Friday, November 20, 2026

MMD-073-2026 - Linux/EasyShell, a new Rust RAT implant and beacon aims Linux and MacOS

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
TLP:CLEAR  |  Version: v11  |  Published: 2026-11-20  |  Updated: 2026-11-21
Table of contents
Part I — Malware analysis
(1) Introduction (2) Threat information and the stager scheme (3) Stager template versus public VShell reports (4) Binary information and major functionality (5) Build provenance left in the binary (6) Configuration block and the !ES slots (7) C2, protocol and network indicators (8) XOR 0x5A string protection (9) Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks (10) Implant overall design (11) Full list of impl-core modules (12) Infrastructure used by the attacker (13) The 32-character constant (14) EasyShell public footprint versus this build (15) Payload set compared: all seven builds (16) What static analysis alone cannot dissect (17) Cross review of the reverse engineering notes and final call
Part II — CTI analysis
(18) CTI: Threat model (19) CTI: Actors and attribution (20) CTI: Timeline and related public research (21) CTI: Kill chain of the attack scheme (22) CTI: TTP — MITRE ATT&CK matrix (23) CTI: Targeted vulnerabilities and weaknesses (24) CTI: IOC triage (enriched)
Part III — Defense
(25) Playbook for IR responders and DFIR (26) Detection and mitigation checklist (27) Detection content: YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery, STIX (28) Responder quick card (29) Inside the victim node: hot forensics (A) Appendix A: Text evidence for chapters 4, 5, 6 and 9 (B) Appendix B: macOS self-check for Linux/EasyShell (C) Appendix C: Revision history (30) Epilogue
Part I — Malware analysis

《 1. Introduction 》

This case started from a shell script spotted in the victim's node, credit to: 0xrb. At first look I read it as one more Chinese miner style uninstaller or downloader, the kind I have seen many times around the VShell, Kinsing and SystemTen campaigns. It is not. The script is a multi platform installer (stager), and the binary it delivers is a Rust beacon implant that I could not find in any public threat report at the time of writing.

I wrote four reverse engineering notes, one forensics analysis note and two OSINT investigation notes during the analysis of this case. In this post I put them side by side, keep only what the sample and the cited sources can prove, and drop the guesses. Every finding carries a confidence label. Predictions are not part of this report. I also keep the forensic evidence analysis (the actor's execution) and the malware analysis (scripts and binaries) in separate sections, so they do not mix, for the purpose of further investigation.

I would like to note that this is one of the earliest publicly documented LoongArch64 RAT implementations, identified within the EasyShell multi-platform Rust implant family.

■ 1.1 Executive summary

ItemSummary
At a glanceA shell stager served from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 drops a payload named polkitd on Linux (5 CPU targets) and macOS (Intel, Apple Silicon). The Linux i386 payload (l32) is a Rust HTTPS beacon implant. Its own build paths name the framework EasyShell (easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core).
Name used in this postLinux/EasyShell (alias ESCH), after the author build string easyshell-http-beacon-implant.
I am confident the malware is a new strain based on the way it built, coding environment trace and based on Rust programming language used, yet it seems inspired with a lot of influence from similar threats we already know under the same ecosystems.
What EasyShell isA Chinese red team C2 framework with versioned releases, HTTP/DNS/KCP listeners, a trial program and a paid member circle, promoted through WeChat security channels next to the tools of the GitHub developer handle doki-byte High. The l32 strings fit that framework (chapter 14).
AimHands-on access: shell, file theft, credential plugins, SOCKS and relay pivot High. No monetisation code. Operator intent unknown (18.1). macOS support is explained in 18.2.
Initial accessNot observed. The C2 was found during the October 2026 vulnerability wave (PHP2Shell and others), but no evidence ties the campaign start to it Unverified (20.1).
StatusStatic analysis of all seven payloads (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and the stager text. No sample was executed.
Payload setAll seven builds share one configuration: same C2, same 32-byte value, same constant Confirmed. Config stamped into prebuilt templates High. The macOS client adds silent screenshots and an AppleScript mouse check; Macs are in scope High (chapters 15, 18.3).
Family callPayload: EasyShell Rust implant Confirmed. Not VShell Confirmed. Stager layout shares the public VShell stager template High. No Kinsing or SystemTen link Confirmed.
Origin markersUSTC cargo mirror, zh-CN first in Accept-Language, Simplified Chinese operator strings, Chinese comments in the stager Confirmed. They describe the build environment of the tool. Since the tool is handed out to trial and paying users, they do not identify the operator of this C2.
C2 / staginghxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (AS36352, prefix 192[.]3.28[.]0/22, US). Same host serves the stager, the payloads and the implant beacon Confirmed.
If you only do one thingLook for a process named like a kernel thread ([kworker/0:0], [rcu_sched], ...) that has a real /proc/<pid>/exe, and for HTTPS POSTs to /api/v2/sync carrying X-Client-Id.

■ 1.2 Key points for busy readers

Short version of what each artifact does. Every point links to the chapter with the evidence. The executive summary in 1.1 is the one summary of the report; later chapters link back to it instead of repeating it.

The stager script
The ELF binary (l32, Linux/EasyShell)
Attacker's shell log analysis
Reading map

■ 1.3 Version

Current version v11 (2026-11-21). The full revision history is in Appendix C.

■ 1.4 OPSEC note

IP addresses and URLs are masked (w[.]x.y[.]z, hxxps) and not linkable. The stager and any code that can be abused are shown as images only. Lab hosts, user names and analysis infrastructure are not shown. Credentials, device identifiers and victim addresses found in the chapter 29 evidence are masked.

■ 1.5 How to read this post

LabelMeaning in this post
ConfirmedProven by the sample bytes, the disassembly, the stager text, or a source page read for this post.
HighStrong evidence from the sample plus at least one public source, small room for another reading.
MediumConsistent with the evidence, but another explanation is still possible.
PartlyPart of the claim holds, part does not.
Not supportedThe sample or the cited source says otherwise, or the claim is an inference presented as a fact.
UnverifiedCould not be checked from the material in hand.

All disassembly views are produced from a static listing (llvm-objdump -d -M intel) with string references resolved by my own script against the i386 GOT base (ebx = 0x083dff88). They are laid out in radare2 style (pd, px, iI, iS) so students can reproduce them with r2 on the same offsets.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A screenshot of a script is evidence of the stager only. The family call must come from the payload, not from the downloader layout.
  • Write confidence next to each finding. It stops a first impression from turning into a conclusion.

《 2. Threat information and the stager scheme 》

▸ [!] The script is shown as an image on purpose (malicious code shown as image for safety). The URL host is masked, each original Chinese comment is kept and followed by its English translation (EN), and the screenshot ends at the line that sets the execute permission, so the execution tail is not visible and is not reconstructed here.
[ITW] stager script with original Chinese comments and English translation (view-only image)
Stager text transcribed from the C2 screenshot, IP masked. Each original Chinese comment is kept and followed by an English line marked EN. Highlighted lines: writable path probe, payload name, macOS hiding and Gatekeeper handling.
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack

Evidence: the original screenshot of the stager as served by the C2. The IP is masked in the image; nothing else is edited. The Chinese comments are the author originals (translated in the transcription above). The capture ends at the execute-permission line.

[ITW] original C2 stager screenshot, IP masked (view-only image)
Original screenshot of the stager served by hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (IP masked, no other edit).
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack

■ 2.1 What each block does

LinesBehaviourConfidence
1 to 8Extends PATH, then tests write access by touching and deleting writeablex in /usr/local/bin, /usr/libexec, /usr/bin. The working directory ends in the last writable one (as root: /usr/bin), otherwise /tmp.Confirmed
10 to 16Seven payload URLs on one host: /file/darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64, l64, l32, a32, a64, l128.Confirmed
18 to 19Payload file name is fixed: polkitd. Any old copy is deleted first. This is the only "removal" in the script.Confirmed
21 to 45Selects the payload by uname -s and uname -m. l128 maps to loongarch64.Confirmed
46 to 48Download chain curl, wget, python3, python2, all with TLS verification off.Confirmed
23 to 27, 53 to 67macOS only: stores in ~/Library/Caches, chflags hidden, xattr -c (drops com.apple.quarantine), ad-hoc codesign when Xcode CLT exists.Confirmed

So the answer to the first question of this case is simple: it is not a macOS uninstaller. It installs, on both macOS and Linux.

■ 2.2 Chinese terms in the stager comments (glossary)

The stager comments are written in Simplified Chinese. The table lists every term used in them with pinyin and the meaning in this context, so readers can recognise the same wording in other samples. Line numbers refer to the stager image above.

ChinesePinyinEnglish (in this context)Stager line
优先yōuxiānprefer, give priority to24
用户级yònghù jíuser-level24
缓存目录huǎncún mùlùcache directory24
无需wúxūno need for (here: no root needed)24
默认隐藏mòrèn yǐncánghidden by default24
失败再退shībài zài tuìif that fails, fall back to24
清掉qīng diàoclear out, wipe55
所有扩展属性suǒyǒu kuòzhǎn shǔxìngall extended attributes (xattr)55
含hánincluding55
下载xiàzàidownload55
本来不带běnlái bù dàidoes not carry in the first place55
隔离属性gélí shǔxìngquarantine attribute (com.apple.quarantine)55
这行是兜底zhè háng shì dōudǐthis line is the fallback / safety net57
保证bǎozhèngto make sure57
即使jíshǐeven if57
浏览器liúlǎnqìweb browser57
隔空投送gékōng tóusòngAirDrop (Apple term in Chinese UI)57
放过来fàng guòláidropped / sent over57
直接跑zhíjiē pǎorun directly57
已装yǐ zhuāngalready installed60
顺手补一次shùnshǒu bǔ yī cìadd it once while at it60
签名qiānmíngsignature (code signing)60
要求yāoqiúrequires60
可执行文件kě zhíxíng wénjiànexecutable file60
有效签名yǒuxiào qiānmíngvalid signature60
这步zhè bùthis step62
都跑得起来dōu pǎo de qǐláican all run62
没装méi zhuāngnot installed62
直接跳过zhíjiē tiàoguòskip straight past it62
不会弹bú huì tánwill not pop up62
安装提示框ānzhuāng tíshì kuànginstall prompt dialog62
黑吃黑hēi chī hēi"black eats black": criminals preying on criminals (not in the stager, used in chapter 29)n/a
▸ Reading tip: colloquial wording such as "兜底" (safety net), "顺手" (while at it) and "跑" (to run, literally "to run on foot") is developer slang. It reads like notes written by the tool author for its users, which fits a framework template more than a one-off script written for this campaign.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Read rm lines in context. Here they only clean the probe files and a previous payload copy.
  • Gatekeeper handling in a downloader (hide, strip quarantine, ad-hoc sign) is a strong macOS hunting point by itself.

《 3. Stager template versus public VShell reports 》

The opening block (PATH extension plus the writeablex probe) is described in Trellix research on VShell, and a December 2025 incident write-up shows the same probe lines with l64/l32/a64/a32 variables on port 8443. NVISO documents the same short architecture labels in its VShell detection rules, plus d64/m64 for Darwin.

ElementPublic VShell materialThis stager
writeablex probeYes (Trellix, incident write-up)Yes
l64 / l32 / a64 / a32 labelsYes (incident write-up, NVISO rules)Yes
Download URL form?h=..&p=..&t=..&a=l64&stage=true (incident write-up)/file/<arch>
Darwin labeld64 / m64 (NVISO rules)darwin_amd64 / darwin_arm64
LoongArchNot documentedl128
Payload nameRandom hex name (incident write-up)Fixed polkitd
macOS Gatekeeper stepsNot documentedYes

Verdict: the stager shares the public VShell stager template High. The /file/ routes, the Darwin names, l128 and the macOS steps are not in the public VShell material I could check Confirmed. The template alone does not name the payload family, and chapter 4 shows the payload is not VShell. Whether this stager is generated by the EasyShell server itself is not proven: the l32 implant speaks of "listener payloads", but the /file/ routes and the stager text are not inside l32 Unverified.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Downloader templates are copied between toolkits. Treat a template match as a link to a layout, not to a malware family.

《 4. Binary information and major functionality 》

polkitd (l32) :: file information  [static, never executed]
l32 payload. Toolchain strings from .comment: Rust 1.95.0 (2026-04-14) built on Ubuntu 22.04.
polkitd (l32) :: sections
Standard sections, not packed: .text about 2.4 MB, .rodata about 640 KB.

The l32 file is the payload of the stager: it is the object served at /file/l32, it is saved as polkitd, and its embedded C2 is the same host and port Confirmed. It is a statically linked Rust binary (3,769,372 bytes), built after 14 April 2026 Confirmed. VShell clients are Go programs, so this payload is not a VShell client Confirmed. Six more builds from the same server (x86-64, LoongArch, ARM and macOS) are compared in chapter 15.

Major functionality, detailed in chapters 6 to 11: tagged config slots patched by a builder, HTTPS beacon to /api/v2/sync, XOR 0x5A string pool, kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox checks, PTY shell, plugin execution, chunked file transfer, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, screenshot helper and self delete.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • The .comment section survives stripping. Compiler and Rust versions there give you a lower bound for the build date.

《 5. Build provenance left in the binary 》

polkitd (l32) :: project source paths left by the build
Project source paths. The crates/ prefix plus mirrors.ustc.edu.cn come from the build host cargo setup.
MarkerValueConfidence
Framework / crate nameseasyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core (27 module paths)Confirmed
Crate sourceEvery dependency fetched through mirrors.ustc.edu.cn (USTC cargo mirror)Confirmed
Operator textSimplified Chinese messages (chapter 8 and 14)Confirmed
Request headerAccept-Language zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Confirmed
Go componentOperator hint Run build-client.ps1, go build, redeploy client and transport labels Rust, Go, Go tcpConfirmed (strings), the Go part itself is not in hand

These are environment markers of the developer. They show a Chinese language build environment High. They do not identify a person or a named threat group, and I do not attribute this case to any group.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Cargo writes the registry path into panic metadata. A mirror name in that path tells you how the build host was configured.

