation, credentials, browser passwords, file search | Confirmed |
| Screen monitoring | screenshot_sidecar.rs | Confirmed |
| Windows side | ConPTY strings | Confirmed |
| Autostart / persistence | No persistence routine in l32 | Not in this build |
Result: l32 is a client of the EasyShell red team framework sold and trialled through these channels High. The framework developer is a tool author. Who operates 192[.]3.31[.]148 is not known, and the trial and member distribution means it can be any user of the tool Confirmed.
- A commercial or trial red team kit found in the wild is a dual-use case. Separate three roles in your report: the tool author, the tool user (operator), and the victim.
- Match features both ways. A public feature you cannot see in the binary is a gap, not a contradiction, and a binary feature missing from the public notes is new information.
《 15. Payload set compared: all seven builds 》
After the first draft, the six other payloads served by the same C2 were collected and analysed statically: /file/l64, /file/l128, /file/a32, /file/a64, /file/darwin_amd64 and /file/darwin_arm64. All seven routes of the stager are now covered.
| Route | File type | Size | Toolchain | SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| l32 | ELF32 Intel 80386, static, stripped | 3,769,372 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.04 | fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4 |
| l64 | ELF64 x86-64, static-pie, stripped | 4,632,328 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 11.2.1 and 9.4.0 objects | c31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696 |
| l128 | ELF64 LoongArch, dynamic (glibc-style names, loader /lib/ld.so.1, see 15.2), stripped | 3,661,344 | rustc 1.96.0 (ac68faa20, 2026-05-25), GCC (GNU) 13.2.0 | 7fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6 |
| a32 | ELF32 ARM EABI5, static, stripped | 3,351,856 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.04 | 12b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf |
| a64 | ELF64 AArch64, static, stripped | 3,755,152 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 9.4.0 | d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4 |
| darwin_amd64 | Mach-O x86_64 PIE, ad-hoc signed | 4,072,800 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 10.15 | fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c |
| darwin_arm64 | Mach-O arm64 PIE, ad-hoc signed | 3,468,736 | rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 11.0 | b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf |
■ 15.1 One configuration in every build
All seven builds carry the same C2 (hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443), the same 32-byte base64 value, the same 32-character constant, the same /api/v2/sync path and the same !ES/ slot layout with UAGT and SBOX left unpatched Confirmed. The configuration was set once for this server Confirmed.
The builds were not compiled in one run: l128 was compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25), the other six with rustc 1.95.0 (2026-04-14), and four different C toolchains appear across the set Confirmed. With the tagged, padded !ES/ slots (chapter 6), this fits a builder that stamps the operator configuration into prebuilt client templates High. The compiler fingerprints then describe how the EasyShell developer builds the templates, not the machine of the operator Medium. Earlier drafts of this chapter said the set was built together; that is corrected here.
■ 15.2 Linux builds: x86-64, ARM and LoongArch
l64, l128, a32 and a64 have the same 27 impl-core module paths as l32, the same kworker name table, sandbox checks, XOR 0x5A pool and operator strings Confirmed. They are the same implant for other CPUs. The differences are in the toolchain: l64 is a static-pie build; a64 was linked with GCC 9.4.0 instead of the Ubuntu 22.04 GCC 11.4.0 of l32 and a32; l128 is the only dynamically linked build (glibc-style names, /lib/ld.so.1, GCC 13.2.0) and the only one compiled with rustc 1.96.0 Confirmed.
The l128 loader path /lib/ld.so.1, its libc.so NEEDED entry and its single GLIBC_2.0 version need do not match a real LoongArch glibc, which uses /lib64/ld-linux-loongarch-lp64d.so.1, libc.so.6 and GLIBC_2.36 or later Confirmed. This points to linking against generic stub libraries instead of a LoongArch sysroot, and on a stock Debian loong64 or Kylin host the file would likely fail to load unless matching links or a compatible loader exist Medium. The build may never have been tested on real hardware Unverified.
LoongArch (l128) is the CPU family of Loongson processors, used mainly in Chinese domestic computing platforms. Shipping a LoongArch client fits a Chinese red team product whose customers must cover those platforms Medium. It does not prove that this operator targets hosts in China Unverified.
■ 15.3 macOS builds

![darwin payloads :: macOS-only behaviour [static] darwin payloads :: macOS-only behaviour [static]](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPOkS3LC9YUVrp7qvl1NDv92e-FB3zM6nnrh_ZnNJDomVf6XdTDAg0KOOTzy4Jabn-MdOGRmRIBTCRDX1q4KwjYvmUAWNeznmhCiXXzLmI6mD135kBGTR-nqhNAvNJWt4aiIsJmlvMnA4M6DTRii4grICiFzI6WBGgPAZVWSq0NstMC_2VgvkfnYhDTs0/s1600/image.png)
| Item | macOS builds | Linux builds | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Source path prefix | /c/impl-core/src/ (28 paths) | crates/impl-core/src/ (27 paths) | Confirmed |
| Screenshot | Built in: screenshot/mod.rs, scale.rs, runs /usr/sbin/screencapture -x -t png (silent); string XOR protected | Helper process (screenshot_sidecar.rs), refuses without a display | Confirmed |
| User presence check | sandbox_mouse.rs: osascript asks "System Events" for the mouse position | /dev/input/mice | Confirmed |
| Process name masquerade | None (procname.rs absent) | Eleven kworker-style names | Confirmed |
| Host information | sysctlbyname: hw.model, hw.machine, hw.cpufrequency; IOKit and SystemConfiguration linked | /proc and DMI files | Confirmed |
| Process listing | ps with a 12 s timeout and an operator hint that macOS TCC may block it ("grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once") | /proc | Confirmed |
| Shell | zsh -i / bash -il with BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1 | /bin/bash -il, /bin/sh | Confirmed |
| Persistence | No LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon strings | None | Confirmed |
| Code signature | Ad-hoc (CodeDirectory flags 0x2), no Team ID, identifier http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID> | n/a | Confirmed |
The signature identifier shows the binary was linked under the name http-beacon-implant and signed without any developer identity Confirmed. The stager re-signs the file on the host (codesign --force --sign -), so the identifier on a victim may differ from the one served Unverified.
On current macOS, a screen capture and an AppleScript call to System Events by an unknown binary are subject to TCC privacy permissions (Screen Recording, Automation). The developer message about TCC shows the author expects that friction Confirmed. For defenders this is useful: TCC prompts or denials for a binary named polkitd in a user cache folder are a detection point Medium.
■ 15.4 What the payload set changes in this report
- The C2, key and constant are confirmed for all seven builds; the IOC and YARA content covers all seven.
- The macOS client is built for a Mac with a logged-in user: silent screenshots and a mouse-based presence check. Together with both darwin builds being live on the C2, Macs are in scope of this campaign (18.2, 18.3).
- Template builds come from several toolchains (Ubuntu 22.04 GCC, separate ARM64 and LoongArch toolchains, Apple linker with SDK 15.2), all with the USTC cargo mirror; l128 was rebuilt with a newer rustc after 2026-05-25 Confirmed.
- When a stager serves several builds, collect them all. Shared config values prove one operator setup; platform-specific modules show what the operator wants on each platform.
- On macOS, read the load commands and the code signature before the code. Minimum OS, SDK, linked frameworks and the signature identifier tell you how and where the binary was built.
《 16. What static analysis alone cannot dissect 》
- All seven payloads were analysed statically; none was executed, so runtime behaviour (for example the AppleScript and TCC paths on macOS) is described from strings and code references only.
- The stager execution tail (after the execute-permission line) is not in the screenshot.
- The TLS certificate on port 8443 was not collected.
- No Windows EasyShell implant, no Extensions plugin and no Go server or client component are in hand.
- The crypto scheme behind the 32-byte value and the
!inj:command path were not traced. - The EasyShell server side (admin console, listeners, notification features) is described only by OSINT notes and cannot be checked from l32.
No sample was executed or emulated: this report is static by policy. The questions below need a dynamic lab (fake network, QEMU user mode or a VM) or deeper control-flow tracing, and stay open until then:
- How
procname.rspicks one of the eleven kernel-thread names, and whether it renames throughprctl(PR_SET_NAME),argv[0]or both. - The key derivation and framing behind the 32-byte base64 value,
crypto.rsand thees-hop-wire-v1relay handshake. - What
sandbox_guard.rsdoes when a DMI, hypervisor or/dev/input/micecheck fails: silent exit, sleep or decoy behaviour. - Whether the rustls
NoVerifiername is wired into a client configuration that skips certificate checks, or is only a library enum name. - What the
!inj:command does on Linux.
These are listed as gaps, not as expectations. Any update will be added as an addendum.
《 17. Cross review of the reverse engineering notes and final call 》
I wrote four static analysis notes on the samples (#1 to #4), each from a different angle and with different tools, and two OSINT notes (A and B, written at different times). To stay self-critical I used my analysis claim-check playbook: every claim that changes the conclusion is checked below against the sample and the sources I could read. The objective is a verdict as objective as possible, with clear reasoning.
■ 17.1 Claim check
| Claim | Raised by | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stager is an installer, not an uninstaller | #2, #3, #4 | Confirmed | Script text |
| Stager is a "miner" dropper | #1, #2 | Not supported | No miner logic in the script; l32 has no mining code |
| Stager follows the VShell stager template | #1, #3, #4, A | High | Trellix, incident write-up, NVISO labels |
VShell serves exactly /file/<arch> incl. l128 | #3 | Not supported | Public material shows ?a=l64&stage=true and d64/m64; /file/ and l128 not documented |
| Payload is VShell | #1 | Not supported | l32 is Rust; VShell clients are Go (NVISO, GTIG) |
| Payload is a Rust EasyShell beacon implant | #2, #3, #4 | Confirmed | Crate paths, config slots, beacon strings |
| Related to Kinsing / SystemTen | #1, #2 | Not supported | No Kinsing markers in stager or payload |
GTIG documented polkitd masquerade in SNOWLIGHT/VShell | #1, #3 | Not supported | GTIG shows polkitd as the argument of COMPOOD (file /tmp/vim), not VShell |
| C2 port 8443 uses a self-signed certificate | #3 | Unverified | Only inferred from -k flags; certificate not collected |
| MalwareBazaar hash and HPE Mach-O VShell spike as correlation | #3 | Unverified | Not checked against the cited sources |
!ES/1/PASS/ = 8M5c7faX... | #3 | Not supported | PASS slot empty; constant used elsewhere (chapter 13) |
!ES/8/BURI/ = C2 URL | #3 | Unverified | URL loaded by code from a separate field |
| XOR 0x5A string protection | #3, #4 | Confirmed | Decoder at 0x080b2721 |
| TLS validation explicitly disabled in the implant | #3 | Unverified | NoVerifier/IgnoreHostnames are library enum names; the code path was not traced |
| Chinese language build environment | #2, #3, #4 | High | USTC mirror, zh-CN header, Chinese operator text |
| Kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox, history suppression | #3, #4 | Confirmed | Tables and strings in chapter 9 |
| IP and implant markers not in public reporting | #1 to #4, A, B | Medium | Search engines and the pages reachable on 2026-11-20 |
| Neighbour 192[.]3.31[.]219 is old AgentTesla hosting, unrelated | A | Confirmed | URLhaus host page |
| 192[.]3.211[.]176:19999 is a ThreatFox VShell C2 on the same provider | A | Unverified | Entry not read; even if true, provider match only |
| Chinese "EasyShell" red team tool is a different Go implementation | A | Partly | The red team EasyShell exists; the l32 strings match it (chapter 14), so "different" is not supported |
EasyShell is a Chinese red team C2 framework linked to doki-byte | B | High | v1.9 and trial notes, GitHub profile (chapter 14) |
| README credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt Strike | B | Unverified | Repository page not reachable |
| Stager is the native EasyShell stager, not a mash-up | B | Unverified | Rests on the README claim; stager routes are not inside l32 |
| HTTP and DNS listeners added on 2026-10-24 | B | Not supported | The v1.9 note already fixes HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions |
| v1.8 rebuilt the client in Rust, 10 MB to 2 MB | B | Partly | Client rebuild and smaller size confirmed; Rust and the sizes not in the page I read |
| 15-minute temporary staging listener explains why scanners missed the C2 | B | Not supported | Feature not verified; scanner silence does not prove a closed port |
| Default admin console on tcp/58090 with Basic auth | B | Unverified | Server side; not checkable from l32; not used as a pivot here |
| Extensions plugins load from the implant directory | B | Partly | Extensions plugin set confirmed in l32; directory and auto-load not |
| Linux user-mode hiding plugin, "likely LD_PRELOAD" | B | Unverified | No hiding code in l32; mechanism is a guess |
| SMTP, WeCom and DingTalk notifications | B | Unverified | Server side; nothing in l32 |
| Built with AI help; bypasses named AV products | B | Unverified | Developer claims, not testable here |
| Operators will combine it with Redis or cloud key abuse | B | Not supported | Prediction, removed from this report |
The confirmed and high-confidence results of this review are the ones listed in 1.1.
■ 17.2 Not established
- Who operates the C2. The tool author is not assumed to be the operator. The intruder of the chapter 29 host ran the stager from this C2, which does not name the operator either.
- Initial access vector. The threat is new and its traffic is limited; the way it is distributed may still leave traces that lead analysts to similar threats.
- Role of the 32-byte base64 value and of the 32-character constant.
- Any second C2 node, leaked source code or paste for this implant: none found on 2026-11-20.
■ 17.3 Naming: Linux/EasyShell
The family is named after the strings the author left in the build: easyshell-http-beacon-implant, the !ES/ slot tags and ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS. "ESCH" is kept as an alias because it appears in the operator messages (ESCH chunk:); its expansion is not known Unverified. "VShell" is used only for the stager template, and "strain" is not used because no parent family is proven.
The name EasyShell is also used by unrelated, legitimate software. None of them is a Rust beacon and none shares the implant crate names Confirmed:
| Project (public) | What it is | Link to this implant |
|---|---|---|
| oyzh1994/easyshell | Cross-platform multi-protocol client (SSH, SFTP, RDP, VNC, Redis, ...) | None found |
| 3th1nk/easyshell | Go library for interactive shell over SSH/Telnet | None found |
| easyshell-ai/easyshell | Server operations platform with agents and web terminal | None found |
| anb0s/EasyShell | Eclipse plugin (discontinued) | None found |
| methodox EasyShell (easy) | C# scripting language for build automation | None found |
| tiandi0716/EasyShell, gitee easyshell | SSH / SFTP / RDP desktop clients | None found |
easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core or !ES/9/UAGT/. The word "easyshell" alone returns the projects above.- A cross review is not a vote. One note with evidence beats three notes repeating the same first impression.
- Reject inference written as fact, even when it sounds plausible. "Scanners did not see it, so the port closed after 15 minutes" is a story, not evidence.
《 18. CTI: Threat model 》
| Field | Value | Supporting text |
|---|---|---|
| Threat | Linux/EasyShell (alias ESCH) | Rust HTTPS beacon client of the EasyShell red team C2 framework (chapter 14) |
| Category | Remote access implant (dual-use red team kit used in the wild) | No mining, no spreader, no ransomware code in l32 |
| Platforms | Linux x86, x86_64, ARM, ARM64, LoongArch; macOS Intel and Apple Silicon | Stager targets; all seven payloads analysed statically (chapter 15) |
| Delivery | Shell stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch> | Needs a shell command on the target; entry point not observed |
| C2 | HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync on tcp/8443 | Chapter 7 |
| Objective | Interactive control, file transfer, tunnelling into the network, plugins for credentials | Capabilities, not observed actions |
| Victims | One compromised host (chapter 29) | No victim is visible in the stager, the payloads or the C2 distribution. Hot forensics of one compromised host (chapter 29) shows an intruder who ran this stager and handled data whose origin and relation to this case are unknown. |
| Impact | High | Full remote shell with root when the stager ran as root, plus SOCKS and relay pivot into internal networks |
| Likelihood | Not measurable from one sample | Exposure grows with the tool distribution (trial and member model confirmed) |
■ 18.1 What the campaign aims at
Only the capabilities are proven; the intent behind this C2 is not. The l32 command set is built for a person at the keyboard: PTY shell, file upload and download, folder archiving, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, outbound proxy, screenshot, process control, and plugins for credential dumping and browser passwords. There is no miner, no DDoS module, no ransomware and no spreader Confirmed. The aim class is therefore hands-on access: collect data and credentials and pivot into internal networks from a foothold High.
| Reading | Fits the evidence because | Against it / missing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Criminal or espionage operator using a commercial kit | Access and pivot toolset; credential plugins; hosting on a cheap VPS provider | No victim, no data theft observed | Unverified |
| Access broker (sell or hand over footholds) | Tunnels and relay hops keep access usable for others | No marketplace or resale evidence | Unverified |
| Authorized red team engagement | EasyShell is sold as a red team tool; one C2, no observed harm | Served openly to anyone who requested the stager | Unverified |
■ 18.2 Why macOS is in scope
The stager handles macOS with care, and its own comments (translated) explain why: it uses the user-level ~/Library/Caches folder because no root is needed and Finder hides it; it clears extended attributes so the file still runs "even if it was delivered by a browser or AirDrop"; and it ad-hoc signs the file because "Apple Silicon requires executables to carry a valid signature", skipping the step when Xcode Command Line Tools are missing "so no install prompt pops up" Confirmed.
| Reading | Evidence | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| R1: the macOS branch is part of the framework generic deployment one-liner, written for every client build | Generic wording ("any darwin payload", browser or AirDrop delivery that has nothing to do with this curl download); the framework also has a Windows side, so client builds exist for several platforms | Medium |
| R2: the operator keeps Macs in scope, in particular Macs with a user in front of them (developer and admin machines) | Both darwin builds are live on the C2 and the stager routes Darwin hosts to them; care to avoid a visible prompt; the macOS client takes silent screenshots and checks mouse movement through AppleScript (chapter 15); Linux and macOS together fit developer and DevOps estates | High (in scope) / Unverified (Macs as the main target) |
Both readings are true at the same time: the framework makes a macOS client available (R1), and this operator chose to keep it live on the server (R2). Hosting a payload is an operator decision even when a builder generates it. What one server cannot show is whether Macs are the main target or one platform among all of them; macOS EDR telemetry for ~/Library/Caches/polkitd and TCC prompts naming it would answer that. Chapter 23.8 lists the October and November 2026 vectors that can reach Linux and macOS together.
■ 18.3 Practical macOS infection chain
Nothing in the stager or the clients exploits macOS. The Mac is infected when one shell command runs as the user; from there each step below is in the stager text or the darwin binaries.
[0] Entry not observed: Terminal paste lure | poisoned dev package | operator over SSH | (stolen keys, or pivot through a Linux foothold SOCKS/relay tunnel) [1] Fetch one-liner pulls the stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (TLS checks off) | [2] Place uname -s = Darwin -> cd ~/Library/Caches (no root, hidden in Finder) | [3] Select uname -m -> /file/darwin_arm64 or /file/darwin_amd64 saved as polkitd | curl download carries no quarantine flag [4] Prepare chflags hidden -> xattr -c -> codesign --force --sign - (only if Xcode CLT exists) | [5] Run chmod +x, start (launch line cut off in the screenshot) | [6] Check sysctl hw.model, AppleScript mouse position via System Events | [7] Beacon HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync X-Client-Id | [8] Operate zsh shell, files, folder zip, screencapture -x, SOCKS/relay, plugins | [9] Persist none in the client: gone at logout or reboot unless the operator adds it
| Step | Evidence | Confidence | Where defenders can see it |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 Entry | Not in the artifacts; the routes are the ones that give a user shell on a Mac | Unverified | Terminal history, browser history of the lure page, package install logs, SSH auth logs |
| 1 to 4 | Stager lines 10 to 67 | Confirmed | Unified log and EDR process events for curl, chflags, xattr, codesign with polkitd; Sigma rule in the pack |
| 3 Quarantine | A file fetched by curl has no com.apple.quarantine attribute, so the Gatekeeper first-launch check that keys on it does not apply; the stager clears attributes anyway | High | Executable without quarantine in a user Caches folder |
| 4 Signature | Both darwin files are already ad-hoc signed as served, so the re-sign step is a safety net | Confirmed | Signature identifier http-beacon-implant-* or a re-signed polkitd without Team ID |
| 6 Check | osascript and sysctl strings in the client; runtime behaviour of the AppleScript query not tested | Confirmed (strings) | osascript child of polkitd; Automation prompt for System Events |
| 8 Screenshots | screencapture -x -t png; macOS asks for Screen Recording permission before a full capture | Confirmed / permission High | Screen Recording prompt or TCC log entry naming the binary or its parent terminal |
| 8 Process list | Operator hint: TCC may block it, "grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once" | Confirmed | Full Disk Access requests in TCC logs |
What the TCC hint tells us about the launch. On macOS, a program started from a Terminal session is normally checked against the privacy permissions of that terminal app. A developer who writes "run from Terminal once" expects the client to be started from an interactive Terminal or SSH session Medium. That fits the Terminal paste lure and the operator over SSH better than a silent drive-by. It also means the first AppleScript or screen capture can raise a visible prompt such as "Terminal wants to control System Events", which a careful user or an MDM log can catch Medium.
What they gain on a Mac. Developer and admin Macs hold source code, SSH keys, cloud tokens and VPN access. With no persistence in the client, the pattern that fits is a short hands-on session: take keys and tokens, look at the screen, then move to servers through the tunnels Medium.
- On macOS, ask first how the first command ran. A kit without an exploit still works on a Mac if a user or an SSH session runs one line.
- Quarantine, signature and TCC are separate controls. Check each one in your logs: missing quarantine, ad-hoc signature without Team ID, and TCC prompts naming an unknown binary.
- Capabilities tell you what an implant can do, not what its operator wants. Write the aim as a capability class and keep intent as a separate, rated reading.
- Comments left in a stager often explain design choices. Read them as the developer voice, not as campaign intelligence.
《 19. CTI: Actors and attribution 》
| Item | Value | Evidence | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tool | EasyShell red team C2 framework | Build strings plus public release notes | High |
| Tool developer | Developer ecosystem around GitHub handle doki-byte | Bundled member offer with EasyTools and morelian | High |
| Tool distribution | WeChat channels, trial program, paid member circle | v1.9 and trial notes | Confirmed |
| Operator of 192[.]3.31[.]148 | Unknown | Any trial or member user can run the kit | Unverified |
| Language environment | Chinese (Simplified) | Operator text, zh-CN header, USTC mirror, stager comments | Confirmed |
| Intruder of the chapter 29 host | Ran the stager from 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (history line 333) | Shell history of the compromised host | Confirmed (fetch and run) / Medium (same operator or affiliate) |
| Named threat group | None | No overlap with a reported group beyond the shared VShell stager template | Unverified |
■ 19.1 Analyst note on the "doki-byte" link
■ 19.2 Diamond model
[ ADVERSARY ]
operator unknown (EasyShell user)
tool from the doki-byte ecosystem
/ \
/ \
[ CAPABILITY ] [ INFRASTRUCTURE ]
EasyShell Rust implant 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443
VShell-template stager AS36352 HostPapa / ColoCrossing
\ /
\ /
[ VICTIM ]
internet-facing Linux / macOS hosts (none observed)
■ 19.3 Source reliability and information credibility (Admiralty code)
| Statement | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Stager behaviour, l32 code and strings | Own static analysis of the artifacts | A1 |
| VShell stager template | Trellix, NVISO, incident write-up | B2 |
| EasyShell versions, listeners, trial and member model | gm7.org and cn-sec.com copies of the developer notes | B2 |
| doki-byte repositories | GitHub profile | A2 |
| README contents, admin port, 15-minute listener, notification channels | OSINT note B, source not reachable | C6 |
| 192[.]3.211[.]176 VShell entry | OSINT note A citing ThreatFox, not read | B6 |
| 192[.]3.31[.]219 AgentTesla history | URLhaus host page | A1 |
- Grade the source and the information separately. A good source can carry an unchecked claim, and that is what the 6 means.