《 6. Configuration block and the !ES slots 》

The builder patches fixed slots tagged !ES/<n>/<TAG>/. Tags present in l32: PASS, PROXY, SBOX, BURI, UAGT, WAIT, JITR, CTYP, HDRS Confirmed. A slot that still shows its tag followed by underscores is unpatched. Next to them, a space padded block holds the live values.

polkitd (l32) :: config table builder  fcn.08062a04
Config table builder: one function loads the C2 URL, the 32-byte base64 value, /api/v2/sync, the SBOX and UAGT slots, a binary blob, 3000, 8, CTYP and HDRS into one structure. C2 masked.
polkitd (l32) :: configuration block bytes
Raw bytes: UAGT and SBOX are unpatched in this build. The base64 value sits in its own space padded field.
polkitd (l32) :: User-Agent slot check  (fcn.08065a89)
If the UAGT slot still starts with its 11-byte tag, the code moves past the tag of a second copy and uses the built-in Chrome 131 Windows User-Agent.
FieldValue in l32What is proven
C2 basehxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443Loaded by the config builder Confirmed
Sync path/api/v2/syncLoaded by the config builder Confirmed
32-byte valueLY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo= (hex 2d8ea70c...cec8de5a)Stored and loaded Confirmed. Role (public key or symmetric key) Unverified
User-AgentBuilt-in default, slot unpatchedConfirmed
Sandbox profile (SBOX)Unpatched; code checks for a { JSON startConfirmed
3000 and 8Literal defaults in the tableStored Confirmed. Meaning (interval, jitter) Unverified
Tag to value mappingFor example BURI = C2 URLUnverified (the URL is not inside the BURI slot)
[EDU] What to learn here
  • When a config uses tagged placeholder slots, compare a patched and an unpatched slot. The padding style tells you which values the operator really set.
  • Do not name a value by its neighbour. Here the C2 URL is loaded by code, not by a tag, so the tag meaning stays unverified.

《 7. C2, protocol and network indicators 》

polkitd (l32) :: beacon header and timeout references
Code references: the Client-Id / X-Client-Id header names, the zh-CN Accept-Language value, and the "beacon first POST timeout" path.
IndicatorValueConfidence
TransportHTTPS via reqwest + rustls to hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443Confirmed
Method / pathPOST /api/v2/syncConfirmed
Client headerX-Client-Id (also Client-Id, client-id)Confirmed
BodyJSON envelope with keys from the HDRS template (requestHeaders, responseHeaders, actionKey, payloadKey, ...)Confirmed (strings) / exact layout Unverified
User-AgentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) ... Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Confirmed
Accept-Languagezh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Confirmed
SleepSleep and jitter messages, 200 ms fast poll modeConfirmed (strings)
Other transports of the frameworkOperator text: the cascade bridge supports only TCP/WebSocket transport, "current HTTP transport unavailable"Confirmed (strings). This build is the HTTP one.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A Windows browser User-Agent sent by a Linux process is a mismatch you can hunt on any proxy log.

《 8. XOR 0x5A string protection 》

Part of the string pool is stored XOR encoded with one byte, 0x5A. Spaces become z (0x20 ^ 0x5A = 0x7A), which is why the encoded pool looks like ?(z 3*z noise Confirmed.

polkitd (l32) :: XOR 0x5A string decoder  fcn.080b2721 + caller
Caller passes the encoded label and the key 0x5a; the decoder loop at 0x080b2778 XORs each byte and appends it to the output buffer.
polkitd (l32) :: decoded samples (XOR 0x5A)
Samples decoded offline with the same key.

Operator messages (Simplified Chinese, translated) say that token elevation, credential dumping (via Mimikatz), browser password theft and sensitive file search are not built into this implant and are offered through an "Extensions" plugin set Confirmed. ConPTY strings for Windows 10 1809 / Server 2019 sit in the same pool, so the framework has a Windows side Confirmed. The Windows implant itself is not in hand.

The same caller copies 32 raw bytes from 0x082afdc0 together with the decoded label es-hop-wire-v1 into a routine with 0x80 padding and a 64-byte block length, the shape of SHA-256 finalisation. This is consistent with a key derivation for the relay hop protocol Medium.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Single-byte XOR leaves the text length unchanged and turns spaces into one repeated byte. Count the most frequent byte in a "random" string pool before you reach for a debugger.

《 9. Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks 》

polkitd (l32) :: process-name table (procname.rs)
Eleven kernel-thread style names stored as (pointer, length) pairs.

The names belong to procname.rs. Real kernel threads have no user space executable, so any of these names with a valid /proc/<pid>/exe link is a strong host indicator Confirmed. The selection logic was not traced in this static pass Unverified.

polkitd (l32) :: anti-sandbox inputs (sandbox_guard.rs)
Inputs read by sandbox_guard.rs: DMI vendor files, hypervisor names, systemd virtualization variable, resource limits and mouse activity on /dev/input/mice.

The interactive shell prepares its environment with HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0 and set +H so shell history is not kept Confirmed.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A sandbox that has no mouse and a small /tmp is easy to detect. Give your dynamic lab realistic resources if you want to see the beacon run.

《 10. Implant overall design 》

The diagram below is drawn only from what the stager text and the l32 binary show. Each box is a module or a string set confirmed in chapters 2 to 9; flows marked between the implant and the C2 come from the config builder and the beacon references.

+------------------------+                 +----------------------------------+
| stager  (sh / bash)    |    /file/<arch> | C2 + staging host                |
| writeablex probe       |<----------------| hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443    |
| uname -s / uname -m    |                 | /file/darwin_amd64  darwin_arm64 |
| curl,wget,python3,py2  |                 | /file/l64 l32 a32 a64 l128       |
+-----------+------------+                 +----------------+-----------------+
            |  save as polkitd                              ^
            |  (macOS: hide, xattr -c, codesign)            |
            v                                               |
+-----------+----------------------------------+            |
| polkitd   Rust  EasyShell impl-core          |            |
|----------------------------------------------|            |  POST /api/v2/sync
|  config    !ES/<n>/<TAG>/ slots, C2 URL,     |            |  X-Client-Id + JSON
|            32-byte base64 value              |            |  UA Chrome/131 (Win)
|  strings   XOR 0x5A protected pool           |            |  Accept-Language zh-CN
|  stealth   procname  [kworker/0:0] ...       |            |
|  guard     sandbox_guard: DMI, VM names,     |            |
|            mouse, cpu/ram/uptime/tmp         |            |
|  uplink    es-beacon-uplink  ----------------|------------+
|            sleep + jitter, 200ms fast poll   |
+-----------+----------------------------------+
            |  tasks from C2 (wire_dispatch, wire_chunk)
            v
+-----------+------------------+           +------------------------------+
| task dispatcher              |---------->| interactive PTY shell        |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| plugin / script execution    |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| file upload / download / zip |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| SOCKS5 + relay hops          |
|                              |           |   es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND    |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| outbound proxy               |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| screenshot sidecar           |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| process list / kill          |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| delete self                  |
+------------------------------+           +------------------------------+
                                             not built in, "Extensions" set:
                                             privesc, Mimikatz, browser creds
Legend: ■ boxes   ■ flow   ■ C2 URL / beacon   ■ payload routes, files, names   ■ components
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Draw the design from confirmed parts only. A box you cannot point to in the binary does not belong in the diagram.

《 11. Full list of impl-core modules 》

Module pathFunction (from module name and nearby strings)Confidence
interactive.rsPTY shell (openpty, /bin/bash -il, zsh -i, /bin/sh)Confirmed
plugin_exec/unix.rs, execute_gate.rsReceives and runs native binaries and scripts ("[*] spawning native binary in isolated child")Confirmed
download_xfer.rs, upload_worker.rs, folder_zip.rs, wire_chunk.rsFile transfer in chunks, folder archiving with a 4 GiB limitConfirmed
socks_tunnel/*SOCKS5 start/stop, multiplexed tunnels, relay hops (es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND), listen and forward labelsConfirmed
outbound_proxy.rsOutbound via tcp/http/https/socks4/socks4a/socks5/socks5h proxyConfirmed
screenshot_sidecar.rsScreenshot through a helper; Linux path refuses without a displayConfirmed
svc_ops.rs, sysinfo.rsProcess list (Process Name, PPID, PID, Arch, User), kill, host infoConfirmed
delete_self.rsSelf delete (delete-self-1)Confirmed
sandbox_guard.rs, sandbox_user.rsAnti-VM and user presence checks (chapter 9)Confirmed
crypto.rsUses AES, curve25519, SHA-2 crates; exact schemeUnverified
(command marker)!inj: platform string next to the PROXY slot: an injection command exists in the command set; what it does on Linux was not tracedConfirmed (string) / behaviour Unverified

No mining code, no wallet, no stratum strings, no competitor killer, no spreader and no persistence routine were found in l32 Confirmed. This is a remote access implant, not a miner.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Rust panic metadata keeps module file paths even in stripped builds. Use them as a free table of contents for the binary.

《 12. Infrastructure used by the attacker 》

// Infrastructure used by attacker //

One IP is used by the attacker in this case: it serves the stager, the seven payloads and the beacon. The other rows are context from the public record, with reverse DNS, ASN, prefix, AS name and country in the same line format.

192[.]3.31[.]148  | (PTR not collected)                     |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
192[.]3.31[.]219  | 192-3-31-219-host.colocrossing[.]com.   |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
192[.]3.211[.]176 | (PTR not collected)                     |36352 | (not collected)   | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
119[.]45.243[.]154 | (PTR not collected)                    |45090 | 119[.]45.0[.]0/16 | TENCENT-NET-AP             | CN |
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack
IP (masked)RoleRelation to this caseConfidence
192[.]3.31[.]148Stager host, payload host and beacon C2 on tcp/8443This caseConfirmed
192[.]3.211[.]176Reported by an OSINT note as a ThreatFox VShell C2 on tcp/19999, first seen 2026-04-15Same provider only. Entry not read for this post; a provider match is not an operator linkUnverified
119[.]45.243[.]154December 2025 incident write-up: same writeablex stager template on tcp/8443Template context, different provider and timeConfirmed (write-up) / link Not supported
▸ BGP data: AS36352 is registered to HostPapa (AS name AS-COLOCROSSING, Buffalo NY, ARIN); 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 is a ColoCrossing prefix of AS36352; 119[.]45.0[.]0/16 is announced by AS45090 (Tencent). Collected 2026-11-20 from public registry and BGP views. The TLS certificate on tcp/8443 was not collected, so no certificate pivot is made. Do not block the whole AS36352: it has a long and mixed history. The neighbour 192[.]3.31[.]219 in the same /22 carried AgentTesla payload URLs in June to July 2020 (URLhaus, all offline); it is old shared hosting and not related to this case.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A shared ASN or a shared /22 is hosting context, not attribution. A shared TLS certificate, a shared URL route or a shared payload hash is a real link.
  • Write the prefix next to the IP. Abuse reports and blocklists work on prefixes, and the prefix tells you whom to contact.

《 13. The 32-character constant 》

polkitd (l32) :: 32-char constant reference  fcn.080b2c62
Lazy initialiser that passes the 32-character string with length 0x20 to a parsing routine.

The string 8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw is a hard-coded constant used by one lazy initialiser Confirmed. It is not stored in the !ES/1/PASS/ slot; that slot holds no value in this build Confirmed. Its role (password, pre-shared key or other) is Unverified. Treat it as a sample-specific string for retro-hunting, not as a credential.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Check where a value lives before you name it. A string near a slot tag is not automatically that slot value.

《 14. EasyShell public footprint versus this build 》

The OSINT notes pointed to a Chinese red team C2 framework called EasyShell. I read what was reachable and compared it with the l32 strings. Only what both sides show is used below.

■ 14.1 What the public pages show

StatementSourceConfidence
EasyShell is a red team C2 tool released in numbered versions; v1.9 fixed a heartbeat bug that made HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions unstable, fixed Linux builds made on a new Ubuntu that ran badly on old CentOS, and reworked the clientgm7.org v1.9 note, cn-sec.com mirrorConfirmed
Earlier release notes listed with it: v1.8 "client rebuilt, smaller size, better AV evasion" and v1.7Same v1.9 noteConfirmed
v1.9 demo covers client generation, screen monitoring and an autostart testSame v1.9 noteConfirmed (claim in the note)
New versions go to a paid member circle together with the morelian WebShell manager and an AV evasion build of EasyTools; old versions are given on requestSame v1.9 noteConfirmed
Trial program for normal users: previous version only, one device for two days, reset by pointsgm7.org trial noteConfirmed
GitHub handle doki-byte publishes EasyTools and other offensive toolinggithub.com/doki-byteConfirmed
EasyShell comes from the same developer ecosystem as doki-byte (tools bundled in the same member offer)v1.9 note plus GitHub profileHigh
A README in a doki-byte/EasyShell repository credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt Strike as design referencesOSINT note B; page not reachable for this postUnverified

■ 14.2 Match against l32

Framework feature (public)Seen in l32Confidence of match
Name EasyShelleasyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slots, ESCH prefixConfirmed
Several listener transports (HTTP, DNS, KCP, plus TCP/WebSocket per OSINT note B)Operator text naming TCP/WebSocket and HTTP transports; "redeploy latest listener payload"; this build is the HTTP one; no KCP and no DNS listener codeHigh
Client rebuilt and made smaller (v1.8)Rust client, 3.77 MB static i386, built after 2026-04-14; Go client hint "go build, redeploy client" still presentMedium (language of v1.8 not stated in the page I read)
Linux build compatibility fix (v1.9)l32 is statically linked, GCC 11.4 on Ubuntu 22.04Medium
Plugins outside the core"Extensions" plugin set for elevation, credentials, browser passwords, file searchConfirmed
Screen monitoringscreenshot_sidecar.rsConfirmed
Windows sideConPTY stringsConfirmed
Autostart / persistenceNo persistence routine in l32Not in this build

Result: l32 is a client of the EasyShell red team framework sold and trialled through these channels High. The framework developer is a tool author. Who operates 192[.]3.31[.]148 is not known, and the trial and member distribution means it can be any user of the tool Confirmed.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A commercial or trial red team kit found in the wild is a dual-use case. Separate three roles in your report: the tool author, the tool user (operator), and the victim.
  • Match features both ways. A public feature you cannot see in the binary is a gap, not a contradiction, and a binary feature missing from the public notes is new information.

《 15. Payload set compared: all seven builds 》

After the first draft, the six other payloads served by the same C2 were collected and analysed statically: /file/l64, /file/l128, /file/a32, /file/a64, /file/darwin_amd64 and /file/darwin_arm64. All seven routes of the stager are now covered.

RouteFile typeSizeToolchainSHA-256
l32ELF32 Intel 80386, static, stripped3,769,372rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.04fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
l64ELF64 x86-64, static-pie, stripped4,632,328rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 11.2.1 and 9.4.0 objectsc31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696
l128ELF64 LoongArch, dynamic (glibc-style names, loader /lib/ld.so.1, see 15.2), stripped3,661,344rustc 1.96.0 (ac68faa20, 2026-05-25), GCC (GNU) 13.2.07fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
a32ELF32 ARM EABI5, static, stripped3,351,856rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.0412b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf
a64ELF64 AArch64, static, stripped3,755,152rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 9.4.0d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4
darwin_amd64Mach-O x86_64 PIE, ad-hoc signed4,072,800rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 10.15fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
darwin_arm64Mach-O arm64 PIE, ad-hoc signed3,468,736rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 11.0b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf

■ 15.1 One configuration in every build

payload set :: one config in all seven builds  [static]
The same C2 field, 32-byte base64 value and 32-character constant in all seven payloads. C2 masked.