《 20. CTI: Timeline and related public research 》
Legend: blue = public VShell research, purple = public EasyShell framework notes, red = October 2026 vulnerability wave (context, see 20.1), yellow = this analysis. Only dated, sourced events are listed.
Trellix documents the VShell stage-2 downloader with PATH extension and the
writeablex probe. (Trellix)NVISO publishes VShell decoding research with the short architecture labels (l64, l32, a64, a32, d64, m64). (NVISO)
Same
writeablex stager template seen after React2Shell exploitation, older ?a=l64&stage=true URL form, tcp/8443, random payload name. (iYoRoy write-up)Six client templates (l32, l64, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) compiled with rustc 1.95.0 (released 2026-04-14), crates from the USTC mirror. (
.comment, cargo paths)LoongArch template (l128) compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25). (l128
.comment)EasyShell v1.9 note: HTTP, DNS and KCP listener fixes, Linux build fix, client rework; lists v1.8 (client rebuilt, smaller) and v1.7. (gm7.org)
PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) found with AI help by Calif, OpenAI and Wiz; reported for coordinated disclosure. (Wikipedia: PHP2Shell)
EasyShell trial program announced for normal users. (gm7.org)
GTIG data: CVE disclosures doubled in 2026; half of the flaws it rates as likely AI-found lead to remote code execution. (Help Net Security)
First PHP2Shell exploitation attempt seen by AWS, four days before the fix. (Datadog Security Labs)
PHP fixes released; honeypot exploitation observed the same day; 1,187 source IPs sent PHP2Shell requests from 21 to 25 October. (watchTowr, CrowdSec)
Suspected China-nexus actor chains PHP2Shell with the Fragnesia kernel flaw (CVE-2026-46300), roots 25 servers, plants web shells. (The Register on Dream research)
CISA adds both PHP2Shell CVEs to KEV. (Tenable)
Storm-3358 uses the ARTEX agentic framework and deploys RATs including vshell (a different tool from EasyShell). (Microsoft)
SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) added to KEV (chapter 23). (CISA KEV)
Stager with
/file/<arch> routes, Darwin and LoongArch targets, and the l32 payload collected from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443. (this case)No public report, paste, code repository or second C2 found for the implant strings, the routes or the IP. (MMD search pass)
■ 20.1 Hypothesis check: did Linux/EasyShell ride the October 2026 vulnerability wave?
Hypothesis tested: the October 2026 wave of AI-found vulnerabilities, starting with the PHP mass exposure (PHP2Shell), was taken by the EasyShell operator as the chance to start this campaign. I tested it against three readings, in ACH style, with only sourced or sample-based evidence.
| Reading | Statement |
|---|---|
| H1 | The campaign started with the wave, PHP2Shell first (early or late October 2026). |
| H2 | The kit is used during the wave as one of several entry options; start date unknown. |
| H3 | The campaign is unrelated to the wave (other entry, or it predates October). |
| # | Evidence | Source | H1 | H2 | H3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The EasyShell framework was versioned and offered in trial before the wave (indexed by June and August 2026) | Chapter 14 | 0 | + | + |
| 2 | l32 was compiled after 2026-04-14; no upper bound on the build date | l32 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | The C2 was seen on 2026-11-19; no earlier public sighting of the IP, routes, hash or strings | This case | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | The stager falls back to /tmp without root and writes to /usr/bin with root: it fits a web-server RCE, but also any shell access | Stager | + | + | + |
| 5 | The stager also targets macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon) and LoongArch; PHP2Shell targets are web servers, so a PHP-only start does not explain these targets | Stager | − | + | + |
| 6 | Public PHP2Shell post-exploitation reports describe Mirai and booter bots, a Go agent, web shells, reverse-shell loops and scripts; none names EasyShell, this C2, polkitd or /file/<arch> | Ellio, Karimi honeypot, SOCRadar, Dream | − | 0 | + |
| 7 | Chinese-speaking operators did exploit PHP2Shell, and other actors deployed VShell-class RATs during October | Dream, Microsoft | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | The Chrome 131 Windows User-Agent built into l32 also appears in PHP2Shell scan traffic; it is a common default string | F5 Labs | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | No victim, no web logs and no process tree exist for this case, so the entry point cannot be tested | This case | 0 | 0 | 0 |
■ 20.2 What would confirm or reject the hypothesis
- Web server logs from a victim showing PHP2Shell-style multipart requests (hundreds of empty fields, deep nested names, upload-progress field) followed within minutes by a fetch of
/file/<arch>. - A process tree
apache2/httpd/php-fpm→sh→curl -korwget --no-check-certificateto the C2 (Sigma rule added to the pack, chapter 27). - First-seen dates for 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 in scan, certificate or passive DNS history: a first sighting before October weakens H1, a first sighting after 21 October supports it.
- First-submission dates of the seven payload hashes in malware repositories.
- Honeypot captures that carry the
writeablexprobe or the/file/routes in an exploit body.
- Two events in the same month are a timeline overlap, not a cause. Write the hypothesis, list what would disprove it, then look for that first.
- An evidence row that fits every reading has no diagnostic value. Keep it in the table, but do not count it as support.
■ 20.3 What this post adds to the public reports
- First public analysis of an EasyShell client binary: config slots, beacon protocol, XOR 0x5A pool, module list, anti-sandbox and masquerade.
- First public link between the EasyShell red team framework and an in-the-wild C2 and stager.
- A VShell-template stager variant with
/file/routes, LoongArch and macOS Gatekeeper handling. - YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery and STIX content for the stager and the implant.
《 21. CTI: Kill chain of the attack scheme 》
[1] Reconnaissance not observed | [2] Weaponization builder patches !ES slots, EasyShell impl-core per arch | [3] Delivery hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch> | [4] Exploitation entry point not observed (see chapter 23) | [5] Installation /usr/bin/polkitd or ~/Library/Caches/polkitd (hidden, quarantine cleared, ad-hoc signed) | [6] C2 POST /api/v2/sync X-Client-Id, kworker name, anti-sandbox | [7] Actions on Obj. shell, plugins, file transfer, SOCKS/relay, screenshot, self delete
| Phase | This case | Where to break the chain |
|---|---|---|
| Delivery | curl/wget/python with TLS checks off to a raw IP on tcp/8443 | Egress filtering for servers; alert on downloads from raw IPs; block /file/<arch> routes at the proxy |
| Exploitation | Not observed | Patch the internet-facing services in chapter 22; remove shell access from web service accounts |
| Installation | Root writes into /usr/bin; macOS quarantine removed | File integrity monitoring on system bin directories; package verification (rpm -Va, debsums); MDM rule for ad-hoc signed binaries in Caches |
| C2 | HTTPS beacon with a Windows browser UA from a Linux host | TLS inspection or JA3/JA4 baselines; proxy rule for /api/v2/sync plus X-Client-Id |
| Actions | Tunnels and plugins | Block outbound SOCKS and unusual listeners; EDR on child processes of fake kernel threads |
《 22. CTI: TTP — MITRE ATT&CK matrix 》
Only techniques seen in the stager text or the l32 binary are mapped.
Stager script; PTY shell in
interactive.rsosascript mouse check in the macOS clientpolkitd file name; eleven kernel-thread process nameschflags hidden on macOSxattr -c and ad-hoc codesignDMI, hypervisor names, resources; sysctl hw.model on macOS
/dev/input/mice on Linux; AppleScript mouse position on macOSXOR 0x5A string pool
delete_self.rsHISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0Process list in
svc_ops.rssysinfo.rs, uname in the stagerscreenshot_sidecar.rs on Linux; silent screencapture -x on macOSFolder zip in
folder_zip.rsHTTPS POST
/api/v2/sync/file/<arch> downloads; plugin deliverySOCKS5, relay hops, outbound proxy
HTTPS on tcp/8443
■ 22.1 Framework techniques not seen in l32
| Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Credential dumping, token elevation, browser passwords (T1003, T1134, T1555.003) | Offered through the Extensions plugin set per operator text; plugins not in hand |
| Process injection (T1055) | !inj: command marker only; behaviour not traced |
| Persistence (autostart) | Mentioned in the v1.9 demo; no routine in l32 |
《 23. CTI: Targeted vulnerabilities and weaknesses 》
■ 23.1 Weaknesses abused in this case
| Weakness | How it is abused | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Shell access as root on a server | Stager writes into /usr/bin after the writable probe | Stager lines 1 to 8 |
| Unrestricted server egress | Payload download and beacon to a raw IP on tcp/8443 | Stager URLs, config C2 |
| TLS verification off in download tools | curl -k, wget no-check, python unverified context | Stager lines 46 to 48 |
| macOS quarantine can be removed by the user context | xattr -c and ad-hoc signing | Stager lines 53 to 67 |
| Process names are not verified | Kernel-thread names on a user process | Chapter 9 |
■ 23.2 Vulnerability triage (October to November 2026)
Triage method, matrix and score breakdown (23.3 to 23.7)
■ 23.3 Selection rules
- Published, or added to KEV, from 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-19.
- Outcome is code or command execution on a Linux or Unix server, or a login shell.
- Windows-only, client-side and appliance-only flaws are left out (example: Cisco Expressway CVE-2026-76466, a root RCE on an appliance, does not match the generic
unamebased stager).