All seven builds carry the same C2 (hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443), the same 32-byte base64 value, the same 32-character constant, the same /api/v2/sync path and the same !ES/ slot layout with UAGT and SBOX left unpatched Confirmed. The configuration was set once for this server Confirmed.

The builds were not compiled in one run: l128 was compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25), the other six with rustc 1.95.0 (2026-04-14), and four different C toolchains appear across the set Confirmed. With the tagged, padded !ES/ slots (chapter 6), this fits a builder that stamps the operator configuration into prebuilt client templates High. The compiler fingerprints then describe how the EasyShell developer builds the templates, not the machine of the operator Medium. Earlier drafts of this chapter said the set was built together; that is corrected here.

■ 15.2 Linux builds: x86-64, ARM and LoongArch

l64, l128, a32 and a64 have the same 27 impl-core module paths as l32, the same kworker name table, sandbox checks, XOR 0x5A pool and operator strings Confirmed. They are the same implant for other CPUs. The differences are in the toolchain: l64 is a static-pie build; a64 was linked with GCC 9.4.0 instead of the Ubuntu 22.04 GCC 11.4.0 of l32 and a32; l128 is the only dynamically linked build (glibc-style names, /lib/ld.so.1, GCC 13.2.0) and the only one compiled with rustc 1.96.0 Confirmed.

The l128 loader path /lib/ld.so.1, its libc.so NEEDED entry and its single GLIBC_2.0 version need do not match a real LoongArch glibc, which uses /lib64/ld-linux-loongarch-lp64d.so.1, libc.so.6 and GLIBC_2.36 or later Confirmed. This points to linking against generic stub libraries instead of a LoongArch sysroot, and on a stock Debian loong64 or Kylin host the file would likely fail to load unless matching links or a compatible loader exist Medium. The build may never have been tested on real hardware Unverified.

l128 (LoongArch) and l64 :: build fingerprints  [static]
l128 (LoongArch): dynamic build with glibc-style names and a non-standard loader path (15.2), compiled with a newer rustc than the rest of the set; l64 for comparison.

LoongArch (l128) is the CPU family of Loongson processors, used mainly in Chinese domestic computing platforms. Shipping a LoongArch client fits a Chinese red team product whose customers must cover those platforms Medium. It does not prove that this operator targets hosts in China Unverified.

■ 15.3 macOS builds

darwin payloads :: Mach-O header, linked frameworks, code signature
Mach-O header, linked system frameworks and the ad-hoc code signature of both darwin payloads.
darwin payloads :: macOS-only behaviour  [static]
macOS-only behaviour: silent screencapture (XOR protected), AppleScript mouse check, TCC-aware process listing, sysctl host info, macOS module paths.
ItemmacOS buildsLinux buildsConfidence
Source path prefix/c/impl-core/src/ (28 paths)crates/impl-core/src/ (27 paths)Confirmed
ScreenshotBuilt in: screenshot/mod.rs, scale.rs, runs /usr/sbin/screencapture -x -t png (silent); string XOR protectedHelper process (screenshot_sidecar.rs), refuses without a displayConfirmed
User presence checksandbox_mouse.rs: osascript asks "System Events" for the mouse position/dev/input/miceConfirmed
Process name masqueradeNone (procname.rs absent)Eleven kworker-style namesConfirmed
Host informationsysctlbyname: hw.model, hw.machine, hw.cpufrequency; IOKit and SystemConfiguration linked/proc and DMI filesConfirmed
Process listingps with a 12 s timeout and an operator hint that macOS TCC may block it ("grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once")/procConfirmed
Shellzsh -i / bash -il with BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1/bin/bash -il, /bin/shConfirmed
PersistenceNo LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon stringsNoneConfirmed
Code signatureAd-hoc (CodeDirectory flags 0x2), no Team ID, identifier http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID>n/aConfirmed

The signature identifier shows the binary was linked under the name http-beacon-implant and signed without any developer identity Confirmed. The stager re-signs the file on the host (codesign --force --sign -), so the identifier on a victim may differ from the one served Unverified.

On current macOS, a screen capture and an AppleScript call to System Events by an unknown binary are subject to TCC privacy permissions (Screen Recording, Automation). The developer message about TCC shows the author expects that friction Confirmed. For defenders this is useful: TCC prompts or denials for a binary named polkitd in a user cache folder are a detection point Medium.

■ 15.4 What the payload set changes in this report

  • The C2, key and constant are confirmed for all seven builds; the IOC and YARA content covers all seven.
  • The macOS client is built for a Mac with a logged-in user: silent screenshots and a mouse-based presence check. Together with both darwin builds being live on the C2, Macs are in scope of this campaign (18.2, 18.3).
  • Template builds come from several toolchains (Ubuntu 22.04 GCC, separate ARM64 and LoongArch toolchains, Apple linker with SDK 15.2), all with the USTC cargo mirror; l128 was rebuilt with a newer rustc after 2026-05-25 Confirmed.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • When a stager serves several builds, collect them all. Shared config values prove one operator setup; platform-specific modules show what the operator wants on each platform.
  • On macOS, read the load commands and the code signature before the code. Minimum OS, SDK, linked frameworks and the signature identifier tell you how and where the binary was built.

《 16. What static analysis alone cannot dissect 》

  • All seven payloads were analysed statically; none was executed, so runtime behaviour (for example the AppleScript and TCC paths on macOS) is described from strings and code references only.
  • The stager execution tail (after the execute-permission line) is not in the screenshot.
  • The TLS certificate on port 8443 was not collected.
  • No Windows EasyShell implant, no Extensions plugin and no Go server or client component are in hand.
  • The crypto scheme behind the 32-byte value and the !inj: command path were not traced.
  • The EasyShell server side (admin console, listeners, notification features) is described only by OSINT notes and cannot be checked from l32.

No sample was executed or emulated: this report is static by policy. The questions below need a dynamic lab (fake network, QEMU user mode or a VM) or deeper control-flow tracing, and stay open until then:

  • How procname.rs picks one of the eleven kernel-thread names, and whether it renames through prctl(PR_SET_NAME), argv[0] or both.
  • The key derivation and framing behind the 32-byte base64 value, crypto.rs and the es-hop-wire-v1 relay handshake.
  • What sandbox_guard.rs does when a DMI, hypervisor or /dev/input/mice check fails: silent exit, sleep or decoy behaviour.
  • Whether the rustls NoVerifier name is wired into a client configuration that skips certificate checks, or is only a library enum name.
  • What the !inj: command does on Linux.

These are listed as gaps, not as expectations. Any update will be added as an addendum.

《 17. Cross review of the reverse engineering notes and final call 》

I wrote four static analysis notes on the samples (#1 to #4), each from a different angle and with different tools, and two OSINT notes (A and B, written at different times). To stay self-critical I used my analysis claim-check playbook: every claim that changes the conclusion is checked below against the sample and the sources I could read. The objective is a verdict as objective as possible, with clear reasoning.

■ 17.1 Claim check

ClaimRaised byVerdictEvidence
Stager is an installer, not an uninstaller#2, #3, #4ConfirmedScript text
Stager is a "miner" dropper#1, #2Not supportedNo miner logic in the script; l32 has no mining code
Stager follows the VShell stager template#1, #3, #4, AHighTrellix, incident write-up, NVISO labels
VShell serves exactly /file/<arch> incl. l128#3Not supportedPublic material shows ?a=l64&stage=true and d64/m64; /file/ and l128 not documented
Payload is VShell#1Not supportedl32 is Rust; VShell clients are Go (NVISO, GTIG)
Payload is a Rust EasyShell beacon implant#2, #3, #4ConfirmedCrate paths, config slots, beacon strings
Related to Kinsing / SystemTen#1, #2Not supportedNo Kinsing markers in stager or payload
GTIG documented polkitd masquerade in SNOWLIGHT/VShell#1, #3Not supportedGTIG shows polkitd as the argument of COMPOOD (file /tmp/vim), not VShell
C2 port 8443 uses a self-signed certificate#3UnverifiedOnly inferred from -k flags; certificate not collected
MalwareBazaar hash and HPE Mach-O VShell spike as correlation#3UnverifiedNot checked against the cited sources
!ES/1/PASS/ = 8M5c7faX...#3Not supportedPASS slot empty; constant used elsewhere (chapter 13)
!ES/8/BURI/ = C2 URL#3UnverifiedURL loaded by code from a separate field
XOR 0x5A string protection#3, #4ConfirmedDecoder at 0x080b2721
TLS validation explicitly disabled in the implant#3UnverifiedNoVerifier/IgnoreHostnames are library enum names; the code path was not traced
Chinese language build environment#2, #3, #4HighUSTC mirror, zh-CN header, Chinese operator text
Kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox, history suppression#3, #4ConfirmedTables and strings in chapter 9
IP and implant markers not in public reporting#1 to #4, A, BMediumSearch engines and the pages reachable on 2026-11-20
Neighbour 192[.]3.31[.]219 is old AgentTesla hosting, unrelatedAConfirmedURLhaus host page
192[.]3.211[.]176:19999 is a ThreatFox VShell C2 on the same providerAUnverifiedEntry not read; even if true, provider match only
Chinese "EasyShell" red team tool is a different Go implementationAPartlyThe red team EasyShell exists; the l32 strings match it (chapter 14), so "different" is not supported
EasyShell is a Chinese red team C2 framework linked to doki-byteBHighv1.9 and trial notes, GitHub profile (chapter 14)
README credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt StrikeBUnverifiedRepository page not reachable
Stager is the native EasyShell stager, not a mash-upBUnverifiedRests on the README claim; stager routes are not inside l32
HTTP and DNS listeners added on 2026-10-24BNot supportedThe v1.9 note already fixes HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions
v1.8 rebuilt the client in Rust, 10 MB to 2 MBBPartlyClient rebuild and smaller size confirmed; Rust and the sizes not in the page I read
15-minute temporary staging listener explains why scanners missed the C2BNot supportedFeature not verified; scanner silence does not prove a closed port
Default admin console on tcp/58090 with Basic authBUnverifiedServer side; not checkable from l32; not used as a pivot here
Extensions plugins load from the implant directoryBPartlyExtensions plugin set confirmed in l32; directory and auto-load not
Linux user-mode hiding plugin, "likely LD_PRELOAD"BUnverifiedNo hiding code in l32; mechanism is a guess
SMTP, WeCom and DingTalk notificationsBUnverifiedServer side; nothing in l32
Built with AI help; bypasses named AV productsBUnverifiedDeveloper claims, not testable here
Operators will combine it with Redis or cloud key abuseBNot supportedPrediction, removed from this report

The confirmed and high-confidence results of this review are the ones listed in 1.1.

■ 17.2 Not established

  • Who operates the C2. The tool author is not assumed to be the operator. The intruder of the chapter 29 host ran the stager from this C2, which does not name the operator either.
  • Initial access vector. The threat is new and its traffic is limited; the way it is distributed may still leave traces that lead analysts to similar threats.
  • Role of the 32-byte base64 value and of the 32-character constant.
  • Any second C2 node, leaked source code or paste for this implant: none found on 2026-11-20.

■ 17.3 Naming: Linux/EasyShell

The family is named after the strings the author left in the build: easyshell-http-beacon-implant, the !ES/ slot tags and ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS. "ESCH" is kept as an alias because it appears in the operator messages (ESCH chunk:); its expansion is not known Unverified. "VShell" is used only for the stager template, and "strain" is not used because no parent family is proven.

The name EasyShell is also used by unrelated, legitimate software. None of them is a Rust beacon and none shares the implant crate names Confirmed:

Project (public)What it isLink to this implant
oyzh1994/easyshellCross-platform multi-protocol client (SSH, SFTP, RDP, VNC, Redis, ...)None found
3th1nk/easyshellGo library for interactive shell over SSH/TelnetNone found
easyshell-ai/easyshellServer operations platform with agents and web terminalNone found
anb0s/EasyShellEclipse plugin (discontinued)None found
methodox EasyShell (easy)C# scripting language for build automationNone found
tiandi0716/EasyShell, gitee easyshellSSH / SFTP / RDP desktop clientsNone found
▸ When you search for this threat, use easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core or !ES/9/UAGT/. The word "easyshell" alone returns the projects above.
Final call: Linux/EasyShell, a Rust client of a Chinese red team C2 framework, delivered by a VShell-template multi-platform stager from one ColoCrossing host; operator unknown; no attribution to a named actor.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A cross review is not a vote. One note with evidence beats three notes repeating the same first impression.
  • Reject inference written as fact, even when it sounds plausible. "Scanners did not see it, so the port closed after 15 minutes" is a story, not evidence.
Part II — CTI analysis

《 18. CTI: Threat model 》

FieldValueSupporting text
ThreatLinux/EasyShell (alias ESCH)Rust HTTPS beacon client of the EasyShell red team C2 framework (chapter 14)
CategoryRemote access implant (dual-use red team kit used in the wild)No mining, no spreader, no ransomware code in l32
PlatformsLinux x86, x86_64, ARM, ARM64, LoongArch; macOS Intel and Apple SiliconStager targets; all seven payloads analysed statically (chapter 15)
DeliveryShell stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>Needs a shell command on the target; entry point not observed
C2HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync on tcp/8443Chapter 7
ObjectiveInteractive control, file transfer, tunnelling into the network, plugins for credentialsCapabilities, not observed actions
VictimsOne compromised host (chapter 29)No victim is visible in the stager, the payloads or the C2 distribution. Hot forensics of one compromised host (chapter 29) shows an intruder who ran this stager and handled data whose origin and relation to this case are unknown.
ImpactHighFull remote shell with root when the stager ran as root, plus SOCKS and relay pivot into internal networks
LikelihoodNot measurable from one sampleExposure grows with the tool distribution (trial and member model confirmed)

■ 18.1 What the campaign aims at

Only the capabilities are proven; the intent behind this C2 is not. The l32 command set is built for a person at the keyboard: PTY shell, file upload and download, folder archiving, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, outbound proxy, screenshot, process control, and plugins for credential dumping and browser passwords. There is no miner, no DDoS module, no ransomware and no spreader Confirmed. The aim class is therefore hands-on access: collect data and credentials and pivot into internal networks from a foothold High.

ReadingFits the evidence becauseAgainst it / missingConfidence
Criminal or espionage operator using a commercial kitAccess and pivot toolset; credential plugins; hosting on a cheap VPS providerNo victim, no data theft observedUnverified
Access broker (sell or hand over footholds)Tunnels and relay hops keep access usable for othersNo marketplace or resale evidenceUnverified
Authorized red team engagementEasyShell is sold as a red team tool; one C2, no observed harmServed openly to anyone who requested the stagerUnverified
▸ None of these readings can be excluded with one C2 and no victim. The report keeps "operator unknown" until a victim or a second C2 is found.