■ 23.4 Weight model (100 points)
| Check item | Weight | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| CISA KEV | 25 | Listed = 25, not listed at check = 0 |
| Exploitation report outside KEV | 10 | Vendor, CERT or MDR statement of in-the-wild use = 10 |
| CVSS base | 10 | 9.0 and above = 10, 7.0 to 8.9 = 6, not collected = 0 (highest published score used) |
| EPSS (FIRST) | 15 | 10% and above = 15, 1% to 10% = 10, 0.1% to 1% = 5, not collected = 0 |
| SSVC (CISA Vulnrichment) | 10 | Automatable yes = 5, Technical Impact total = 5, not collected = 0 |
| Fit to this threat | 20 | High = 20, medium = 10, post-access = 5 |
| Pre-authentication | 10 | No privileges or credentials needed = 10 |
| CWE / EUVD / CWSS / CSAF | 0 | Recorded as checklist fields, not scored (identifiers and advisory format, not risk signals) |
■ 23.5 Triage matrix
| # | CVE | EUVD | Product | CWE | CVSS | EPSS | CISA KEV | SSVC | CWSS | CSAF | Fit to this threat | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole) | n/c | OpenSSH sshd < 10.6p2 on musl Linux without PAM (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt) | CWE-394 (Red Hat: CWE-303) | 8.1 (v3.1) | 16.5% (FIRST, 2026-11-10) | 2026-11-09 | Expl. active, Auto no, Total | n/c | Red Hat not-affected statement (VEX: verify) | High: Linux servers and containers, unauth shell login; watchTowr reported botnet and miner use | 91 |
| 2 | CVE-2026-90436 | EUVD-2026-118323 | Apache Axis 1.x (Confluence DC Remote API, N-able N-central) | CWE-470 | 9.8 (CISA ADP v3.1) / 9.3 (Atlassian v4.0) | 0.57% | 2026-11-18 | Expl. none*, Auto yes, Total | n/c | verify | High: Linux Java servers, unauth RCE, Rapid7 MDR saw exploitation 2026-11-13 | 90 |
| 3 | CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell) | n/c | PHP 8.2 to 8.5 core | CWE-1419, CWE-824, CWE-1325 (CNA) | 9.2 (PHP v4.0) / 9.8 (v3.1) | >96th percentile (value n/c) | 2026-10-26 | n/c | n/c | verify | High: PHP web servers on Linux, unauth | 75 |
| 4 | CVE-2026-90817 | n/c | REDCap >= 13.3.0 | CWE-94, CWE-73 | 9.8 (v3.1) | n/c | 2026-11-18 | n/c | n/c | verify | Medium: needs a valid public survey hash; Unit 42 tracked an XMRig campaign through it (2026-10-07) | 65 |
| 5 | CVE-2026-102895 | n/c | GPUStack | n/c | 9.8 | n/c | 2026-11-09 | n/c | n/c | verify | Medium: Linux AI inference hosts; unauth admin access to code execution; in-the-wild report credited in the advisory | 65 |
| 6 | CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset) | EUVD-2026-123532 | Apache httpd 2.4.55 to 2.4.70, mod_http2 | CWE-362, CWE-20 | 9.8 (Red Hat) / 8.1 (CSA, CISA) | 1.5% to 1.6% | not listed at check | n/c | n/c | Red Hat RHEL packages listed (CSAF VEX: verify) | High: Linux web servers with HTTP/2; Singapore CSA reported exploitation 2026-11-17 | 60 |
| 7 | CVE-2026-106931 | n/c | SiteGuard Server Edition (host WAF in Apache, Nginx, IIS) | CWE-78 | 7.8 (v3.0) / 8.5 (JVN v4.0, local, PR:L) | 0.66% (51st pct) | 2026-10-20 | n/c | n/c | JVN#88474777 | Medium: root command execution on Linux web servers, widely used in Japan; local vector per JVN | 56 |
| 8 | CVE-2026-115731 | EUVD-2026-116495 | Puppet Server / OpenVox (report deserialization) | CWE-502, CWE-94 | 9.4 (v4.0, PR:L) | 0.37% | 2026-11-17 | Expl. none*, Auto no, Total | n/c | Red Hat CVE page (verify) | Medium: Linux management servers; needs an agent certificate (autosign can expose it) | 55 |
| 9 | CVE-2026-116779 | n/c | SignalWire FreeSWITCH | n/c | 9.8 | n/c | 2026-11-09 | n/c | n/c | verify | Medium: Linux VoIP servers, command execution | 45 |
| 10 | CVE-2026-129448 | n/c | Apache Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 (XML-RPC) | CWE-502 | 9.8 (v3.1) | not yet scored | not listed at check | n/c | n/c | verify | Medium: Java blog servers, unauth; ASF confirmed exploitation | 40 |
| 11 | CVE-2026-46300 | n/c | Linux kernel (local) | n/c | n/c | n/c | 2026-10-28 | n/c | n/c | verify | Post-access only: privilege escalation after a foothold (lets the stager write into /usr/bin) | 30 |
n/c = not collected in this pass. * SSVC "Exploitation none" is the pre-KEV Vulnrichment value; the KEV listing supersedes it. CWSS: no published CWSS score exists for these CVEs, so the column stays open for your own weakness scoring. CSAF: "verify" means check the vendor or distribution CSAF/VEX feed (for example Red Hat security data) before relying on it. EPSS values move daily and the sources disagree for SSHole (0.98% to 18.9% depending on date); the FIRST value of 2026-11-10 is used.Same matrix, one block per CVE (for narrow screens)
CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole) Score 91- EUVD: n/c
- Product: OpenSSH sshd < 10.6p2 on musl Linux without PAM (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt)
- CWE: CWE-394 (Red Hat: CWE-303)
- CVSS: 8.1 (v3.1)
- EPSS: 16.5% (FIRST, 2026-11-10)
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
- SSVC: Expl. active, Auto no, Total
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: Red Hat not-affected statement (VEX: verify)
- Fit to this threat: High: Linux servers and containers, unauth shell login; watchTowr reported botnet and miner use
CVE-2026-90436 Score 90- EUVD: EUVD-2026-118323
- Product: Apache Axis 1.x (Confluence DC Remote API, N-able N-central)
- CWE: CWE-470
- CVSS: 9.8 (CISA ADP v3.1) / 9.3 (Atlassian v4.0)
- EPSS: 0.57%
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-18
- SSVC: Expl. none*, Auto yes, Total
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: High: Linux Java servers, unauth RCE, Rapid7 MDR saw exploitation 2026-11-13
CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell) Score 75- EUVD: n/c
- Product: PHP 8.2 to 8.5 core
- CWE: CWE-1419, CWE-824, CWE-1325 (CNA)
- CVSS: 9.2 (PHP v4.0) / 9.8 (v3.1)
- EPSS: >96th percentile (value n/c)
- CISA KEV: 2026-10-26
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: High: PHP web servers on Linux, unauth
CVE-2026-90817 Score 65- EUVD: n/c
- Product: REDCap >= 13.3.0
- CWE: CWE-94, CWE-73
- CVSS: 9.8 (v3.1)
- EPSS: n/c
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-18
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: Medium: needs a valid public survey hash; Unit 42 tracked an XMRig campaign through it (2026-10-07)
CVE-2026-102895 Score 65- EUVD: n/c
- Product: GPUStack
- CWE: n/c
- CVSS: 9.8
- EPSS: n/c
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux AI inference hosts; unauth admin access to code execution; in-the-wild report credited in the advisory
CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset) Score 60- EUVD: EUVD-2026-123532
- Product: Apache httpd 2.4.55 to 2.4.70, mod_http2
- CWE: CWE-362, CWE-20
- CVSS: 9.8 (Red Hat) / 8.1 (CSA, CISA)
- EPSS: 1.5% to 1.6%
- CISA KEV: not listed at check
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: Red Hat RHEL packages listed (CSAF VEX: verify)
- Fit to this threat: High: Linux web servers with HTTP/2; Singapore CSA reported exploitation 2026-11-17
CVE-2026-106931 Score 56- EUVD: n/c
- Product: SiteGuard Server Edition (host WAF in Apache, Nginx, IIS)
- CWE: CWE-78
- CVSS: 7.8 (v3.0) / 8.5 (JVN v4.0, local, PR:L)
- EPSS: 0.66% (51st pct)
- CISA KEV: 2026-10-20
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: JVN#88474777
- Fit to this threat: Medium: root command execution on Linux web servers, widely used in Japan; local vector per JVN
CVE-2026-115731 Score 55- EUVD: EUVD-2026-116495
- Product: Puppet Server / OpenVox (report deserialization)
- CWE: CWE-502, CWE-94
- CVSS: 9.4 (v4.0, PR:L)
- EPSS: 0.37%
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-17
- SSVC: Expl. none*, Auto no, Total
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: Red Hat CVE page (verify)
- Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux management servers; needs an agent certificate (autosign can expose it)
CVE-2026-116779 Score 45- EUVD: n/c
- Product: SignalWire FreeSWITCH
- CWE: n/c
- CVSS: 9.8
- EPSS: n/c
- CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux VoIP servers, command execution
CVE-2026-129448 Score 40- EUVD: n/c
- Product: Apache Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 (XML-RPC)
- CWE: CWE-502
- CVSS: 9.8 (v3.1)
- EPSS: not yet scored
- CISA KEV: not listed at check
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: Medium: Java blog servers, unauth; ASF confirmed exploitation
CVE-2026-46300 Score 30- EUVD: n/c
- Product: Linux kernel (local)
- CWE: n/c
- CVSS: n/c
- EPSS: n/c
- CISA KEV: 2026-10-28
- SSVC: n/c
- CWSS: n/c
- CSAF: verify
- Fit to this threat: Post-access only: privilege escalation after a foothold (lets the stager write into /usr/bin)
The matrix is also kept as triage_matrix.csv in the detection pack folder.
■ 23.6 Score breakdown
| CVE | KEV 25 | Exploit report 10 | CVSS 10 | EPSS 15 | SSVC 10 | Fit 20 | Pre-auth 10 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole) | 25 | 10 | 6 | 15 | 5 | 20 | 10 | 91 |
CVE-2026-90436 | 25 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 20 | 10 | 90 |
CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell) | 25 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | 10 | 75 |
CVE-2026-90817 | 25 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 65 |
CVE-2026-102895 | 25 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 65 |
CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset) | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | 10 | 60 |
CVE-2026-106931 | 25 | 10 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 56 |
CVE-2026-115731 | 25 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 55 |
CVE-2026-116779 | 25 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 45 |
CVE-2026-129448 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 40 |
CVE-2026-46300 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 30 |
■ 23.7 Reference case (outside the window)
CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell, CVSS 10.0, disclosed December 2025) is the only public case where the same writeablex stager template was documented after exploitation. It is listed for context and not scored, because it is outside the October to November window.
■ 23.8 Vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (October to November 2026)
Most flaws in 23.5 hit Linux servers only. The stager also serves macOS, so I checked which published October and November 2026 vectors run on both. None of them is linked to this C2; this is a list of candidates to check, ranked by fit.
| Vector | Date | Linux | macOS | Fit to this stager | Link to this case |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker (stolen maintainer tokens): credential stealer plus an hourly remote code loader on Linux and macOS; loader seen dormant (SOCRadar, Help Net Security) | 2026-10-21 | Yes | Yes | High: a loader already running on both platforms only needs a URL to fetch a two-OS stager | None found |
| Stolen SSH keys and cloud credentials from the supply chain incidents in this table | Oct to Nov | Yes | Yes | High: the stager is one command that works on any Unix host it is pasted into | None found |
| @subql/common 5.8.3 on npm: secrets theft plus remote shell (incident tracker) | 2026-10-05 | Yes | Yes | Medium: remote shell on developer hosts | None found |
| tensorlake 0.5.144 on npm: Shai-Hulud style stealer (incident tracker) | 2026-10-08 | Yes | Yes | Medium: credential theft and self-spreading | None found |
| 106 malicious npm and PyPI packages, 26 to 28 October (Safeguard) | 2026-10-26 to 28 | Yes | Yes | Medium: install-time code on developer machines | None found |
| agent-framework on PyPI: collector only, no second stage reported (CSA) | 2026-11-17 | Yes | Partly | Low | None found |
| Java4Shell, OpenJDK CVE-2026-114938 (Censys) | 2026-11-17 | Yes | x86-64 JVMs only by the CISA description | Partial: Apple Silicon JVMs are outside that description | None found |
| PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618/109619 | 2026-10-21 | Yes | PHP on macOS is rarely internet facing | Low for macOS | None found (20.1) |
■ 23.9 How to use this matrix
- Score 75 and above: patch or isolate now, then hunt with chapter 25 on hosts that were exposed before the patch.
- Score 55 to 74: patch in the current cycle and confirm exposure (internet facing, feature enabled).
- Below 55: confirm you do not run the product, then close the row.
- A KEV listing proves exploitation somewhere, not on your host and not by this actor.
- Keep the evidence fields (KEV, EPSS, SSVC) separate from your own judgement (fit). Then anybody can rerun the score when EPSS or KEV changes.
- Record when each value was collected. EPSS and KEV status change daily, so an undated score cannot be checked.