■ 18.2 Why macOS is in scope

The stager handles macOS with care, and its own comments (translated) explain why: it uses the user-level ~/Library/Caches folder because no root is needed and Finder hides it; it clears extended attributes so the file still runs "even if it was delivered by a browser or AirDrop"; and it ad-hoc signs the file because "Apple Silicon requires executables to carry a valid signature", skipping the step when Xcode Command Line Tools are missing "so no install prompt pops up" Confirmed.

ReadingEvidenceConfidence
R1: the macOS branch is part of the framework generic deployment one-liner, written for every client buildGeneric wording ("any darwin payload", browser or AirDrop delivery that has nothing to do with this curl download); the framework also has a Windows side, so client builds exist for several platformsMedium
R2: the operator keeps Macs in scope, in particular Macs with a user in front of them (developer and admin machines)Both darwin builds are live on the C2 and the stager routes Darwin hosts to them; care to avoid a visible prompt; the macOS client takes silent screenshots and checks mouse movement through AppleScript (chapter 15); Linux and macOS together fit developer and DevOps estatesHigh (in scope) / Unverified (Macs as the main target)

Both readings are true at the same time: the framework makes a macOS client available (R1), and this operator chose to keep it live on the server (R2). Hosting a payload is an operator decision even when a builder generates it. What one server cannot show is whether Macs are the main target or one platform among all of them; macOS EDR telemetry for ~/Library/Caches/polkitd and TCC prompts naming it would answer that. Chapter 23.8 lists the October and November 2026 vectors that can reach Linux and macOS together.

■ 18.3 Practical macOS infection chain

Nothing in the stager or the clients exploits macOS. The Mac is infected when one shell command runs as the user; from there each step below is in the stager text or the darwin binaries.

[0] Entry      not observed: Terminal paste lure | poisoned dev package | operator over SSH
        |              (stolen keys, or pivot through a Linux foothold SOCKS/relay tunnel)
[1] Fetch      one-liner pulls the stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (TLS checks off)
        |
[2] Place      uname -s = Darwin  ->  cd ~/Library/Caches  (no root, hidden in Finder)
        |
[3] Select     uname -m  ->  /file/darwin_arm64 or /file/darwin_amd64  saved as polkitd
        |              curl download carries no quarantine flag
[4] Prepare    chflags hidden -> xattr -c -> codesign --force --sign - (only if Xcode CLT exists)
        |
[5] Run        chmod +x, start (launch line cut off in the screenshot)
        |
[6] Check      sysctl hw.model, AppleScript mouse position via System Events
        |
[7] Beacon     HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync  X-Client-Id
        |
[8] Operate    zsh shell, files, folder zip, screencapture -x, SOCKS/relay, plugins
        |
[9] Persist    none in the client: gone at logout or reboot unless the operator adds it
StepEvidenceConfidenceWhere defenders can see it
0 EntryNot in the artifacts; the routes are the ones that give a user shell on a MacUnverifiedTerminal history, browser history of the lure page, package install logs, SSH auth logs
1 to 4Stager lines 10 to 67ConfirmedUnified log and EDR process events for curl, chflags, xattr, codesign with polkitd; Sigma rule in the pack
3 QuarantineA file fetched by curl has no com.apple.quarantine attribute, so the Gatekeeper first-launch check that keys on it does not apply; the stager clears attributes anywayHighExecutable without quarantine in a user Caches folder
4 SignatureBoth darwin files are already ad-hoc signed as served, so the re-sign step is a safety netConfirmedSignature identifier http-beacon-implant-* or a re-signed polkitd without Team ID
6 Checkosascript and sysctl strings in the client; runtime behaviour of the AppleScript query not testedConfirmed (strings)osascript child of polkitd; Automation prompt for System Events
8 Screenshotsscreencapture -x -t png; macOS asks for Screen Recording permission before a full captureConfirmed / permission HighScreen Recording prompt or TCC log entry naming the binary or its parent terminal
8 Process listOperator hint: TCC may block it, "grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once"ConfirmedFull Disk Access requests in TCC logs

What the TCC hint tells us about the launch. On macOS, a program started from a Terminal session is normally checked against the privacy permissions of that terminal app. A developer who writes "run from Terminal once" expects the client to be started from an interactive Terminal or SSH session Medium. That fits the Terminal paste lure and the operator over SSH better than a silent drive-by. It also means the first AppleScript or screen capture can raise a visible prompt such as "Terminal wants to control System Events", which a careful user or an MDM log can catch Medium.

What they gain on a Mac. Developer and admin Macs hold source code, SSH keys, cloud tokens and VPN access. With no persistence in the client, the pattern that fits is a short hands-on session: take keys and tokens, look at the screen, then move to servers through the tunnels Medium.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • On macOS, ask first how the first command ran. A kit without an exploit still works on a Mac if a user or an SSH session runs one line.
  • Quarantine, signature and TCC are separate controls. Check each one in your logs: missing quarantine, ad-hoc signature without Team ID, and TCC prompts naming an unknown binary.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Capabilities tell you what an implant can do, not what its operator wants. Write the aim as a capability class and keep intent as a separate, rated reading.
  • Comments left in a stager often explain design choices. Read them as the developer voice, not as campaign intelligence.

《 19. CTI: Actors and attribution 》

ItemValueEvidenceConfidence
ToolEasyShell red team C2 frameworkBuild strings plus public release notesHigh
Tool developerDeveloper ecosystem around GitHub handle doki-byteBundled member offer with EasyTools and morelianHigh
Tool distributionWeChat channels, trial program, paid member circlev1.9 and trial notesConfirmed
Operator of 192[.]3.31[.]148UnknownAny trial or member user can run the kitUnverified
Language environmentChinese (Simplified)Operator text, zh-CN header, USTC mirror, stager commentsConfirmed
Intruder of the chapter 29 hostRan the stager from 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (history line 333)Shell history of the compromised hostConfirmed (fetch and run) / Medium (same operator or affiliate)
Named threat groupNoneNo overlap with a reported group beyond the shared VShell stager templateUnverified

Additionally, C2 timeline analysis from similar threat I followed is showing a correlation to VShell threat as per shown in the table below, but its association is unverified at the moment we released this analysis.

C2 Service              | Threat information                      | Threat correlation
------------------------+-----------------------------------------+---------------------
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443	| EasyShell staging and C2, Nov 2026	  | Direct (this case)
192[.]3.211[.]176:19999	| Previously reported VShell C2, Apr 2026 | Same ASN; association unverified
119[.]45.243[.]154:8443	| Similar VShell stager, Dec 2025         | Technique similarity only; association unverified

■ 19.1 Analyst note on the "doki-byte" link

▸ The link is to the tool, not to the attack. Naming a tool developer as the attacker would be the same mistake as naming the Cobalt Strike vendor for every Beacon in the wild. The developer link is kept at High because of the shared member offer, and the operator stays Unknown.

■ 19.2 Diamond model

                     [ ADVERSARY ]
              operator unknown (EasyShell user)
            tool from the doki-byte ecosystem
                    /          \
                   /            \
[ CAPABILITY ]                    [ INFRASTRUCTURE ]
EasyShell Rust implant            192[.]3.31[.]148:8443
VShell-template stager            AS36352 HostPapa / ColoCrossing
                   \            /
                    \          /
                     [ VICTIM ]
        internet-facing Linux / macOS hosts (none observed)

■ 19.3 Source reliability and information credibility (Admiralty code)

StatementSourceGrade
Stager behaviour, l32 code and stringsOwn static analysis of the artifactsA1
VShell stager templateTrellix, NVISO, incident write-upB2
EasyShell versions, listeners, trial and member modelgm7.org and cn-sec.com copies of the developer notesB2
doki-byte repositoriesGitHub profileA2
README contents, admin port, 15-minute listener, notification channelsOSINT note B, source not reachableC6
192[.]3.211[.]176 VShell entryOSINT note A citing ThreatFox, not readB6
192[.]3.31[.]219 AgentTesla historyURLhaus host pageA1
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Grade the source and the information separately. A good source can carry an unchecked claim, and that is what the 6 means.

《 20. CTI: Timeline and related public research 》

Legend: blue = public VShell research, purple = public EasyShell framework notes, red = October 2026 vulnerability wave (context, see 20.1), yellow = this analysis. Only dated, sourced events are listed.

2025
Trellix documents the VShell stage-2 downloader with PATH extension and the writeablex probe. (Trellix)
2025-11
NVISO publishes VShell decoding research with the short architecture labels (l64, l32, a64, a32, d64, m64). (NVISO)
2025-12
Same writeablex stager template seen after React2Shell exploitation, older ?a=l64&stage=true URL form, tcp/8443, random payload name. (iYoRoy write-up)
after 2026-04-14
Six client templates (l32, l64, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) compiled with rustc 1.95.0 (released 2026-04-14), crates from the USTC mirror. (.comment, cargo paths)
after 2026-05-25
LoongArch template (l128) compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25). (l128 .comment)
mid 2026 (indexed by June)
EasyShell v1.9 note: HTTP, DNS and KCP listener fixes, Linux build fix, client rework; lists v1.8 (client rebuilt, smaller) and v1.7. (gm7.org)
2026-08
PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) found with AI help by Calif, OpenAI and Wiz; reported for coordinated disclosure. (Wikipedia: PHP2Shell)
mid 2026 (indexed by August)
EasyShell trial program announced for normal users. (gm7.org)
2026-10-01
GTIG data: CVE disclosures doubled in 2026; half of the flaws it rates as likely AI-found lead to remote code execution. (Help Net Security)
2026-10-17
First PHP2Shell exploitation attempt seen by AWS, four days before the fix. (Datadog Security Labs)
2026-10-21
PHP fixes released; honeypot exploitation observed the same day; 1,187 source IPs sent PHP2Shell requests from 21 to 25 October. (watchTowr, CrowdSec)
2026-10-23 to 24
Suspected China-nexus actor chains PHP2Shell with the Fragnesia kernel flaw (CVE-2026-46300), roots 25 servers, plants web shells. (The Register on Dream research)
2026-10-26
CISA adds both PHP2Shell CVEs to KEV. (Tenable)
2026-10 onward
Storm-3358 uses the ARTEX agentic framework and deploys RATs including vshell (a different tool from EasyShell). (Microsoft)
2026-11-09
SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) added to KEV (chapter 23). (CISA KEV)
2026-11-19
Stager with /file/<arch> routes, Darwin and LoongArch targets, and the l32 payload collected from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443. (this case)
2026-11-20
No public report, paste, code repository or second C2 found for the implant strings, the routes or the IP. (MMD search pass)
▸ Exact dates given by OSINT note B (first release 14 to 16 May 2026, v1.8 on 3 June 2026, an update on 24 October 2026) were not confirmed in the pages I could read, and the 24 October listener claim conflicts with the v1.9 note. They are left out of the timeline.

■ 20.1 Hypothesis check: did Linux/EasyShell ride the October 2026 vulnerability wave?

Hypothesis tested: the October 2026 wave of AI-found vulnerabilities, starting with the PHP mass exposure (PHP2Shell), was taken by the EasyShell operator as the chance to start this campaign. I tested it against three readings, in ACH style, with only sourced or sample-based evidence.

ReadingStatement
H1The campaign started with the wave, PHP2Shell first (early or late October 2026).
H2The kit is used during the wave as one of several entry options; start date unknown.
H3The campaign is unrelated to the wave (other entry, or it predates October).
#EvidenceSourceH1H2H3
1The EasyShell framework was versioned and offered in trial before the wave (indexed by June and August 2026)Chapter 140++
2l32 was compiled after 2026-04-14; no upper bound on the build datel32000
3The C2 was seen on 2026-11-19; no earlier public sighting of the IP, routes, hash or stringsThis case000
4The stager falls back to /tmp without root and writes to /usr/bin with root: it fits a web-server RCE, but also any shell accessStager+++
5The stager also targets macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon) and LoongArch; PHP2Shell targets are web servers, so a PHP-only start does not explain these targetsStager−++
6Public PHP2Shell post-exploitation reports describe Mirai and booter bots, a Go agent, web shells, reverse-shell loops and scripts; none names EasyShell, this C2, polkitd or /file/<arch>Ellio, Karimi honeypot, SOCRadar, Dream−0+
7Chinese-speaking operators did exploit PHP2Shell, and other actors deployed VShell-class RATs during OctoberDream, Microsoft000
8The Chrome 131 Windows User-Agent built into l32 also appears in PHP2Shell scan traffic; it is a common default stringF5 Labs000
9No victim, no web logs and no process tree exist for this case, so the entry point cannot be testedThis case000
▸ Legend: + consistent, − inconsistent, 0 neutral or no diagnostic value. Rows 7 and 8 show only that the opportunity existed. A shared User-Agent string is not a link.
Result: H1 is Unverified with no supporting evidence: the only link is that the C2 was found during the wave. Rows 5 and 6 argue against a PHP2Shell-first start. H2 cannot be excluded, and the vulnerability triage in chapter 23 is written for that case. This report does not claim the campaign started in October.

■ 20.2 What would confirm or reject the hypothesis

  • Web server logs from a victim showing PHP2Shell-style multipart requests (hundreds of empty fields, deep nested names, upload-progress field) followed within minutes by a fetch of /file/<arch>.
  • A process tree apache2 / httpd / php-fpm → sh → curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate to the C2 (Sigma rule added to the pack, chapter 27).
  • First-seen dates for 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 in scan, certificate or passive DNS history: a first sighting before October weakens H1, a first sighting after 21 October supports it.
  • First-submission dates of the seven payload hashes in malware repositories.
  • Honeypot captures that carry the writeablex probe or the /file/ routes in an exploit body.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Two events in the same month are a timeline overlap, not a cause. Write the hypothesis, list what would disprove it, then look for that first.
  • An evidence row that fits every reading has no diagnostic value. Keep it in the table, but do not count it as support.

■ 20.3 What this post adds to the public reports

  • First public analysis of an EasyShell client binary: config slots, beacon protocol, XOR 0x5A pool, module list, anti-sandbox and masquerade.
  • First public link between the EasyShell red team framework and an in-the-wild C2 and stager.
  • A VShell-template stager variant with /file/ routes, LoongArch and macOS Gatekeeper handling.
  • YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery and STIX content for the stager and the implant.