《 24. CTI: IOC triage (enriched) 》
| Indicator | Type | Role | Source | Confidence | Status | Triage / recommended action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 | IP:port | Stager, payloads, beacon C2 | This case | Confirmed | Not in public feeds (2026-11-20) | Block and alert; retro-hunt flows since April 2026 |
| hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch> | URL | Payload routes (7) | Stager | Confirmed | Not public | Proxy block; hunt the path on any host |
| hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/sync | URL | Beacon | l32 config | Confirmed | Not public | Proxy and TLS-inspection rule with X-Client-Id |
| fe1666de...e81d4 | SHA256 | l32 payload | This case | Confirmed | Not public | EDR hash block; sandbox retro-hunt |
| c31f7fe4...e3d95696, 7fbed01a...8d481cabe6b6 | SHA256 | l64 and l128 payloads (Linux x86-64, LoongArch) | This case | Confirmed | Not public | EDR hash block |
| 12b5bbae...234ab6cf, d1ec7081...bc0501be4 | SHA256 | a32 and a64 payloads (Linux ARM) | This case | Confirmed | Not public | EDR hash block on ARM servers and devices |
| fce33d2a...ac465f2c, b389c22a...d7cac7bf | SHA256 | darwin_amd64 and darwin_arm64 payloads (macOS) | This case | Confirmed | Not public | MDM / EDR hash block on Macs |
| http-beacon-implant-55554944<UUID> | Code signature | macOS client identifier as served | darwin payloads | Confirmed | Not public | osquery signature table; may change after the stager re-sign |
| polkitd outside the polkit package path | File | Dropped payload | Stager | Confirmed | n/a | Verify package ownership; image the host if foreign |
| ~/Library/Caches/polkitd | File | macOS payload | Stager | Confirmed | n/a | MDM query for hidden ad-hoc signed files |
| Kernel-thread name with an exe link | Process | Masquerade | l32 | Confirmed | n/a | osquery fleet hunt (chapter 25) |
| easyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slots | String | Family marker | l32 | Confirmed | Not public | YARA family rule |
| 192[.]3.31[.]219 | IP | Old AgentTesla hosting, same /22 | URLhaus | Confirmed | Offline since 2020 | No action for this case |
| 192[.]3.211[.]176:19999 | IP:port | VShell C2 per OSINT note A | ThreatFox (not read) | Unverified | Unchecked | Check the entry and the TLS certificate before any link |
| 119[.]45.243[.]154:8443 | IP:port | Same stager template, December 2025 | Incident write-up | Confirmed | Historic | Context only |
| redeploy latest listener payload | String | Framework operator text in l32 | l32 | Confirmed | Not public | Added to the YARA family rule |
| !inj: platform | String | Injection command marker in l32 | l32 | Confirmed | Not public | Added to the YARA family rule |
| 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 (AS36352) | Prefix | Hosting context of the C2 | l32 | Confirmed | Not public | Context only, do not block the whole AS |
■ 24.1 Copy-friendly IOC list (defanged)
# hashes: sha256 / sha1 / md5
l32 fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe 754b9d13e9fa687a5bf471423722e06c
a32 12b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf
8b3d1d3ee8e3500c7115bba939e047450a0783ac d44eb9976ec3aee864f076a42b152385
a64 d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4
c1e9edbdc877a9365343dc0dfad9d1660073750a 4c1ef60aa2585ff3a5e38ea49babe331
l64 c31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696
547cc85bc060b6ebf220fbb82146476627150856 df786f29ddcd086130cb8730ce6c9612
l128 7fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
550bec09b879e0c8e07a9d58909e1fb5a4ac0c74 64b940bc41468f51933e0bdebe23f493
darwin_amd64 fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
c1762547592e298cabc0e90309180fa79247ebd3 8d25e6d0dde86738484550e3f68b2a19
darwin_arm64 b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf
7e827b3a7ba5e5064018244cbf594d47a34aefae 6a9adbc92009568bae5cb2d10f24c02c
# macOS code signature identifier (as served)
http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID>
# C2 / download server
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443
# URLs
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_amd64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_arm64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l128
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/sync
# host artifacts
/usr/bin/polkitd /usr/local/bin/polkitd /usr/libexec/polkitd(*) /tmp/polkitd
~/Library/Caches/polkitd
writeablex (probe file, short lived)
(*) legit only when owned by the polkit package
# network artifacts
POST /api/v2/sync header X-Client-Id
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
User-Agent: Windows Chrome/131.0.0.0 from a Linux or macOS host
# implant strings
easyshell-http-beacon-implant crates/impl-core/src/ !ES/9/UAGT/ !ES/7/SBOX/
ESCH chunk: ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS es-mux-agg es-hop-wire-v1 (XOR 0x5A)
LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo=
8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw
/file/ routes, the hash or the implant strings. The public EasyShell notes describe the framework, not this C2.《 25. Playbook for IR responders and DFIR 》
Golden rule: do not kill the fake kernel thread first. Collect its process state and memory, freeze it, cut its network, then clean. Killing it first loses the live config, the session keys and the tunnel table.
ALERT -> HOT 1 triage -> HOT 2 observe -> HOT 3 acquire -> HOT 4 freeze -> COLD 1 image -> COLD 2 timeline -> COLD 3 artifacts -> SCOPE -> CLEAN
■ 25.1 Hot forensics 0: confirm the alert
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args | grep -E "\[(kworker|migration|rcu_sched|watchdog)" ls -l /proc/<PID>/exe # a real kernel thread has no exe link rpm -qf /usr/bin/polkitd || dpkg -S /usr/bin/polkitd
- One command decides the case: a kernel-thread name whose
/proc/<pid>/exepoints to a file is a user process in disguise.
■ 25.2 Hot forensics 1 to 3: observe and acquire
cat /proc/<PID>/cmdline | tr "\0" " "; cat /proc/<PID>/environ | tr "\0" "\n" ls -l /proc/<PID>/fd; cat /proc/<PID>/maps ss -tnp | grep <PID> cp /proc/<PID>/exe /evidence/polkitd.bin; sha256sum /evidence/polkitd.bin # memory: use your approved acquisition tool (AVML or LiME) before any change
■ 25.3 Hot forensics 4 and 5: freeze and contain
kill -STOP <PID> # freeze, do not kill # block 192[.]3.31[.]148 and tcp/8443 at the host firewall and upstream # then check for child shells, SOCKS listeners and relay sessions
■ 25.4 Cold forensics 1 and 2: image and timeline
- Image the disk; keep the frozen process memory with the image.
- Timeline
/usr/bin,/usr/local/bin,/usr/libexec,/tmparound thepolkitdbirth time; look for the short-livedwriteablexin audit logs. - Find the parent of the stager: web server, application runtime or SSH session logs at the same time.
- Check
/etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd units and shell profiles as a standard step (no persistence was found in l32, but plugins can add it).
■ 25.5 radare2 on the evidence
r2 -A /evidence/polkitd.bin [0x...]> iI # toolchain, static, arch [0x...]> pd 40 @ 0x08062a04 # config table builder [0x...]> px 64 @ 0x082be821 # C2 field [0x...]> pd 30 @ 0x080b2721 # XOR 0x5A decoder [0x...]> izz~easyshell
- Same offsets, same views as chapters 6 to 9. If your build differs, search the strings first and follow the cross references.
■ 25.6 Hunting at scale with osquery
SELECT pid, name, path, cmdline, cwd, on_disk FROM processes WHERE (name LIKE '[kworker/%' OR name LIKE '[migration/%' OR name LIKE '[rcu_sched]%' OR name LIKE '[watchdog/%' OR name LIKE 'kworker/%' OR name LIKE 'migration/%' OR name = 'rcu_sched' OR name LIKE 'watchdog/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[kworker/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[rcu_sched]%') AND path != '';
The full pack (six queries) is in the GitHub detection pack, chapter 27.
■ 25.7 If the host runs PHP: check the entry point
- Apache or PHP error bursts with "Allowed memory size exhausted" and worker segfaults around the
polkitdbirth time are a PHP2Shell sign. - Shells,
curlorwgetstarted by the web server user (www-data,apache,nobody) toward a raw IP on 8443. - Patch PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 or the distribution backport; rotate secrets that lived in PHP worker memory.
- Report any match: it is the evidence 20.2 asks for.
■ 25.8 Containers
- Run the same
/proc/*/execheck inside each container namespace; kernel-thread names never appear inside a container. - Compare the image layer with the running file system for new files in bin directories.
- Rebuild from a clean image; do not clean a container in place.
■ 25.9 Tabletop exercise (30 minutes)
| Time | Inject | Expected decision |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00 | EDR shows [kworker/0:0] with an exe link on a web server | Declare incident, start hot forensics, do not kill |
| 00:10 | Proxy shows POST /api/v2/sync to a raw IP on 8443 | Collect memory, then block egress |
| 00:20 | A second server shows the same hash | Fleet hunt with osquery, scope by egress logs |
| 00:30 | Management asks who did it | Report tool and infrastructure; operator unknown |
■ 25.10 Who does what (RACI)
| Task | SOC | Linux admin | Cloud team | IR lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Triage alert | R | C | I | A |
| Memory and disk acquisition | C | R | C | A |
| Egress block | R | C | R | A |
| Fleet hunt | R | C | C | A |
| Rebuild and patch | I | R | R | A |
■ 25.11 Contain, eradicate, recover
| Step | Action | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Contain | Freeze the process, block the C2 and tcp/8443 egress, isolate the host | Stops tunnels and plugin delivery |
| Eradicate | Rebuild from known good media; rotate credentials used on the host | Plugins may have taken credentials |
| Recover | Patch the entry service, restore data, monitor for the beacon pattern | The stager needs the same entry again |
《 26. Detection and mitigation checklist 》
- Processes: kernel-thread names with an exe link (the name table is in the binary; the selection logic was not traced);
polkitdoutside the package path; shells withHISTFILE=/dev/null. - Files:
polkitdin/usr/bin,/usr/local/bin,/tmp; hidden ad-hoc signed~/Library/Caches/polkitd. - Persistence: none in l32; still check
/etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd and shell profiles after plugin use. - Network: downloads from
/file/<arch>; POST/api/v2/syncwithX-Client-Id; Windows Chrome UA from servers; raw IP on tcp/8443. - Hardening: server egress allow-list; no shell for web service accounts; FIM on system bin directories; patch chapter 23 rows.
- macOS:
polkitd(macOS has none) in a user Caches folder;screencapture -xorosascriptmouse queries from it; TCC prompts or denials naming it; code signature identifierhttp-beacon-implant-*. - Developer and admin workstations: check Macs and Linux laptops for
~/Library/Caches/polkitdorpolkitdin user folders; review LiteLLM 1.107.0 and the October npm/PyPI incidents in 23.8; rotate SSH keys and cloud credentials exposed by them. - Web servers: web server user spawning
sh,curl -korwget --no-check-certificate; PHP patched for PHP2Shell (25.7). - Response: follow chapter 25, freeze before kill.
- Detection example: YARA family rule
MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implanton memory dumps and new binaries.