《 21. CTI: Kill chain of the attack scheme 》

[1] Reconnaissance   not observed
        |
[2] Weaponization    builder patches !ES slots, EasyShell impl-core per arch
        |
[3] Delivery         hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>
        |
[4] Exploitation     entry point not observed (see chapter 23)
        |
[5] Installation     /usr/bin/polkitd or ~/Library/Caches/polkitd (hidden, quarantine cleared, ad-hoc signed)
        |
[6] C2               POST /api/v2/sync  X-Client-Id, kworker name, anti-sandbox
        |
[7] Actions on Obj.  shell, plugins, file transfer, SOCKS/relay, screenshot, self delete
PhaseThis caseWhere to break the chain
Deliverycurl/wget/python with TLS checks off to a raw IP on tcp/8443Egress filtering for servers; alert on downloads from raw IPs; block /file/<arch> routes at the proxy
ExploitationNot observedPatch the internet-facing services in chapter 22; remove shell access from web service accounts
InstallationRoot writes into /usr/bin; macOS quarantine removedFile integrity monitoring on system bin directories; package verification (rpm -Va, debsums); MDM rule for ad-hoc signed binaries in Caches
C2HTTPS beacon with a Windows browser UA from a Linux hostTLS inspection or JA3/JA4 baselines; proxy rule for /api/v2/sync plus X-Client-Id
ActionsTunnels and pluginsBlock outbound SOCKS and unusual listeners; EDR on child processes of fake kernel threads

《 22. CTI: TTP — MITRE ATT&CK matrix 》

Only techniques seen in the stager text or the l32 binary are mapped.

Execution
T1059.004 Unix Shell
Stager script; PTY shell in interactive.rs
T1059.002 AppleScript
osascript mouse check in the macOS client
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location
polkitd file name; eleven kernel-thread process names
T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
chflags hidden on macOS
T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass
xattr -c and ad-hoc codesign
T1497.001 System Checks
DMI, hypervisor names, resources; sysctl hw.model on macOS
T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks
/dev/input/mice on Linux; AppleScript mouse position on macOS
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
XOR 0x5A string pool
T1070.004 File Deletion
delete_self.rs
T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging
HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery
Process list in svc_ops.rs
T1082 System Information Discovery
sysinfo.rs, uname in the stager
Collection
T1113 Screen Capture
screenshot_sidecar.rs on Linux; silent screencapture -x on macOS
T1560.002 Archive via Library
Folder zip in folder_zip.rs
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols
HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
/file/<arch> downloads; plugin delivery
T1090 Proxy
SOCKS5, relay hops, outbound proxy
T1571 Non-Standard Port
HTTPS on tcp/8443

■ 22.1 Framework techniques not seen in l32

TechniqueEvidence
Credential dumping, token elevation, browser passwords (T1003, T1134, T1555.003)Offered through the Extensions plugin set per operator text; plugins not in hand
Process injection (T1055)!inj: command marker only; behaviour not traced
Persistence (autostart)Mentioned in the v1.9 demo; no routine in l32

《 23. CTI: Targeted vulnerabilities and weaknesses 》

■ 23.1 Weaknesses abused in this case

WeaknessHow it is abusedEvidence
Shell access as root on a serverStager writes into /usr/bin after the writable probeStager lines 1 to 8
Unrestricted server egressPayload download and beacon to a raw IP on tcp/8443Stager URLs, config C2
TLS verification off in download toolscurl -k, wget no-check, python unverified contextStager lines 46 to 48
macOS quarantine can be removed by the user contextxattr -c and ad-hoc signingStager lines 53 to 67
Process names are not verifiedKernel-thread names on a user processChapter 9

■ 23.2 Vulnerability triage (October to November 2026)

▸ Scope: initial access is not observed, so this triage is context for defenders, not intelligence about this actor. It answers one question: which flaws published or added to CISA KEV between 1 October and 19 November 2026 can give the shell command the stager needs on an internet-facing Linux or macOS host. It does not say which flaw was used; the October wave hypothesis is tested separately in 20.1. Short answer: SSHole (CVE-2026-123158), Apache Axis (CVE-2026-90436) and PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) score highest; if your estate is developer laptops and CI runners, read 23.8 first. The method, the full matrix and the score breakdown are folded below.
Triage method, matrix and score breakdown (23.3 to 23.7)

■ 23.3 Selection rules

  • Published, or added to KEV, from 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-19.
  • Outcome is code or command execution on a Linux or Unix server, or a login shell.
  • Windows-only, client-side and appliance-only flaws are left out (example: Cisco Expressway CVE-2026-76466, a root RCE on an appliance, does not match the generic uname based stager).

■ 23.4 Weight model (100 points)

Check itemWeightRule
CISA KEV25Listed = 25, not listed at check = 0
Exploitation report outside KEV10Vendor, CERT or MDR statement of in-the-wild use = 10
CVSS base109.0 and above = 10, 7.0 to 8.9 = 6, not collected = 0 (highest published score used)
EPSS (FIRST)1510% and above = 15, 1% to 10% = 10, 0.1% to 1% = 5, not collected = 0
SSVC (CISA Vulnrichment)10Automatable yes = 5, Technical Impact total = 5, not collected = 0
Fit to this threat20High = 20, medium = 10, post-access = 5
Pre-authentication10No privileges or credentials needed = 10
CWE / EUVD / CWSS / CSAF0Recorded as checklist fields, not scored (identifiers and advisory format, not risk signals)
▸ Mapping rules, so anybody can rerun the score: (1) EPSS uses the FIRST value published on the collection date; when sources disagree, the FIRST value wins. (2) When only an EPSS percentile is published and no probability, the 95th percentile or above scores 10. (3) CVSS uses the highest published base score. (4) A field that was not collected scores 0.

■ 23.5 Triage matrix

▸ [!] Wide table: scroll sideways to see the Fit and Score columns.
#CVEEUVDProductCWECVSSEPSSCISA KEVSSVCCWSSCSAFFit to this threatScore
1CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole)n/cOpenSSH sshd < 10.6p2 on musl Linux without PAM (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt)CWE-394 (Red Hat: CWE-303)8.1 (v3.1)16.5% (FIRST, 2026-11-10)2026-11-09Expl. active, Auto no, Totaln/cRed Hat not-affected statement (VEX: verify)High: Linux servers and containers, unauth shell login; watchTowr reported botnet and miner use91
2CVE-2026-90436EUVD-2026-118323Apache Axis 1.x (Confluence DC Remote API, N-able N-central)CWE-4709.8 (CISA ADP v3.1) / 9.3 (Atlassian v4.0)0.57%2026-11-18Expl. none*, Auto yes, Totaln/cverifyHigh: Linux Java servers, unauth RCE, Rapid7 MDR saw exploitation 2026-11-1390
3CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell)n/cPHP 8.2 to 8.5 coreCWE-1419, CWE-824, CWE-1325 (CNA)9.2 (PHP v4.0) / 9.8 (v3.1)>96th percentile (value n/c)2026-10-26n/cn/cverifyHigh: PHP web servers on Linux, unauth75
4CVE-2026-90817n/cREDCap >= 13.3.0CWE-94, CWE-739.8 (v3.1)n/c2026-11-18n/cn/cverifyMedium: needs a valid public survey hash; Unit 42 tracked an XMRig campaign through it (2026-10-07)65
5CVE-2026-102895n/cGPUStackn/c9.8n/c2026-11-09n/cn/cverifyMedium: Linux AI inference hosts; unauth admin access to code execution; in-the-wild report credited in the advisory65
6CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset)EUVD-2026-123532Apache httpd 2.4.55 to 2.4.70, mod_http2CWE-362, CWE-209.8 (Red Hat) / 8.1 (CSA, CISA)1.5% to 1.6%not listed at checkn/cn/cRed Hat RHEL packages listed (CSAF VEX: verify)High: Linux web servers with HTTP/2; Singapore CSA reported exploitation 2026-11-1760
7CVE-2026-106931n/cSiteGuard Server Edition (host WAF in Apache, Nginx, IIS)CWE-787.8 (v3.0) / 8.5 (JVN v4.0, local, PR:L)0.66% (51st pct)2026-10-20n/cn/cJVN#88474777Medium: root command execution on Linux web servers, widely used in Japan; local vector per JVN56
8CVE-2026-115731EUVD-2026-116495Puppet Server / OpenVox (report deserialization)CWE-502, CWE-949.4 (v4.0, PR:L)0.37%2026-11-17Expl. none*, Auto no, Totaln/cRed Hat CVE page (verify)Medium: Linux management servers; needs an agent certificate (autosign can expose it)55
9CVE-2026-116779n/cSignalWire FreeSWITCHn/c9.8n/c2026-11-09n/cn/cverifyMedium: Linux VoIP servers, command execution45
10CVE-2026-129448n/cApache Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 (XML-RPC)CWE-5029.8 (v3.1)not yet scorednot listed at checkn/cn/cverifyMedium: Java blog servers, unauth; ASF confirmed exploitation40
11CVE-2026-46300n/cLinux kernel (local)n/cn/cn/c2026-10-28n/cn/cverifyPost-access only: privilege escalation after a foothold (lets the stager write into /usr/bin)30
▸ n/c = not collected in this pass. * SSVC "Exploitation none" is the pre-KEV Vulnrichment value; the KEV listing supersedes it. CWSS: no published CWSS score exists for these CVEs, so the column stays open for your own weakness scoring. CSAF: "verify" means check the vendor or distribution CSAF/VEX feed (for example Red Hat security data) before relying on it. EPSS values move daily and the sources disagree for SSHole (0.98% to 18.9% depending on date); the FIRST value of 2026-11-10 is used.
Same matrix, one block per CVE (for narrow screens)
#1 CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole)   Score 91
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: OpenSSH sshd < 10.6p2 on musl Linux without PAM (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt)
  • CWE: CWE-394 (Red Hat: CWE-303)
  • CVSS: 8.1 (v3.1)
  • EPSS: 16.5% (FIRST, 2026-11-10)
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
  • SSVC: Expl. active, Auto no, Total
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: Red Hat not-affected statement (VEX: verify)
  • Fit to this threat: High: Linux servers and containers, unauth shell login; watchTowr reported botnet and miner use
#2 CVE-2026-90436   Score 90
  • EUVD: EUVD-2026-118323
  • Product: Apache Axis 1.x (Confluence DC Remote API, N-able N-central)
  • CWE: CWE-470
  • CVSS: 9.8 (CISA ADP v3.1) / 9.3 (Atlassian v4.0)
  • EPSS: 0.57%
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-18
  • SSVC: Expl. none*, Auto yes, Total
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: High: Linux Java servers, unauth RCE, Rapid7 MDR saw exploitation 2026-11-13
#3 CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell)   Score 75
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: PHP 8.2 to 8.5 core
  • CWE: CWE-1419, CWE-824, CWE-1325 (CNA)
  • CVSS: 9.2 (PHP v4.0) / 9.8 (v3.1)
  • EPSS: >96th percentile (value n/c)
  • CISA KEV: 2026-10-26
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: High: PHP web servers on Linux, unauth
#4 CVE-2026-90817   Score 65
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: REDCap >= 13.3.0
  • CWE: CWE-94, CWE-73
  • CVSS: 9.8 (v3.1)
  • EPSS: n/c
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-18
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: needs a valid public survey hash; Unit 42 tracked an XMRig campaign through it (2026-10-07)
#5 CVE-2026-102895   Score 65
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: GPUStack
  • CWE: n/c
  • CVSS: 9.8
  • EPSS: n/c
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux AI inference hosts; unauth admin access to code execution; in-the-wild report credited in the advisory
#6 CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset)   Score 60
  • EUVD: EUVD-2026-123532
  • Product: Apache httpd 2.4.55 to 2.4.70, mod_http2
  • CWE: CWE-362, CWE-20
  • CVSS: 9.8 (Red Hat) / 8.1 (CSA, CISA)
  • EPSS: 1.5% to 1.6%
  • CISA KEV: not listed at check
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: Red Hat RHEL packages listed (CSAF VEX: verify)
  • Fit to this threat: High: Linux web servers with HTTP/2; Singapore CSA reported exploitation 2026-11-17
#7 CVE-2026-106931   Score 56
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: SiteGuard Server Edition (host WAF in Apache, Nginx, IIS)
  • CWE: CWE-78
  • CVSS: 7.8 (v3.0) / 8.5 (JVN v4.0, local, PR:L)
  • EPSS: 0.66% (51st pct)
  • CISA KEV: 2026-10-20
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: JVN#88474777
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: root command execution on Linux web servers, widely used in Japan; local vector per JVN
#8 CVE-2026-115731   Score 55
  • EUVD: EUVD-2026-116495
  • Product: Puppet Server / OpenVox (report deserialization)
  • CWE: CWE-502, CWE-94
  • CVSS: 9.4 (v4.0, PR:L)
  • EPSS: 0.37%
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-17
  • SSVC: Expl. none*, Auto no, Total
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: Red Hat CVE page (verify)
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux management servers; needs an agent certificate (autosign can expose it)
#9 CVE-2026-116779   Score 45
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: SignalWire FreeSWITCH
  • CWE: n/c
  • CVSS: 9.8
  • EPSS: n/c
  • CISA KEV: 2026-11-09
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: Linux VoIP servers, command execution
#10 CVE-2026-129448   Score 40
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: Apache Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 (XML-RPC)
  • CWE: CWE-502
  • CVSS: 9.8 (v3.1)
  • EPSS: not yet scored
  • CISA KEV: not listed at check
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: Medium: Java blog servers, unauth; ASF confirmed exploitation
#11 CVE-2026-46300   Score 30
  • EUVD: n/c
  • Product: Linux kernel (local)
  • CWE: n/c
  • CVSS: n/c
  • EPSS: n/c
  • CISA KEV: 2026-10-28
  • SSVC: n/c
  • CWSS: n/c
  • CSAF: verify
  • Fit to this threat: Post-access only: privilege escalation after a foothold (lets the stager write into /usr/bin)

The matrix is also kept as triage_matrix.csv in the detection pack folder.

■ 23.6 Score breakdown

CVEKEV 25Exploit report 10CVSS 10EPSS 15SSVC 10Fit 20Pre-auth 10Total
CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole)25106155201091
CVE-2026-90436251010510201090
CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell)25010100201075
CVE-2026-9081725101000101065
CVE-2026-10289525101000101065
CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset)01010100201060
CVE-2026-106931251065010056
CVE-2026-115731250105510055
CVE-2026-116779250100010045
CVE-2026-1294480101000101040
CVE-2026-463002500005030
▸ Sensitivity: published EPSS values for SSHole range from 0.98% to 18.9% depending on the date. At the low end its EPSS points drop from 15 to 5, its total from 91 to 81, and it ranks second behind CVE-2026-90436 (90). The top two rows are close enough that both belong in the "patch or isolate now" band either way.

■ 23.7 Reference case (outside the window)

CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell, CVSS 10.0, disclosed December 2025) is the only public case where the same writeablex stager template was documented after exploitation. It is listed for context and not scored, because it is outside the October to November window.

■ 23.8 Vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (October to November 2026)

Most flaws in 23.5 hit Linux servers only. The stager also serves macOS, so I checked which published October and November 2026 vectors run on both. None of them is linked to this C2; this is a list of candidates to check, ranked by fit.