《 27. Detection content: YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery, STIX 》
The full pack is published on the MalwareMustDie GitHub. The YARA rules and the macOS Sigma and osquery content are printed here (27.1).
| File | Type | What it detects |
|---|---|---|
| yara/MMD_EasyShell.yar | YARA | Stager (variant and template), implant family (ELF and Mach-O), macOS client, XOR 0x5A strings, payload set of this C2 |
| sigma/*.yml (8) | Sigma | web server spawning the stager download, macOS client screencapture and AppleScript mouse check, writeablex probe, polkitd outside package path, macOS hide/xattr/codesign, beacon and payload routes, C2 connection |
| snort/MMD_easyshell.rules | Snort | C2 host, payload routes, beacon, header set, stager in HTTP response |
| suricata/MMD_easyshell.rules | Suricata | Same logic with sticky buffers |
| osquery/MMD_easyshell_hunt.conf | osquery | Kernel-thread name with exe, polkitd path, drop files, C2 sockets, history suppression, payload set hashes, web server user running curl/wget with TLS checks off, macOS cache drop and signature identifier |
| stix/MMD_easyshell_stix21.json | STIX 2.1 | Malware, tool, infrastructure, indicators, ATT&CK patterns |
| Rule | Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_Stager | Stager script (this variant) | writeablex probe + /file/<arch> routes + polkitd or macOS steps |
| MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_Probe | Any VShell-template stager | Broader, lower confidence; also matches the older ?a=l64&stage=true form |
| MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant | EasyShell implant, any build | Crate paths (Linux and macOS prefixes), signature identifier (counts only with a beacon or slot string), !ES slots, beacon, tunnel and listener markers; ELF and Mach-O; hits all seven payloads |
| MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_Implant | EasyShell macOS client | macOS module paths, screencapture (XOR), AppleScript mouse check, TCC hint, signature identifier |
| MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_Implant | EasyShell implant | Analyst note #3 rule kept as written |
| MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_Strings | EasyShell implant | XOR 0x5A protected strings, survives path stripping |
| MMD_EasyShell_PayloadSet_Sample | The seven builds of this C2 | In the .yar file only (contains the unmasked C2); former name MMD_Linux_EasyShell_l32_Sample |
http-beacon-implant-55554944 is written by the Apple linker as <output name>-55554944<LC_UUID>, where 55554944 is the text "UUID" in hex: the prefix does not change between builds, but it depends on the output name, so the family rule counts it only together with a beacon or slot string. v11 rule change: the generic crate path count (crates/impl-core/src/ five times) was replaced by five EasyShell module paths, because another Rust workspace could also use a crate named impl-core; all five paths and the beacon strings are present in all seven payloads (string check). The size limit was raised from 20 MB to 64 MB, so a future build with debug symbols or more static dependencies is not missed. False positives: a string-level check of the family markers over 2,852 benign ELF files on an analysis host (49 of them Rust builds with crates/ or /rustc/ paths) found no match outside the seven samples. This is a small corpus and string matching, not the YARA engine; a goodware retrohunt is the proper test and is not done yet.
/*
MMD_EasyShell.yar
EasyShell Rust beacon implant and its VShell-template multi-platform stager
MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp, 2026-11-20, TLP:CLEAR
Tested: implant rules against all seven payloads served by the C2 (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64,
darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and both stager rules against the transcribed stager text (no stager hits on any binary).
Rule 3 is adapted from an internal analyst note (#3) and kept for compatibility.
*/
rule MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_Stager
{
meta:
description = "Multi-platform shell stager (VShell template + /file/<arch> routes, polkitd drop, macOS Gatekeeper handling)"
author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "MMD-073-2026"
tlp = "CLEAR"
strings:
$p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
$p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
$p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
$p4 = "export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)" ascii
$r1 = /:\d{2,5}\/file\/darwin_(amd|arm)64"/ ascii
$r2 = /\/file\/(l64|l32|a32|a64|l128)"/ ascii
$r3 = "loongarch64) DL=" ascii
$n1 = "v=\"polkitd\"" ascii
$m1 = "chflags hidden \"$v\"" ascii
$m2 = "xattr -c \"$v\"" ascii
$m3 = "codesign --force --sign - \"$v\"" ascii
$m4 = "$HOME/Library/Caches" ascii
$d1 = "_create_unverified_context()" ascii
condition:
filesize < 64KB and 2 of ($p*) and
( ($n1 and 1 of ($r*)) or (2 of ($m*) and 1 of ($r*)) or (#r2 >= 3 and $d1) )
}
rule MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_Probe
{
meta:
description = "Generic writable-path probe used by VShell-template stagers (older ?a=l64&stage=true and newer /file/<arch> forms); broader, lower confidence"
author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "MMD-073-2026"
strings:
$p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
$p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
$p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
$p4 = "rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
$a1 = "uname -m" ascii
condition:
filesize < 64KB and 3 of ($p*) and $a1
}
rule MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
meta:
description = "EasyShell (impl-core) Rust HTTPS beacon implant, any build: crate paths, !ES config slots, beacon and tunnel markers"
author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "MMD-073-2026"
tlp = "CLEAR"
strings:
$crate1 = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
$mod1 = "impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_wire.rs" ascii
$mod2 = "impl-core/src/sandbox_guard.rs" ascii
$mod3 = "impl-core/src/wire_dispatch.rs" ascii
$mod4 = "impl-core/src/wire_chunk.rs" ascii
$mod5 = "impl-core/src/delete_self.rs" ascii
$crate4 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii // ld64 ad-hoc identifier: <output name>-55554944 ("UUID" in hex) + LC_UUID; prefix is stable, depends on the output name
$s1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
$s2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
$s3 = "!ES/13/CTYP/" ascii
$s4 = "!ES/14/HDRS/" ascii
$s5 = "!ES/5/PROXY/" ascii
$s6 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
$s7 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
$s8 = "!ES/10/WAIT/" ascii
$s9 = "!ES/11/JITR/" ascii
$b1 = "es-beacon-uplink" ascii
$b2 = "beacon first POST timeout" ascii
$b3 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
$b4 = "ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS" ascii
$b5 = "es-mux-agg" ascii
$b6 = "es-pump-tcpmux" ascii
$b7 = "redeploy latest listener payload" ascii
$b8 = "!inj: platform" ascii
condition:
(uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
and filesize < 64MB
and ( $crate1 or ($crate4 and 1 of ($b*,$s*)) or (3 of ($mod*) and 2 of ($b*)) or 4 of ($s*) or (2 of ($s*) and 2 of ($b*)) )
}
rule MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
meta:
description = "EasyShell (impl-core) macOS client: Mach-O with macOS-only modules (native screencapture, osascript mouse check), ad-hoc signature identifier http-beacon-implant-<UUID>"
author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "MMD-073-2026"
tlp = "CLEAR"
tested = "darwin_amd64 fce33d2a...465f2c, darwin_arm64 b389c22a...c7bf"
strings:
$m1 = "/c/impl-core/src/sandbox_mouse.rs" ascii
$m2 = "/c/impl-core/src/screenshot/mod.rs" ascii
$m3 = "to get position of mouse" ascii
$m4 = "macOS TCC may block process listing" ascii
$m5 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii
$m6 = "/usr/sbin/screencapture" xor(0x5a)
$m7 = "export BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1" ascii
$e1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
$e2 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
condition:
(uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
and filesize < 64MB and 3 of ($m*) and 1 of ($e*)
}
rule MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_Implant
{
meta:
description = "Detects EasyShell (ESCH) Rust HTTP beacon C2 implant (analyst note #3 rule, kept as is)"
author = "CTI / RE Analysis"
date = "2026-11-19"
strings:
$slab1 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
$slab2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
$slab3 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
$slab4 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
$crate = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
$chunk = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
$hop_xor = { 3f 29 77 32 35 2a 77 2d 33 28 3f 77 2c 6b } // "es-hop-wire-v1" ^ 0x5A
condition:
uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and ( $crate or $chunk or $hop_xor or 3 of ($slab*) )
}
rule MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_Strings
{
meta:
description = "EasyShell single-byte XOR 0x5A protected strings (survives removal of plain crate paths)"
author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "MMD-073-2026"
strings:
$x1 = "es-hop-wire-v1" xor(0x5a)
$x2 = "screen control" xor(0x5a)
$x3 = "folder zip prepare failed" xor(0x5a)
$x4 = "Remove failed" xor(0x5a)
condition:
(uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe) and 2 of them
}
■ 27.1 macOS chain: Sigma and osquery
The rules below cover the macOS chain in 18.3: the Gatekeeper handling by the stager and the client behaviour that raises TCC prompts. The Linux rules are in the pack.
title: macOS Payload Hidden and Quarantine Cleared in Library/Caches (EasyShell Stager)
id: 86c74039-1854-5f1c-bb9d-e89889f7c663
status: experimental
description: Detects the macOS branch of the EasyShell stager that hides polkitd, clears its extended attributes and applies an ad-hoc signature.
references:
- https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/
author: MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1553.001
- attack.t1564.001
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
sel_chflags:
Image|endswith: '/chflags'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'hidden'
- 'polkitd'
sel_xattr:
Image|endswith: '/xattr'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -c '
- 'polkitd'
sel_codesign:
Image|endswith: '/codesign'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '--force'
- '--sign -'
- 'polkitd'
condition: 1 of sel_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely (polkitd is not a macOS binary)
level: high
title: EasyShell macOS Client Silent Screenshot or AppleScript Mouse Check from Non-Standard Parent
id: a288a8f2-8682-5b3c-b14d-46b97f4e0511
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the EasyShell macOS client (MMD-073-2026) behaviour seen in its static strings:
silent screenshots with /usr/sbin/screencapture -x -t png and an anti-sandbox mouse
check through osascript and System Events, started by a binary in a user cache folder
or named polkitd (macOS has no polkitd).
references:
- https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/
author: MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1113
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1497.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
parent:
- ParentImage|endswith: '/polkitd'
- ParentImage|contains: '/Library/Caches/'
shot:
Image|endswith: '/screencapture'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -x'
- 'png'
mouse:
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
CommandLine|contains: 'get position of mouse'
condition: parent and (shot or mouse)
falsepositives:
- Unknown; screencapture or osascript started from a cache folder binary is not normal
level: high
-- mmd_easyshell_macos_caches_polkitd (darwin, every 3600 s) SELECT f.path, f.size, f.mtime, f.uid, s.signed, s.identifier, s.team_identifier, s.authority, h.sha256 FROM file f LEFT JOIN signature s ON s.path = f.path LEFT JOIN hash h ON h.path = f.path WHERE f.path LIKE '/Users/%/Library/Caches/polkitd' OR f.path = '/tmp/polkitd'; -- mmd_easyshell_macos_codesign_identifier (darwin, every 3600 s) SELECT s.path, s.identifier, s.signed, s.team_identifier, s.cdhash FROM signature s WHERE s.path IN (SELECT path FROM file WHERE directory LIKE '/Users/%/Library/Caches' OR directory = '/tmp' OR directory = '/private/tmp') AND (s.identifier LIKE 'http-beacon-implant-%' OR s.identifier = 'polkitd');
- Pair a narrow rule (this build) with a family rule (any build) and a technique rule (template). Each one fails differently, so together they last longer.
《 28. Responder quick card 》
For the findings see 1.1. This card lists only what to look for and what to do.
| Check | Look for | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Process | Kernel-thread name ([kworker/0:0] style) with a real /proc/<pid>/exe; shells with HISTFILE=/dev/null | 25.1, 25.6 |
| File | polkitd outside the polkit package path; hidden, ad-hoc signed ~/Library/Caches/polkitd on Macs | 24, 27.1 |
| Network | POST /api/v2/sync with X-Client-Id, Windows Chrome 131 UA from a server, raw IP on tcp/8443, downloads from /file/<arch> | 7, 24 |
| Entry | Not observed; web server user spawning curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate, developer and CI hosts (23.8) | 23, 25.7 |
Respond: freeze before kill, take memory, block egress, hunt the fleet with the kernel-thread exe check, rebuild, rotate credentials, report the tool and the infrastructure, not a guessed actor (chapter 25).
《 29. Inside the victim node: hot forensics 》
.bash_history capture of 706 lines from the compromised host (SHA-256 of the copy examined: 093523b34792a5e625524299b262ff30476b652fe8b9e657b75cf995a87e2af3). This chapter is forensic evidence only and is not mixed with the static analysis in Parts I to III. Credentials, device identifiers, the victim IP and all domains are masked. The raw file is available on request under the MalwareMustDie sharing policy.This chapter is a forensic examination of one compromised host, not static analysis, so it stands apart from Parts I to III. The evidence is the root shell history of the host, captured while the host was running and during the period of the intrusion (hence hot forensics). It records a multi-session "black-on-black" (黑吃黑, hēi chī hēi) intrusion: one criminal operation robbed by another, with source code theft and a hunt for cryptocurrency seeds, keys and tokens.
■ 29.1 Link to this case
History line 333 fetches the stager from 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file and pipes it to sh, with curl and a wget fallback, both with TLS checks off. This is the only link between the intrusion and the EasyShell case.
| Statement | Evidence | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| The intruder ran the EasyShell stager from this C2 on the host | History line 333 | Confirmed |
| The intruder is the operator of that C2, or works with the operator | Same C2, same stager route; no other link | Medium |
| Who the operator is | Not in the history | Unknown (17.2, 19) |
| The stager added persistence | The client has no persistence routine (11, 15) | Not supported |
■ 29.2 What the host is
The host is not an enterprise server. It is a multi-tenant Chinese mobile malware server that hosts Android and iOS C2 panels, exploit kits and their build pipelines. The table lists what the history shows; roles come from names, paths and the files the intruder opened Confirmed for presence, High for the role.
| Component | Role | Location and data | History lines |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fisher C2 / PandaV6 (熊猫V6, 嘴哥管理系统 ZGL) | Android banking RAT panel (ts5025[.]cc) | Node.js on 8443 in /opt/fisher-node/, SQLite fisher.db, PHP API in /var/www/ts5025[.]cc/api/; APK builder from kiss and ghost templates with dpt-shell packing; phishing landing templates | L3, L8 to L19, L85 to L98, L151 to L184, L458 to L463 |
| Caishenge V2 (财神哥, ios.ts5025[.]cc) | iOS exploit C2 and crypto drainer | Docker FastAPI and MySQL 8.0 in /www/; tables devices and wallet_data | L20 to L23, L102 to L104, L116 to L118, L647 |
| iOS exploit kit core | FastAPI modules, sync endpoints, exploit chains | /www/backend/, /www/backend/chains/, patch archive in an rfix backup | L21 to L28, L68 to L76, L393 |
| DarkSword / DarkSword-RCE | iOS 17 to 18.7 exploit chain and C2 | MySQL darksword and darksword_rce, kernel and WebKit offset tables, darksword_full.tar.gz | L24, L397, L451, L491, L516, L642 |
| Coruna (dingxin8[.]cc, i[.]131422[.]com) | iOS 13 to 17.2.1 exploit kit and wallet stealer | MySQL ioscoruna (wallets, decrypted wallets, mnemonic hits); adm888app/ wallet sweeping scripts | L33 to L36, L229, L252, L355, L477, L518 |
| Blackhole | iOS exploit kit archive | src-02-blackhole-ios.tgz in /root and /tmp | L662 to L666, L696 |
| iOS肯德基无感 ("KFC" silent) | Zero-click iOS delivery and admin panel | /wwww/iOS肯德基无感/: Python backend, React admin-web | L70 to L73 |
| Moying V2 (墨影远控, beta666888[.]cc) | Python and Android RAT framework | /root/moying-v2/: server, agent crypto, protocol, APK builds, refc2.db | L29 to L32, L106, L123 to L150, L186 to L200 |
| c2c_deploy | Panel with a kit to decrypt stolen iOS wallet keychains | /www/wwwroot/c2c_deploy/, mnemonic_decrypt_kit/ | L233, L258 to L265, L605 to L618 |
| FengJC (FENGJC 销售站) | Sales storefront for the panels | /opt/fengjc_site/ | L37 to L39, L182 |
Claude Code and Codex CLI directories (/root/.claude/, /root/.codex/) with prompt histories and session transcripts were on the host (L48 to L50, L584 to L595). That the panel operators built their code with these tools Medium is read from the directories only. The intruder read them and also started both tools (L215 to L219) Confirmed. The host also seems to match a server in a Censys open directory report on DarkSword and Coruna of 7 October 2026 (hostname C2026**********) Unverified.
■ 29.3 Activity by session
Ten exit lines split the history into eleven sessions. Two working styles appear: one inventories and packs the hosted kits, the other hunts wallets and keys. They may be one actor or two actors sharing the shell Unverified.
| Session | Lines | Activity |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | L1 | End of an earlier session |
| 2 | L2 to L64 | Starts helper scripts (/dev/shm/.gc.sh, /tmp/deep_mine3.py); reads the Fisher .jwt_secret, mints a 30-day super-admin JWT and queries the local Fisher API; inventories files, sizes and line counts of every hosted platform, the deployment configs and the AI CLI histories |
| 3 | L65 to L84 | Line counts per component; finds iOS肯德基无感 |
| 4 | L85 to L113 | Queries fisher.db, caishenge (devices, wallet data), ios_admin, refc2.db and niubi for victim devices; reads the FRP configs; checks pm2, docker and listening ports |
| 5 | L114 to L122 | Exports victim tables to CSV; counts devices and wallets; lists live connections on 8443 |
| 6 | L123 to L185 | Audits every module of Moying V2 and Fisher: patches, APK builder, templates, PHP API, the sales site |
| 7 | L186 to L204 | Audits Android build artifacts and manifests; searches the file system for RAT-related directory names |
| 8, 9 | L205 to L214 | Packs moying-v2 and fisher-node; runs pack_all.sh, pack_all_v2.sh, repack_fix.sh |
| 10 | L215 to L334 | Starts claude and codex; dumps ioscoruna, the webroot and every non-system MySQL database; sets MySQL bind-address = 0.0.0.0 (L272); archives /var/www; deletes the staging archives (L313 to L327); re-runs the EasyShell stager (L333) |
| 11 | L335 to L706 | Installs ripgrep (L337); sweeps databases, raw .ibd files, iOS wallet extractions, archives and AI CLI transcripts for wallet addresses, seed phrases, private keys, GitHub tokens and SSH keys (29.4); reads lateral movement files (ssh_root.py, ssh_hits.txt, au4.sh) |
■ 29.4 What the intruder searched for
The ripgrep sweeps in session 11 used these patterns Confirmed:
| Regex Pattern | Target Artifact / Secret Type |
|---|---|
\bbc1[ac-hj-np-z02-9]{35,75}\b | Bitcoin Native SegWit (Bech32 / Taproot) addresses |
\bT[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}\b | TRON (TRX / TRC-20 USDT) addresses |
\b0x([A-F,a-f,0-9]{40})\b | Ethereum / EVM (ETH / BSC / ERC-20) wallet addresses |
\b0x([a-f,0-9]{64})\b | Raw 256-bit (64-hex) EVM Private Keys |
\b([a-z]{3,8}\s){11}[a-z]{3,8}\b | 12-word BIP-39 Mnemonic Seed Phrases |
(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22,}) | GitHub Personal Access Tokens & OAuth/App Tokens |
"BEGIN OPENSSH" | OpenSSH & PEM Private Keys |
■ 29.5 Tools and infrastructure on the host
| Item | Detail | History lines |
|---|---|---|
| FRP | /opt/frps/frpc.toml, frpc-web.toml; ports 1996 to 1998, 7000, 7500 | L46, L99 to L101 |
| Helper scripts | /dev/shm/.gc.sh, /tmp/deep_mine3.py, /tmp/gen_catalog.py, /tmp/clear_builds.py, /tmp/pack_all*.sh, /tmp/repack_fix.sh, /tmp/au4.sh, ssh_root.py, rt5k_rev2 | L2 to L7, L210 to L213, L370, L547 to L603 |
| Databases | ios_admin, niubi, admin_com, chapter_db; dshops_backdoor_backup_20261013-211329.tar.gz | L105, L108, L268, L277, L387, L513 to L522 |
| Credentials used | MySQL root and service logins read from configs (masked here) | L102, L116, L252, L267, L509 |
| Archives seen | darksword_full.tar.gz, fisher-source-20260928.tar.gz, pkg_caishenge.tgz, c10_chains.tgz, se_deploy_kit.tgz, wa_keychain_C477******.tar.gz | L397 to L457, L627 to L698 |
■ 29.6 Limits of this evidence
- A shell history records commands, not their output. What was found, copied out and where it went is not shown.
- The two working styles cannot be split into two people from the history alone.
- The roles of the hosted kits come from names, paths and files the intruder opened, not from analysis of those kits.
■ 29.7 The intrusion history evidence
- Keep forensic evidence and malware analysis apart, and state the one fact that links them. Here it is a single history line.
- Shell history shows intent, not results. Rate each reading and say what the history cannot prove.
《 Appendix A. Text evidence for chapters 4, 5, 6 and 9 》
The views in chapters 4 to 9 are images. This appendix gives the same evidence as text, so students can copy strings, search them and check offsets in radare2. Source: the l32 payload (sha256 fe1666de...e81d4), static listing with llvm-objdump -d -M intel and string references resolved against the GOT base ebx = 0x083dff88. The C2 is masked everywhere.
■ A.1 Chapter 4: file information and sections
; view produced with file/readelf/sha*sum, laid out radare2 iI style [0x0805605a]> iI arch x86 bits 32 os linux class ELF32 machine Intel 80386 type EXEC static true stripped true lang rust size 3769372 entry 0x0805605a [0x0805605a]> ph md5,sha1,sha256 md5 754b9d13e9fa687a5bf471423722e06c sha1 1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe sha256 fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4 [0x0805605a]> iS~.comment; psz @ section..comment GCC: (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04.3) 11.4.0 rustc version 1.95.0 (59807616e 2026-04-14) GCC: (GNU) 11.2.1 20211120
; sections (readelf -SW), radare2 iS layout [0x0805605a]> iS nth vaddr size perm name 1 0x080480f4 0x7 r-x .init 2 0x08048100 0x25db0f r-x .text 3 0x082a5c0f 0x7 r-x .fini 4 0x082a5c40 0x9c7cc r-- .rodata 5 0x0834240c 0xf47c r-- .eh_frame_hdr 6 0x08351888 0x51614 r-- .eh_frame 7 0x083a2e9c 0x1c1ac r-- .gcc_except_table 8 0x083c018c 0x4c rw- .tdata 9 0x083c01d8 0xf8 rw- .tbss 10 0x083c01d8 0x4 rw- .init_array 11 0x083c01dc 0x4 rw- .fini_array 12 0x083c01e0 0x1fda8 rw- .data.rel.ro 13 0x083dff88 0x78 rw- .got 14 0x083e0000 0x103c rw- .data 15 0x083e1040 0xdf8 rw- .bss 16 0x00000000 0x74 --- .comment 17 0x00000000 0x9a --- .shstrtab
■ A.2 Chapter 5: project source paths
; strings filtered for the project crates (not crates.io deps) [0x0805605a]> izz~crates/impl-core,easyshell crates/easyshell-http-beacon-implant/src/http_runtime.rs crates/impl-core/src/binfmt.rs crates/impl-core/src/connect_prelude.rs crates/impl-core/src/crypto.rs crates/impl-core/src/delete_self.rs crates/impl-core/src/download_xfer.rs crates/impl-core/src/execute_gate.rs crates/impl-core/src/extra_slabs.rs crates/impl-core/src/folder_zip.rs crates/impl-core/src/interactive.rs crates/impl-core/src/outbound_proxy.rs crates/impl-core/src/plugin_exec/unix.rs crates/impl-core/src/procname.rs crates/impl-core/src/sandbox_guard.rs crates/impl-core/src/sandbox_user.rs crates/impl-core/src/screenshot_sidecar.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/backward_listen.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/codec.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_relay.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_wire.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mod.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mt19937.rs crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mux.rs crates/impl-core/src/svc_ops.rs crates/impl-core/src/sysinfo.rs crates/impl-core/src/upload_worker.rs crates/impl-core/src/wire_chunk.rs crates/impl-core/src/wire_dispatch.rs [0x0805605a]> izz~mirrors.ustc~? 62 ; distinct crates fetched via mirrors.ustc.edu.cn
■ A.3 Chapter 6: configuration builder, slot bytes and User-Agent check
; llvm-objdump -d -M intel, ebx = GOT 0x083dff88, string refs resolved by script
[0x0805605a]> pd 30 @ 0x8062a50
0x8062a50 call 0x81021bb ; fcn.81021bb
0x8062a55 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x121767] ; 0x082be821 "hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 "
0x8062a5b lea eax, [ebp - 0x4188]
0x8062a61 lea esi, [ebx - 0x12141a] ; 0x082beb6e "!ES/7/SBOX/_____________________________"
0x8062a67 mov edx, 0x300
0x8062a6c mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x110], ecx
0x8062a72 mov dword ptr [eax], ecx
0x8062a74 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1217a9] ; 0x082be7df " "
0x8062a7a mov dword ptr [ebp - 0xbc], ecx
0x8062a80 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x4], ecx
0x8062a83 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1216e7] ; 0x082be8a1 "LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I"
0x8062a89 mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x10c], ecx
0x8062a8f mov dword ptr [eax + 0x8], ecx
0x8062a92 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12169a] ; 0x082be8ee " "
0x8062a98 mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x108], ecx
0x8062a9e mov dword ptr [eax + 0xc], ecx
0x8062aa1 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x121928] ; 0x082be660 "/api/v2/sync "
0x8062aa7 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x10], ecx
0x8062aaa lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1218a8] ; 0x082be6e0 "!ES/9/UAGT/_____________________________"
0x8062ab0 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x14], ecx
0x8062ab3 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12149a] ; 0x082beaee "Z...$..x...w..Q....g.|....q...?.".*-...."