VectorDateLinuxmacOSFit to this stagerLink to this case
LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker (stolen maintainer tokens): credential stealer plus an hourly remote code loader on Linux and macOS; loader seen dormant (SOCRadar, Help Net Security)2026-10-21YesYesHigh: a loader already running on both platforms only needs a URL to fetch a two-OS stagerNone found
Stolen SSH keys and cloud credentials from the supply chain incidents in this tableOct to NovYesYesHigh: the stager is one command that works on any Unix host it is pasted intoNone found
@subql/common 5.8.3 on npm: secrets theft plus remote shell (incident tracker)2026-10-05YesYesMedium: remote shell on developer hostsNone found
tensorlake 0.5.144 on npm: Shai-Hulud style stealer (incident tracker)2026-10-08YesYesMedium: credential theft and self-spreadingNone found
106 malicious npm and PyPI packages, 26 to 28 October (Safeguard)2026-10-26 to 28YesYesMedium: install-time code on developer machinesNone found
agent-framework on PyPI: collector only, no second stage reported (CSA)2026-11-17YesPartlyLowNone found
Java4Shell, OpenJDK CVE-2026-114938 (Censys)2026-11-17Yesx86-64 JVMs only by the CISA descriptionPartial: Apple Silicon JVMs are outside that descriptionNone found
PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618/1096192026-10-21YesPHP on macOS is rarely internet facingLow for macOSNone found (20.1)
▸ Linux-only flaws (SSHole on musl, Fragnesia, the MPTCP kernel flaw CVE-2026-98432 found by Anthropic researchers) cannot explain the macOS branch. If the entry is a developer supply chain or stolen credentials, look for the stager on build hosts, CI runners and developer laptops, not only on web servers.

■ 23.9 How to use this matrix

  • Score 75 and above: patch or isolate now, then hunt with chapter 25 on hosts that were exposed before the patch.
  • Score 55 to 74: patch in the current cycle and confirm exposure (internet facing, feature enabled).
  • Below 55: confirm you do not run the product, then close the row.
  • A KEV listing proves exploitation somewhere, not on your host and not by this actor.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Keep the evidence fields (KEV, EPSS, SSVC) separate from your own judgement (fit). Then anybody can rerun the score when EPSS or KEV changes.
  • Record when each value was collected. EPSS and KEV status change daily, so an undated score cannot be checked.

《 24. CTI: IOC triage (enriched) 》

IndicatorTypeRoleSourceConfidenceStatusTriage / recommended action
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443IP:portStager, payloads, beacon C2This caseConfirmedNot in public feeds (2026-11-20)Block and alert; retro-hunt flows since April 2026
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>URLPayload routes (7)StagerConfirmedNot publicProxy block; hunt the path on any host
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/syncURLBeaconl32 configConfirmedNot publicProxy and TLS-inspection rule with X-Client-Id
fe1666de...e81d4SHA256l32 payloadThis caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block; sandbox retro-hunt
c31f7fe4...e3d95696, 7fbed01a...8d481cabe6b6SHA256l64 and l128 payloads (Linux x86-64, LoongArch)This caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block
12b5bbae...234ab6cf, d1ec7081...bc0501be4SHA256a32 and a64 payloads (Linux ARM)This caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block on ARM servers and devices
fce33d2a...ac465f2c, b389c22a...d7cac7bfSHA256darwin_amd64 and darwin_arm64 payloads (macOS)This caseConfirmedNot publicMDM / EDR hash block on Macs
http-beacon-implant-55554944<UUID>Code signaturemacOS client identifier as serveddarwin payloadsConfirmedNot publicosquery signature table; may change after the stager re-sign
polkitd outside the polkit package pathFileDropped payloadStagerConfirmedn/aVerify package ownership; image the host if foreign
~/Library/Caches/polkitdFilemacOS payloadStagerConfirmedn/aMDM query for hidden ad-hoc signed files
Kernel-thread name with an exe linkProcessMasqueradel32Confirmedn/aosquery fleet hunt (chapter 25)
easyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slotsStringFamily markerl32ConfirmedNot publicYARA family rule
192[.]3.31[.]219IPOld AgentTesla hosting, same /22URLhausConfirmedOffline since 2020No action for this case
192[.]3.211[.]176:19999IP:portVShell C2 per OSINT note AThreatFox (not read)UnverifiedUncheckedCheck the entry and the TLS certificate before any link
119[.]45.243[.]154:8443IP:portSame stager template, December 2025Incident write-upConfirmedHistoricContext only
redeploy latest listener payloadStringFramework operator text in l32l32ConfirmedNot publicAdded to the YARA family rule
!inj: platformStringInjection command marker in l32l32ConfirmedNot publicAdded to the YARA family rule
192[.]3.28[.]0/22 (AS36352)PrefixHosting context of the C2l32ConfirmedNot publicContext only, do not block the whole AS

■ 24.1 Copy-friendly IOC list (defanged)

# hashes: sha256 / sha1 / md5
l32           fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
              1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe  754b9d13e9fa687a5bf471423722e06c
a32           12b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf
              8b3d1d3ee8e3500c7115bba939e047450a0783ac  d44eb9976ec3aee864f076a42b152385
a64           d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4
              c1e9edbdc877a9365343dc0dfad9d1660073750a  4c1ef60aa2585ff3a5e38ea49babe331
l64           c31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696
              547cc85bc060b6ebf220fbb82146476627150856  df786f29ddcd086130cb8730ce6c9612
l128          7fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
              550bec09b879e0c8e07a9d58909e1fb5a4ac0c74  64b940bc41468f51933e0bdebe23f493
darwin_amd64  fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
              c1762547592e298cabc0e90309180fa79247ebd3  8d25e6d0dde86738484550e3f68b2a19
darwin_arm64  b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf
              7e827b3a7ba5e5064018244cbf594d47a34aefae  6a9adbc92009568bae5cb2d10f24c02c

# macOS code signature identifier (as served)
http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID>

# C2 / download server
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443

# URLs
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_amd64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_arm64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l128
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/sync

# host artifacts
/usr/bin/polkitd  /usr/local/bin/polkitd  /usr/libexec/polkitd(*)  /tmp/polkitd
~/Library/Caches/polkitd
writeablex (probe file, short lived)
(*) legit only when owned by the polkit package

# network artifacts
POST /api/v2/sync  header X-Client-Id
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
User-Agent: Windows Chrome/131.0.0.0 from a Linux or macOS host

# implant strings
easyshell-http-beacon-implant  crates/impl-core/src/  !ES/9/UAGT/  !ES/7/SBOX/
ESCH chunk:  ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS  es-mux-agg  es-hop-wire-v1 (XOR 0x5A)
LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo=
8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack
▸ OSINT at the time of writing: no public report, feed entry or write-up was found for this IP, the /file/ routes, the hash or the implant strings. The public EasyShell notes describe the framework, not this C2.
Part III — Defense

《 25. Playbook for IR responders and DFIR 》

Golden rule: do not kill the fake kernel thread first. Collect its process state and memory, freeze it, cut its network, then clean. Killing it first loses the live config, the session keys and the tunnel table.

ALERT -> HOT 1 triage -> HOT 2 observe -> HOT 3 acquire -> HOT 4 freeze
      -> COLD 1 image -> COLD 2 timeline -> COLD 3 artifacts -> SCOPE -> CLEAN

■ 25.1 Hot forensics 0: confirm the alert

ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args | grep -E "\[(kworker|migration|rcu_sched|watchdog)"
ls -l /proc/<PID>/exe          # a real kernel thread has no exe link
rpm -qf /usr/bin/polkitd || dpkg -S /usr/bin/polkitd
[EDU] What to learn here
  • One command decides the case: a kernel-thread name whose /proc/<pid>/exe points to a file is a user process in disguise.

■ 25.2 Hot forensics 1 to 3: observe and acquire

cat /proc/<PID>/cmdline | tr "\0" " "; cat /proc/<PID>/environ | tr "\0" "\n"
ls -l /proc/<PID>/fd; cat /proc/<PID>/maps
ss -tnp | grep <PID>
cp /proc/<PID>/exe /evidence/polkitd.bin; sha256sum /evidence/polkitd.bin
# memory: use your approved acquisition tool (AVML or LiME) before any change

■ 25.3 Hot forensics 4 and 5: freeze and contain

kill -STOP <PID>                # freeze, do not kill
# block 192[.]3.31[.]148 and tcp/8443 at the host firewall and upstream
# then check for child shells, SOCKS listeners and relay sessions

■ 25.4 Cold forensics 1 and 2: image and timeline

  • Image the disk; keep the frozen process memory with the image.
  • Timeline /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /usr/libexec, /tmp around the polkitd birth time; look for the short-lived writeablex in audit logs.
  • Find the parent of the stager: web server, application runtime or SSH session logs at the same time.
  • Check /etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd units and shell profiles as a standard step (no persistence was found in l32, but plugins can add it).

■ 25.5 radare2 on the evidence

r2 -A /evidence/polkitd.bin
[0x...]> iI                         # toolchain, static, arch
[0x...]> pd 40 @ 0x08062a04         # config table builder
[0x...]> px 64 @ 0x082be821         # C2 field
[0x...]> pd 30 @ 0x080b2721         # XOR 0x5A decoder
[0x...]> izz~easyshell
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Same offsets, same views as chapters 6 to 9. If your build differs, search the strings first and follow the cross references.

■ 25.6 Hunting at scale with osquery

SELECT pid, name, path, cmdline, cwd, on_disk FROM processes WHERE (name LIKE '[kworker/%' OR name LIKE '[migration/%' OR name LIKE '[rcu_sched]%' OR name LIKE '[watchdog/%' OR name LIKE 'kworker/%' OR name LIKE 'migration/%' OR name = 'rcu_sched' OR name LIKE 'watchdog/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[kworker/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[rcu_sched]%') AND path != '';

The full pack (six queries) is in the GitHub detection pack, chapter 27.

■ 25.7 If the host runs PHP: check the entry point

  • Apache or PHP error bursts with "Allowed memory size exhausted" and worker segfaults around the polkitd birth time are a PHP2Shell sign.
  • Shells, curl or wget started by the web server user (www-data, apache, nobody) toward a raw IP on 8443.
  • Patch PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 or the distribution backport; rotate secrets that lived in PHP worker memory.
  • Report any match: it is the evidence 20.2 asks for.

■ 25.8 Containers

  • Run the same /proc/*/exe check inside each container namespace; kernel-thread names never appear inside a container.
  • Compare the image layer with the running file system for new files in bin directories.
  • Rebuild from a clean image; do not clean a container in place.

■ 25.9 Tabletop exercise (30 minutes)

TimeInjectExpected decision
00:00EDR shows [kworker/0:0] with an exe link on a web serverDeclare incident, start hot forensics, do not kill
00:10Proxy shows POST /api/v2/sync to a raw IP on 8443Collect memory, then block egress
00:20A second server shows the same hashFleet hunt with osquery, scope by egress logs
00:30Management asks who did itReport tool and infrastructure; operator unknown

■ 25.10 Who does what (RACI)

TaskSOCLinux adminCloud teamIR lead
Triage alertRCIA
Memory and disk acquisitionCRCA
Egress blockRCRA
Fleet huntRCCA
Rebuild and patchIRRA

■ 25.11 Contain, eradicate, recover

StepActionWhy
ContainFreeze the process, block the C2 and tcp/8443 egress, isolate the hostStops tunnels and plugin delivery
EradicateRebuild from known good media; rotate credentials used on the hostPlugins may have taken credentials
RecoverPatch the entry service, restore data, monitor for the beacon patternThe stager needs the same entry again

《 26. Detection and mitigation checklist 》

  • Processes: kernel-thread names with an exe link (the name table is in the binary; the selection logic was not traced); polkitd outside the package path; shells with HISTFILE=/dev/null.
  • Files: polkitd in /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /tmp; hidden ad-hoc signed ~/Library/Caches/polkitd.
  • Persistence: none in l32; still check /etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd and shell profiles after plugin use.
  • Network: downloads from /file/<arch>; POST /api/v2/sync with X-Client-Id; Windows Chrome UA from servers; raw IP on tcp/8443.
  • Hardening: server egress allow-list; no shell for web service accounts; FIM on system bin directories; patch chapter 23 rows.
  • macOS: polkitd (macOS has none) in a user Caches folder; screencapture -x or osascript mouse queries from it; TCC prompts or denials naming it; code signature identifier http-beacon-implant-*.
  • Developer and admin workstations: check Macs and Linux laptops for ~/Library/Caches/polkitd or polkitd in user folders; review LiteLLM 1.107.0 and the October npm/PyPI incidents in 23.8; rotate SSH keys and cloud credentials exposed by them.
  • Web servers: web server user spawning sh, curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate; PHP patched for PHP2Shell (25.7).
  • Response: follow chapter 25, freeze before kill.
  • Detection example: YARA family rule MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant on memory dumps and new binaries.

《 27. Detection content: YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery, STIX 》

The full pack is published on the MalwareMustDie GitHub. The YARA rules and the macOS Sigma and osquery content are printed here (27.1).