0x8062ab9 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x18], ecx
0x8062abc lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1302e8] ; 0x082afca0 "3000 state mu"
0x8062ac2 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x1c], esi
0x8062ac5 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x20], ecx
0x8062ac8 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x139ed8] ; 0x082a60b0 "8 0123456789ABCDEFU...]..."
0x8062ace mov dword ptr [eax + 0x24], ecx
0x8062ad1 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12d938] ; 0x082b2650 "!ES/13/CTYP/____________________________"
0x8062ad7 mov dword ptr [eax + 0x28], ecx
0x8062ada lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12d8f8] ; 0x082b2690 "{"requestHeaders":{"Content-Type":"appli"
; slot marker + underscore padding = unpatched slot; value areas are space padded [0x0805605a]> px 48 @ 0x082be6e0 0x082be6e0 21 45 53 2f 39 2f 55 41 47 54 2f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f !ES/9/UAGT/_____ 0x082be6f0 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f ________________ 0x082be700 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f ________________ [0x0805605a]> px 64 @ 0x082be8a1 0x082be8a1 4c 59 36 6e 44 47 49 77 72 44 6c 5a 5a 72 76 48 LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvH 0x082be8b1 74 52 73 65 67 2b 49 57 42 72 4a 75 76 62 54 36 tRseg+IWBrJuvbT6 0x082be8c1 4c 46 48 45 55 4d 37 49 33 6c 6f 3d 20 20 20 20 LFHEUM7I3lo= 0x082be8d1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 [0x0805605a]> px 32 @ 0x082beb6e 0x082beb6e 21 45 53 2f 37 2f 53 42 4f 58 2f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f !ES/7/SBOX/_____ 0x082beb7e 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f ________________ ; C2 URL field @ 0x082be821 = hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (dump omitted, IP masked)
; slot still starts with "!ES/9/UAGT/" -> built-in default UA after the 11-byte tag [0x0805605a]> pd 22 @ 0x8065ab0 0x8065ab0 mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x14], ecx 0x8065ab3 lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1218a8] ; 0x082be6e0 "!ES/9/UAGT/_____________________________" 0x8065ab9 mov edx, 0xff 0x8065abe mov dword ptr [esp], 0x20 0x8065ac5 call 0x8111545 ; fcn.8111545 0x8065aca mov esi, eax 0x8065acc lea eax, [ebx - 0xfbd5f] ; 0x082e4229 "!ES/9/UAGT/Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;" 0x8065ad2 mov edi, edx 0x8065ad4 mov dword ptr [esp + 0x4], 0xb 0x8065adc mov ecx, esi 0x8065ade mov dword ptr [esp], eax 0x8065ae1 call 0x81c4c51 ; fcn.81c4c51 0x8065ae6 test al, al 0x8065ae8 je 0x8065b32 0x8065aea lea eax, [ebx - 0xfbd5f] ; 0x082e4229 "!ES/9/UAGT/Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;" 0x8065af0 mov ecx, esi 0x8065af2 mov edx, edi 0x8065af4 mov dword ptr [esp + 0x4], 0xb 0x8065afc mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x10], esi 0x8065aff mov dword ptr [esp], eax 0x8065b02 call 0x811b7fd ; fcn.811b7fd 0x8065b07 xor ecx, ecx
■ A.4 Chapter 9: anti-sandbox inputs and the process-name table
[0x0805605a]> pd 8 @ 0x80638f1 0x80638f1 mov eax, 0x1f4 0x80638f6 cmp edx, 0x1f5 0x80638fc cmovb edx, eax 0x80638ff mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x28], edx 0x8063902 lea edi, [ebx - 0xfc402] ; 0x082e3b86 "/dev/input/miceDISPLAYWAYLAND_DISPLAY500" 0x8063908 mov ecx, edi 0x806390a push 0xf 0x806390c pop edx [0x0805605a]> ps 96 @ 0x082e30f4 vmware virtualbox kvm xen virtual bochs parallels hyper-v hyperv microsoft corporation innotek bhyve proxmox [0x0805605a]> ps 108 @ 0x082e3154 /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor /sys/class/dmi/id/board_vendor /proc/xen SYSTEMD_VIRTUALIZATION hypervisor [0x0805605a]> ps 90 @ 0x082e3b60 sleepMs tmpMin uptimeMinSec mouseMs mousePx /dev/input/mice DISPLAY WAYLAND_DISPLAY ; string boundaries added for reading; the pool is stored without separators
; (ptr,len) pairs in .data.rel.ro, each pointing to a kernel-thread style name [0x0805605a]> pxw 32 @ 0x083c3684 0x083c3684 0x082e419c 0x0000000d ; "[kworker/0:0]" 0x083c368c 0x082e41a9 0x0000000d ; "[kworker/1:0]" 0x083c3694 0x082e41b6 0x0000000d ; "[kworker/2:0]" 0x083c369c 0x082e41c3 0x0000000d ; "[kworker/3:0]" 0x083c36a4 0x082e41d0 0x0000000e ; "[kworker/u8:0]" 0x083c36ac 0x082e41de 0x0000000e ; "[kworker/u9:0]" 0x083c36b4 0x082e41ec 0x0000000d ; "[migration/0]" 0x083c36bc 0x082e41f9 0x0000000d ; "[migration/1]" 0x083c36c4 0x082e4206 0x0000000b ; "[rcu_sched]" 0x083c36cc 0x082a7320 0x00000008 ; "[rcu_bh]"
- Reproduce each block with the radare2 command on its first line. If your offsets differ, search the string first (
izz~) and follow the cross references.
《 Appendix B. Revision history 》
Show the revision history (v1 to v11)
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| v1 | 2026-11-19 | First review draft: stager, l32 static analysis, cross review, CTI, vulnerability triage, YARA. |
| v2 | 2026-11-20 | Two OSINT notes verified and merged (chapters 14, 17, 19, 20). Infrastructure BGP table added (chapter 12). Chapter layout aligned with MMD-071. YARA family rule extended with two framework strings. |
| v3 | 2026-11-20 | Original stager screenshot added as evidence (chapter 2). Key points for busy readers with chapter links (1.2). Triage matrix column widths fixed with sideways scrolling (23.5). |
| v4 | 2026-11-20 | October 2026 vulnerability wave added to the timeline; hypothesis "campaign started with the wave" tested with ACH (20.1, 20.2). Web-server-to-stager Sigma rule and osquery query added. |
| v5 | 2026-11-20 | Campaign aim and the reason for macOS support (18.1, 18.2); October to November 2026 vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (23.8). macOS osquery query added. |
| v6 | 2026-11-20 | Four more payloads analysed (a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64): new chapter 15 with three radare2 style views; one shared configuration confirmed; macOS client modules documented; 18.2 R2 raised to Medium; IOC, TTP, YARA (new macOS rule), Sigma, osquery and STIX updated. |
| v7 | 2026-11-20 | l64 and l128 analysed: all seven payloads covered; correction in 15.1 (builds not compiled in one run, l128 uses rustc 1.96.0; config stamped into prebuilt templates); LoongArch note; Macs in scope raised to High; new 18.3 practical macOS infection chain; IOC, YARA, osquery and STIX updated. |
| v8 | 2026-11-20 | Stager image redrawn with each original Chinese comment followed by its English translation; Chinese glossary with pinyin added (2.2); placeholder chapter 29 for the hot forensics of a victim node; placeholder for the attacker's shell log analysis in 1.2. |
| v9 | 2026-11-20 | Released. Chapter 29 (hot forensics of a compromised host) and the attacker's shell log key points in 1.2 written; LoongArch64 note in the introduction. |
| v10 | 2026-11-21 | Review comments from IR and CERT readers applied: contradictions between chapters 18, 19 and 29 fixed and the chapter 29 link to this C2 rated; credentials, device identifiers, the victim IP and all domains in chapter 29 masked, provenance added; header block, reading map, CVE block view, scoring rules and sensitivity note, YARA condition for the signature identifier, false positive check, Appendix A text evidence; l128 loader note; copy edit. |
| v11 | 2026-11-21 | Second review round: repeated summaries removed (1.2 defender list, 17.2, 17.3, 24.1, epilogue hash block), 1.1 is the one summary and 28 a responder quick card; chapter 29 rewritten into the report structure; revision history moved to Appendix B; vulnerability triage method and matrix folded under 23.2 as context; YARA family rule tightened (EasyShell module paths instead of a crate path count, size limit 64 MB); macOS Sigma and osquery printed in 27; open questions for dynamic work listed in 16. |
《 30. Epilogue 》
The lesson of this case is small but important. The downloader in a glimpse looked like another threat's binary (VShell, Kinsing etc), and the payload was none of them. The binary answered the question once it was read statically, and the public notes on the EasyShell framework then fitted the strings the binary already showed.
The shell history suggests that the attacker(s) installed and used agentic AI CLI sessions during the intrusion. Defenders should be alert to what such sessions can execute on a compromised host.
Not only Linux environments are targeted, macOS is too. The intention is remote access (RAT functionality), but the infection route is unclear. So yes, we have a macOS malware case here too, with no confirmed macOS infection so far.
This sample series includes a LoongArch (258) build. It is one of the earliest publicly documented LoongArch64 RAT implementations I could find in public reporting (as of 2026-11-21). In practice it targets Loongson 3A5000, 3A6000 and 3C/3D-series machines running a new-world distribution (Debian loong64, Loongnix, Kylin, UOS and so on). I have not run it, and its loader path suggests it may not load on a stock system as served. Its fingerprint is in 15.1 and 15.2.
If you are a student, take the offsets in this post and reproduce each view in radare2 (pd, px, izz) on your own copy, in an isolated environment. If you are a defender, start with the kernel-thread name check in chapter 25.
■ Related posts references
- Trellix: The Silent, Fileless Threat of VShell
- NVISO: Decoding VShell (PDF)
- iYoRoy: server compromise via CVE-2025-66478 / CVE-2025-55182
- GTIG: Multiple Threat Actors Exploit React2Shell
- EasyShell v1.9 release note (gm7.org copy), cn-sec.com copy
- EasyShell trial note (gm7.org copy)
- GitHub: doki-byte
- ThreatFox: AS36352
- SOCRadar: LiteLLM 1.107.0 supply chain attack
- October 2026 supply chain incident tracker
- Safeguard: 106 malicious npm and PyPI packages
- CSA: agent-framework PyPI compromise
- Censys: Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938
- watchTowr: PHP2Shell FAQ
- CrowdSec: PHP2Shell first five days
- The Register: PHP2Shell and Fragnesia chain (Dream research)
- Ellio: PHP2Shell payloads observed
- F5 Labs: PHP2Shell exploitation attempts
- SOCRadar: PHP2Shell credential-harvesting campaign
- Microsoft: ARTEX abuse and Storm-3358
- Help Net Security: GTIG data on AI-found vulnerabilities
@unixfreaxjp, malwaremustdie.org