FileTypeWhat it detects
yara/MMD_EasyShell.yarYARAStager (variant and template), implant family (ELF and Mach-O), macOS client, XOR 0x5A strings, payload set of this C2
sigma/*.yml (8)Sigmaweb server spawning the stager download, macOS client screencapture and AppleScript mouse check, writeablex probe, polkitd outside package path, macOS hide/xattr/codesign, beacon and payload routes, C2 connection
snort/MMD_easyshell.rulesSnortC2 host, payload routes, beacon, header set, stager in HTTP response
suricata/MMD_easyshell.rulesSuricataSame logic with sticky buffers
osquery/MMD_easyshell_hunt.confosqueryKernel-thread name with exe, polkitd path, drop files, C2 sockets, history suppression, payload set hashes, web server user running curl/wget with TLS checks off, macOS cache drop and signature identifier
stix/MMD_easyshell_stix21.jsonSTIX 2.1Malware, tool, infrastructure, indicators, ATT&CK patterns
RuleTargetNotes
MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_StagerStager script (this variant)writeablex probe + /file/<arch> routes + polkitd or macOS steps
MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_ProbeAny VShell-template stagerBroader, lower confidence; also matches the older ?a=l64&stage=true form
MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_ImplantEasyShell implant, any buildCrate paths (Linux and macOS prefixes), signature identifier (counts only with a beacon or slot string), !ES slots, beacon, tunnel and listener markers; ELF and Mach-O; hits all seven payloads
MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_ImplantEasyShell macOS clientmacOS module paths, screencapture (XOR), AppleScript mouse check, TCC hint, signature identifier
MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_ImplantEasyShell implantAnalyst note #3 rule kept as written
MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_StringsEasyShell implantXOR 0x5A protected strings, survives path stripping
MMD_EasyShell_PayloadSet_SampleThe seven builds of this C2In the .yar file only (contains the unmasked C2); former name MMD_Linux_EasyShell_l32_Sample
▸ Validation notes. The implant rules were run against all seven payloads. The stager rules were validated against the transcribed stager text only, because the script was not collected as a file. The signature identifier http-beacon-implant-55554944 is written by the Apple linker as <output name>-55554944<LC_UUID>, where 55554944 is the text "UUID" in hex: the prefix does not change between builds, but it depends on the output name, so the family rule counts it only together with a beacon or slot string. v11 rule change: the generic crate path count (crates/impl-core/src/ five times) was replaced by five EasyShell module paths, because another Rust workspace could also use a crate named impl-core; all five paths and the beacon strings are present in all seven payloads (string check). The size limit was raised from 20 MB to 64 MB, so a future build with debug symbols or more static dependencies is not missed. False positives: a string-level check of the family markers over 2,852 benign ELF files on an analysis host (49 of them Rust builds with crates/ or /rustc/ paths) found no match outside the seven samples. This is a small corpus and string matching, not the YARA engine; a goodware retrohunt is the proper test and is not done yet.
/*
   MMD_EasyShell.yar
   EasyShell Rust beacon implant and its VShell-template multi-platform stager
   MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp, 2026-11-20, TLP:CLEAR
   Tested: implant rules against all seven payloads served by the C2 (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64,
   darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and both stager rules against the transcribed stager text (no stager hits on any binary).
   Rule 3 is adapted from an internal analyst note (#3) and kept for compatibility.
*/

rule MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_Stager
{
  meta:
    description = "Multi-platform shell stager (VShell template + /file/<arch> routes, polkitd drop, macOS Gatekeeper handling)"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
  strings:
    $p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
    $p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p4 = "export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)" ascii
    $r1 = /:\d{2,5}\/file\/darwin_(amd|arm)64"/ ascii
    $r2 = /\/file\/(l64|l32|a32|a64|l128)"/ ascii
    $r3 = "loongarch64) DL=" ascii
    $n1 = "v=\"polkitd\"" ascii
    $m1 = "chflags hidden \"$v\"" ascii
    $m2 = "xattr -c \"$v\"" ascii
    $m3 = "codesign --force --sign - \"$v\"" ascii
    $m4 = "$HOME/Library/Caches" ascii
    $d1 = "_create_unverified_context()" ascii
  condition:
    filesize < 64KB and 2 of ($p*) and
    ( ($n1 and 1 of ($r*)) or (2 of ($m*) and 1 of ($r*)) or (#r2 >= 3 and $d1) )
}

rule MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_Probe
{
  meta:
    description = "Generic writable-path probe used by VShell-template stagers (older ?a=l64&stage=true and newer /file/<arch> forms); broader, lower confidence"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
  strings:
    $p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
    $p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p4 = "rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $a1 = "uname -m" ascii
  condition:
    filesize < 64KB and 3 of ($p*) and $a1
}

rule MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell (impl-core) Rust HTTPS beacon implant, any build: crate paths, !ES config slots, beacon and tunnel markers"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
  strings:
    $crate1 = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
    $mod1 = "impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_wire.rs" ascii
    $mod2 = "impl-core/src/sandbox_guard.rs" ascii
    $mod3 = "impl-core/src/wire_dispatch.rs" ascii
    $mod4 = "impl-core/src/wire_chunk.rs" ascii
    $mod5 = "impl-core/src/delete_self.rs" ascii
    $crate4 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii   // ld64 ad-hoc identifier: <output name>-55554944 ("UUID" in hex) + LC_UUID; prefix is stable, depends on the output name
    $s1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $s2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
    $s3 = "!ES/13/CTYP/" ascii
    $s4 = "!ES/14/HDRS/" ascii
    $s5 = "!ES/5/PROXY/" ascii
    $s6 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
    $s7 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
    $s8 = "!ES/10/WAIT/" ascii
    $s9 = "!ES/11/JITR/" ascii
    $b1 = "es-beacon-uplink" ascii
    $b2 = "beacon first POST timeout" ascii
    $b3 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
    $b4 = "ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS" ascii
    $b5 = "es-mux-agg" ascii
    $b6 = "es-pump-tcpmux" ascii
    $b7 = "redeploy latest listener payload" ascii
    $b8 = "!inj: platform" ascii
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
    and filesize < 64MB
    and ( $crate1 or ($crate4 and 1 of ($b*,$s*)) or (3 of ($mod*) and 2 of ($b*)) or 4 of ($s*) or (2 of ($s*) and 2 of ($b*)) )
}

rule MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell (impl-core) macOS client: Mach-O with macOS-only modules (native screencapture, osascript mouse check), ad-hoc signature identifier http-beacon-implant-<UUID>"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
    tested = "darwin_amd64 fce33d2a...465f2c, darwin_arm64 b389c22a...c7bf"
  strings:
    $m1 = "/c/impl-core/src/sandbox_mouse.rs" ascii
    $m2 = "/c/impl-core/src/screenshot/mod.rs" ascii
    $m3 = "to get position of mouse" ascii
    $m4 = "macOS TCC may block process listing" ascii
    $m5 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii
    $m6 = "/usr/sbin/screencapture" xor(0x5a)
    $m7 = "export BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1" ascii
    $e1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $e2 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
    and filesize < 64MB and 3 of ($m*) and 1 of ($e*)
}

rule MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "Detects EasyShell (ESCH) Rust HTTP beacon C2 implant (analyst note #3 rule, kept as is)"
    author = "CTI / RE Analysis"
    date = "2026-11-19"
  strings:
    $slab1 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
    $slab2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
    $slab3 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $slab4 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
    $crate = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
    $chunk = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
    $hop_xor = { 3f 29 77 32 35 2a 77 2d 33 28 3f 77 2c 6b } // "es-hop-wire-v1" ^ 0x5A
  condition:
    uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and ( $crate or $chunk or $hop_xor or 3 of ($slab*) )
}

rule MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_Strings
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell single-byte XOR 0x5A protected strings (survives removal of plain crate paths)"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
  strings:
    $x1 = "es-hop-wire-v1" xor(0x5a)
    $x2 = "screen control" xor(0x5a)
    $x3 = "folder zip prepare failed" xor(0x5a)
    $x4 = "Remove failed" xor(0x5a)
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe) and 2 of them
}

■ 27.1 macOS chain: Sigma and osquery

The rules below cover the macOS chain in 18.3: the Gatekeeper handling by the stager and the client behaviour that raises TCC prompts. The Linux rules are in the pack.

title: macOS Payload Hidden and Quarantine Cleared in Library/Caches (EasyShell Stager)
id: 86c74039-1854-5f1c-bb9d-e89889f7c663
status: experimental
description: Detects the macOS branch of the EasyShell stager that hides polkitd, clears its extended attributes and applies an ad-hoc signature.
references:
    - https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/
author: MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1553.001
    - attack.t1564.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    sel_chflags:
        Image|endswith: '/chflags'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'hidden'
            - 'polkitd'
    sel_xattr:
        Image|endswith: '/xattr'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -c '
            - 'polkitd'
    sel_codesign:
        Image|endswith: '/codesign'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--force'
            - '--sign -'
            - 'polkitd'
    condition: 1 of sel_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely (polkitd is not a macOS binary)
level: high
title: EasyShell macOS Client Silent Screenshot or AppleScript Mouse Check from Non-Standard Parent
id: a288a8f2-8682-5b3c-b14d-46b97f4e0511
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the EasyShell macOS client (MMD-073-2026) behaviour seen in its static strings:
    silent screenshots with /usr/sbin/screencapture -x -t png and an anti-sandbox mouse
    check through osascript and System Events, started by a binary in a user cache folder
    or named polkitd (macOS has no polkitd).
references:
    - https://blog.malwaremustdie.org/
author: MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1113
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1497.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.002
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    parent:
        - ParentImage|endswith: '/polkitd'
        - ParentImage|contains: '/Library/Caches/'
    shot:
        Image|endswith: '/screencapture'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -x'
            - 'png'
    mouse:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
        CommandLine|contains: 'get position of mouse'
    condition: parent and (shot or mouse)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown; screencapture or osascript started from a cache folder binary is not normal
level: high
-- mmd_easyshell_macos_caches_polkitd (darwin, every 3600 s)
SELECT f.path, f.size, f.mtime, f.uid, s.signed, s.identifier, s.team_identifier, s.authority, h.sha256
FROM file f LEFT JOIN signature s ON s.path = f.path LEFT JOIN hash h ON h.path = f.path
WHERE f.path LIKE '/Users/%/Library/Caches/polkitd' OR f.path = '/tmp/polkitd';

-- mmd_easyshell_macos_codesign_identifier (darwin, every 3600 s)
SELECT s.path, s.identifier, s.signed, s.team_identifier, s.cdhash FROM signature s
WHERE s.path IN (SELECT path FROM file WHERE directory LIKE '/Users/%/Library/Caches' OR directory = '/tmp' OR directory = '/private/tmp')
  AND (s.identifier LIKE 'http-beacon-implant-%' OR s.identifier = 'polkitd');
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Pair a narrow rule (this build) with a family rule (any build) and a technique rule (template). Each one fails differently, so together they last longer.

《 28. Responder quick card 》

For the findings see 1.1. This card lists only what to look for and what to do.

CheckLook forWhere
ProcessKernel-thread name ([kworker/0:0] style) with a real /proc/<pid>/exe; shells with HISTFILE=/dev/null25.1, 25.6
Filepolkitd outside the polkit package path; hidden, ad-hoc signed ~/Library/Caches/polkitd on Macs24, 27.1
NetworkPOST /api/v2/sync with X-Client-Id, Windows Chrome 131 UA from a server, raw IP on tcp/8443, downloads from /file/<arch>7, 24
EntryNot observed; web server user spawning curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate, developer and CI hosts (23.8)23, 25.7

Respond: freeze before kill, take memory, block egress, hunt the fleet with the kernel-thread exe check, rebuild, rotate credentials, report the tool and the infrastructure, not a guessed actor (chapter 25).

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material

《 29. Inside the victim node: hot forensics 》

Evidence and handling. Source: one .bash_history capture of 706 lines from the compromised host (SHA-256 of the copy examined: 093523b34792a5e625524299b262ff30476b652fe8b9e657b75cf995a87e2af3). This chapter is forensic evidence only and is not mixed with the static analysis in Parts I to III. Credentials, device identifiers, the victim IP and all domains are masked. The raw file is available on request under the MalwareMustDie sharing policy.

This chapter is a forensic examination of one compromised host, not static analysis, so it stands apart from Parts I to III. The evidence is the root shell history of the host, captured while the host was running and during the period of the intrusion (hence hot forensics). It records a multi-session "black-on-black" (黑吃黑, hēi chī hēi) intrusion: one criminal operation robbed by another, with source code theft and a hunt for cryptocurrency seeds, keys and tokens.

■ 29.1 Link to this case

History line 333 fetches the stager from 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file and pipes it to sh, with curl and a wget fallback, both with TLS checks off. This is the only link between the intrusion and the EasyShell case.

[ITW] history line 333: EasyShell stager one-liner, C2 masked (view-only image)
History line 333, shown as an image on purpose. C2 masked.
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack
StatementEvidenceConfidence
The intruder ran the EasyShell stager from this C2 on the hostHistory line 333Confirmed
The intruder is the operator of that C2, or works with the operatorSame C2, same stager route; no other linkMedium
Who the operator isNot in the historyUnknown (17.2, 19)
The stager added persistenceThe client has no persistence routine (11, 15)Not supported

■ 29.2 What the host is

The host is not an enterprise server. It is a multi-tenant Chinese mobile malware server that hosts Android and iOS C2 panels, exploit kits and their build pipelines. The table lists what the history shows; roles come from names, paths and the files the intruder opened Confirmed for presence, High for the role.

ComponentRoleLocation and dataHistory lines
Fisher C2 / PandaV6 (熊猫V6, 嘴哥管理系统 ZGL)Android banking RAT panel (ts5025[.]cc)Node.js on 8443 in /opt/fisher-node/, SQLite fisher.db, PHP API in /var/www/ts5025[.]cc/api/; APK builder from kiss and ghost templates with dpt-shell packing; phishing landing templatesL3, L8 to L19, L85 to L98, L151 to L184, L458 to L463
Caishenge V2 (财神哥, ios.ts5025[.]cc)iOS exploit C2 and crypto drainerDocker FastAPI and MySQL 8.0 in /www/; tables devices and wallet_dataL20 to L23, L102 to L104, L116 to L118, L647
iOS exploit kit coreFastAPI modules, sync endpoints, exploit chains/www/backend/, /www/backend/chains/, patch archive in an rfix backupL21 to L28, L68 to L76, L393
DarkSword / DarkSword-RCEiOS 17 to 18.7 exploit chain and C2MySQL darksword and darksword_rce, kernel and WebKit offset tables, darksword_full.tar.gzL24, L397, L451, L491, L516, L642
Coruna (dingxin8[.]cc, i[.]131422[.]com)iOS 13 to 17.2.1 exploit kit and wallet stealerMySQL ioscoruna (wallets, decrypted wallets, mnemonic hits); adm888app/ wallet sweeping scriptsL33 to L36, L229, L252, L355, L477, L518
BlackholeiOS exploit kit archivesrc-02-blackhole-ios.tgz in /root and /tmpL662 to L666, L696
iOS肯德基无感 ("KFC" silent)Zero-click iOS delivery and admin panel/wwww/iOS肯德基无感/: Python backend, React admin-webL70 to L73
Moying V2 (墨影远控, beta666888[.]cc)Python and Android RAT framework/root/moying-v2/: server, agent crypto, protocol, APK builds, refc2.dbL29 to L32, L106, L123 to L150, L186 to L200
c2c_deployPanel with a kit to decrypt stolen iOS wallet keychains/www/wwwroot/c2c_deploy/, mnemonic_decrypt_kit/L233, L258 to L265, L605 to L618
FengJC (FENGJC 销售站)Sales storefront for the panels/opt/fengjc_site/L37 to L39, L182

Claude Code and Codex CLI directories (/root/.claude/, /root/.codex/) with prompt histories and session transcripts were on the host (L48 to L50, L584 to L595). That the panel operators built their code with these tools Medium is read from the directories only. The intruder read them and also started both tools (L215 to L219) Confirmed. The host also seems to match a server in a Censys open directory report on DarkSword and Coruna of 7 October 2026 (hostname C2026**********) Unverified.

■ 29.3 Activity by session

Ten exit lines split the history into eleven sessions. Two working styles appear: one inventories and packs the hosted kits, the other hunts wallets and keys. They may be one actor or two actors sharing the shell Unverified.

SessionLinesActivity
1L1End of an earlier session
2L2 to L64Starts helper scripts (/dev/shm/.gc.sh, /tmp/deep_mine3.py); reads the Fisher .jwt_secret, mints a 30-day super-admin JWT and queries the local Fisher API; inventories files, sizes and line counts of every hosted platform, the deployment configs and the AI CLI histories
3L65 to L84Line counts per component; finds iOS肯德基无感
4L85 to L113Queries fisher.db, caishenge (devices, wallet data), ios_admin, refc2.db and niubi for victim devices; reads the FRP configs; checks pm2, docker and listening ports
5L114 to L122Exports victim tables to CSV; counts devices and wallets; lists live connections on 8443
6L123 to L185Audits every module of Moying V2 and Fisher: patches, APK builder, templates, PHP API, the sales site
7L186 to L204Audits Android build artifacts and manifests; searches the file system for RAT-related directory names
8, 9L205 to L214Packs moying-v2 and fisher-node; runs pack_all.sh, pack_all_v2.sh, repack_fix.sh
10L215 to L334Starts claude and codex; dumps ioscoruna, the webroot and every non-system MySQL database; sets MySQL bind-address = 0.0.0.0 (L272); archives /var/www; deletes the staging archives (L313 to L327); re-runs the EasyShell stager (L333)
11L335 to L706Installs ripgrep (L337); sweeps databases, raw .ibd files, iOS wallet extractions, archives and AI CLI transcripts for wallet addresses, seed phrases, private keys, GitHub tokens and SSH keys (29.4); reads lateral movement files (ssh_root.py, ssh_hits.txt, au4.sh)

■ 29.4 What the intruder searched for

The ripgrep sweeps in session 11 used these patterns Confirmed:

Regex PatternTarget Artifact / Secret Type
\bbc1[ac-hj-np-z02-9]{35,75}\bBitcoin Native SegWit (Bech32 / Taproot) addresses
\bT[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}\bTRON (TRX / TRC-20 USDT) addresses
\b0x([A-F,a-f,0-9]{40})\bEthereum / EVM (ETH / BSC / ERC-20) wallet addresses
\b0x([a-f,0-9]{64})\bRaw 256-bit (64-hex) EVM Private Keys
\b([a-z]{3,8}\s){11}[a-z]{3,8}\b12-word BIP-39 Mnemonic Seed Phrases
(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22,})GitHub Personal Access Tokens & OAuth/App Tokens
"BEGIN OPENSSH"OpenSSH & PEM Private Keys

■ 29.5 Tools and infrastructure on the host

ItemDetailHistory lines
FRP/opt/frps/frpc.toml, frpc-web.toml; ports 1996 to 1998, 7000, 7500L46, L99 to L101
Helper scripts/dev/shm/.gc.sh, /tmp/deep_mine3.py, /tmp/gen_catalog.py, /tmp/clear_builds.py, /tmp/pack_all*.sh, /tmp/repack_fix.sh, /tmp/au4.sh, ssh_root.py, rt5k_rev2L2 to L7, L210 to L213, L370, L547 to L603
Databasesios_admin, niubi, admin_com, chapter_db; dshops_backdoor_backup_20261013-211329.tar.gzL105, L108, L268, L277, L387, L513 to L522
Credentials usedMySQL root and service logins read from configs (masked here)L102, L116, L252, L267, L509
Archives seendarksword_full.tar.gz, fisher-source-20260928.tar.gz, pkg_caishenge.tgz, c10_chains.tgz, se_deploy_kit.tgz, wa_keychain_C477******.tar.gzL397 to L457, L627 to L698

■ 29.6 Limits of this evidence

  • A shell history records commands, not their output. What was found, copied out and where it went is not shown.
  • The two working styles cannot be split into two people from the history alone.
  • The roles of the hosted kits come from names, paths and files the intruder opened, not from analysis of those kits.

■ 29.7 The intrusion history evidence

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
evidence: intrusion shell history (view-only image)
[!] Malicious script shown as an image on purpose, so it cannot be copy-pasted or picked up as live code.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Keep forensic evidence and malware analysis apart, and state the one fact that links them. Here it is a single history line.
  • Shell history shows intent, not results. Rate each reading and say what the history cannot prove.

《 Appendix A. Text evidence for chapters 4, 5, 6 and 9 》

The views in chapters 4 to 9 are images. This appendix gives the same evidence as text, so students can copy strings, search them and check offsets in radare2. Source: the l32 payload (sha256 fe1666de...e81d4), static listing with llvm-objdump -d -M intel and string references resolved against the GOT base ebx = 0x083dff88. The C2 is masked everywhere.

■ A.1 Chapter 4: file information and sections

polkitd (l32) :: file information [static, never executed]
; view produced with file/readelf/sha*sum, laid out radare2 iI style
[0x0805605a]> iI
arch     x86          bits     32        os       linux
class    ELF32        machine  Intel 80386   type  EXEC
static   true         stripped true      lang  rust
size     3769372      entry    0x0805605a
[0x0805605a]> ph md5,sha1,sha256
md5     754b9d13e9fa687a5bf471423722e06c
sha1    1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe
sha256  fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
[0x0805605a]> iS~.comment;  psz @ section..comment
GCC: (Ubuntu 11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04.3) 11.4.0
rustc version 1.95.0 (59807616e 2026-04-14)
GCC: (GNU) 11.2.1 20211120
polkitd (l32) :: sections
; sections (readelf -SW), radare2 iS layout
[0x0805605a]> iS
nth  vaddr       size      perm  name
1    0x080480f4  0x7       r-x   .init
2    0x08048100  0x25db0f  r-x   .text
3    0x082a5c0f  0x7       r-x   .fini
4    0x082a5c40  0x9c7cc   r--   .rodata
5    0x0834240c  0xf47c    r--   .eh_frame_hdr
6    0x08351888  0x51614   r--   .eh_frame
7    0x083a2e9c  0x1c1ac   r--   .gcc_except_table
8    0x083c018c  0x4c      rw-   .tdata
9    0x083c01d8  0xf8      rw-   .tbss
10   0x083c01d8  0x4       rw-   .init_array
11   0x083c01dc  0x4       rw-   .fini_array
12   0x083c01e0  0x1fda8   rw-   .data.rel.ro
13   0x083dff88  0x78      rw-   .got
14   0x083e0000  0x103c    rw-   .data
15   0x083e1040  0xdf8     rw-   .bss
16   0x00000000  0x74      ---   .comment
17   0x00000000  0x9a      ---   .shstrtab

■ A.2 Chapter 5: project source paths

polkitd (l32) :: project source paths left by the build
; strings filtered for the project crates (not crates.io deps)
[0x0805605a]> izz~crates/impl-core,easyshell
crates/easyshell-http-beacon-implant/src/http_runtime.rs
crates/impl-core/src/binfmt.rs
crates/impl-core/src/connect_prelude.rs
crates/impl-core/src/crypto.rs
crates/impl-core/src/delete_self.rs
crates/impl-core/src/download_xfer.rs
crates/impl-core/src/execute_gate.rs
crates/impl-core/src/extra_slabs.rs
crates/impl-core/src/folder_zip.rs
crates/impl-core/src/interactive.rs
crates/impl-core/src/outbound_proxy.rs
crates/impl-core/src/plugin_exec/unix.rs
crates/impl-core/src/procname.rs
crates/impl-core/src/sandbox_guard.rs
crates/impl-core/src/sandbox_user.rs
crates/impl-core/src/screenshot_sidecar.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/backward_listen.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/codec.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_relay.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/hop_wire.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mod.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mt19937.rs
crates/impl-core/src/socks_tunnel/mux.rs
crates/impl-core/src/svc_ops.rs
crates/impl-core/src/sysinfo.rs
crates/impl-core/src/upload_worker.rs
crates/impl-core/src/wire_chunk.rs
crates/impl-core/src/wire_dispatch.rs
[0x0805605a]> izz~mirrors.ustc~?
62   ; distinct crates fetched via mirrors.ustc.edu.cn

■ A.3 Chapter 6: configuration builder, slot bytes and User-Agent check

polkitd (l32) :: config table builder fcn.08062a04
; llvm-objdump -d -M intel, ebx = GOT 0x083dff88, string refs resolved by script
[0x0805605a]> pd 30 @ 0x8062a50
0x8062a50  call 0x81021bb                              ; fcn.81021bb
0x8062a55  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x121767]                   ; 0x082be821 "hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443               "
0x8062a5b  lea eax, [ebp - 0x4188]                     
0x8062a61  lea esi, [ebx - 0x12141a]                   ; 0x082beb6e "!ES/7/SBOX/_____________________________"
0x8062a67  mov edx, 0x300                              
0x8062a6c  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x110], ecx            
0x8062a72  mov dword ptr [eax], ecx                    
0x8062a74  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1217a9]                   ; 0x082be7df "                                        "
0x8062a7a  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0xbc], ecx             
0x8062a80  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x4], ecx              
0x8062a83  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1216e7]                   ; 0x082be8a1 "LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I"
0x8062a89  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x10c], ecx            
0x8062a8f  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x8], ecx              
0x8062a92  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12169a]                   ; 0x082be8ee "                                        "
0x8062a98  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x108], ecx            
0x8062a9e  mov dword ptr [eax + 0xc], ecx              
0x8062aa1  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x121928]                   ; 0x082be660 "/api/v2/sync                            "
0x8062aa7  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x10], ecx             
0x8062aaa  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1218a8]                   ; 0x082be6e0 "!ES/9/UAGT/_____________________________"
0x8062ab0  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x14], ecx             
0x8062ab3  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12149a]                   ; 0x082beaee "Z...$..x...w..Q....g.|....q...?.".*-...."
0x8062ab9  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x18], ecx             
0x8062abc  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1302e8]                   ; 0x082afca0 "3000                            state mu"
0x8062ac2  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x1c], esi             
0x8062ac5  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x20], ecx             
0x8062ac8  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x139ed8]                   ; 0x082a60b0 "8               0123456789ABCDEFU...]..."
0x8062ace  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x24], ecx             
0x8062ad1  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12d938]                   ; 0x082b2650 "!ES/13/CTYP/____________________________"
0x8062ad7  mov dword ptr [eax + 0x28], ecx             
0x8062ada  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x12d8f8]                   ; 0x082b2690 "{"requestHeaders":{"Content-Type":"appli"
polkitd (l32) :: configuration block bytes
; slot marker + underscore padding = unpatched slot; value areas are space padded
[0x0805605a]> px 48 @ 0x082be6e0
0x082be6e0  21 45 53 2f 39 2f 55 41 47 54 2f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f  !ES/9/UAGT/_____
0x082be6f0  5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f  ________________
0x082be700  5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f  ________________
[0x0805605a]> px 64 @ 0x082be8a1
0x082be8a1  4c 59 36 6e 44 47 49 77 72 44 6c 5a 5a 72 76 48  LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvH
0x082be8b1  74 52 73 65 67 2b 49 57 42 72 4a 75 76 62 54 36  tRseg+IWBrJuvbT6
0x082be8c1  4c 46 48 45 55 4d 37 49 33 6c 6f 3d 20 20 20 20  LFHEUM7I3lo=    
0x082be8d1  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20                  
[0x0805605a]> px 32 @ 0x082beb6e
0x082beb6e  21 45 53 2f 37 2f 53 42 4f 58 2f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f  !ES/7/SBOX/_____
0x082beb7e  5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f 5f  ________________
; C2 URL field @ 0x082be821 = hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (dump omitted, IP masked)
polkitd (l32) :: User-Agent slot check (fcn.08065a89)
; slot still starts with "!ES/9/UAGT/" -> built-in default UA after the 11-byte tag
[0x0805605a]> pd 22 @ 0x8065ab0
0x8065ab0  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x14], ecx             
0x8065ab3  lea ecx, [ebx - 0x1218a8]                   ; 0x082be6e0 "!ES/9/UAGT/_____________________________"
0x8065ab9  mov edx, 0xff                               
0x8065abe  mov dword ptr [esp], 0x20                   
0x8065ac5  call 0x8111545                              ; fcn.8111545
0x8065aca  mov esi, eax                                
0x8065acc  lea eax, [ebx - 0xfbd5f]                    ; 0x082e4229 "!ES/9/UAGT/Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;"
0x8065ad2  mov edi, edx                                
0x8065ad4  mov dword ptr [esp + 0x4], 0xb              
0x8065adc  mov ecx, esi                                
0x8065ade  mov dword ptr [esp], eax                    
0x8065ae1  call 0x81c4c51                              ; fcn.81c4c51
0x8065ae6  test al, al                                 
0x8065ae8  je 0x8065b32                                
0x8065aea  lea eax, [ebx - 0xfbd5f]                    ; 0x082e4229 "!ES/9/UAGT/Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;"
0x8065af0  mov ecx, esi                                
0x8065af2  mov edx, edi                                
0x8065af4  mov dword ptr [esp + 0x4], 0xb              
0x8065afc  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x10], esi             
0x8065aff  mov dword ptr [esp], eax                    
0x8065b02  call 0x811b7fd                              ; fcn.811b7fd
0x8065b07  xor ecx, ecx                                

■ A.4 Chapter 9: anti-sandbox inputs and the process-name table

polkitd (l32) :: anti-sandbox inputs (sandbox_guard.rs)
[0x0805605a]> pd 8 @ 0x80638f1
0x80638f1  mov eax, 0x1f4                              
0x80638f6  cmp edx, 0x1f5                              
0x80638fc  cmovb edx, eax                              
0x80638ff  mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x28], edx             
0x8063902  lea edi, [ebx - 0xfc402]                    ; 0x082e3b86 "/dev/input/miceDISPLAYWAYLAND_DISPLAY500"
0x8063908  mov ecx, edi                                
0x806390a  push 0xf                                    
0x806390c  pop edx                                     
[0x0805605a]> ps 96 @ 0x082e30f4
vmware virtualbox kvm xen virtual bochs parallels hyper-v hyperv
microsoft corporation innotek bhyve proxmox
[0x0805605a]> ps 108 @ 0x082e3154
/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor
/sys/class/dmi/id/board_vendor /proc/xen SYSTEMD_VIRTUALIZATION hypervisor
[0x0805605a]> ps 90 @ 0x082e3b60
sleepMs tmpMin uptimeMinSec mouseMs mousePx /dev/input/mice DISPLAY WAYLAND_DISPLAY
; string boundaries added for reading; the pool is stored without separators
polkitd (l32) :: process-name table (procname.rs)
; (ptr,len) pairs in .data.rel.ro, each pointing to a kernel-thread style name
[0x0805605a]> pxw 32 @ 0x083c3684
0x083c3684  0x082e419c 0x0000000d   ; "[kworker/0:0]"
0x083c368c  0x082e41a9 0x0000000d   ; "[kworker/1:0]"
0x083c3694  0x082e41b6 0x0000000d   ; "[kworker/2:0]"
0x083c369c  0x082e41c3 0x0000000d   ; "[kworker/3:0]"
0x083c36a4  0x082e41d0 0x0000000e   ; "[kworker/u8:0]"
0x083c36ac  0x082e41de 0x0000000e   ; "[kworker/u9:0]"
0x083c36b4  0x082e41ec 0x0000000d   ; "[migration/0]"
0x083c36bc  0x082e41f9 0x0000000d   ; "[migration/1]"
0x083c36c4  0x082e4206 0x0000000b   ; "[rcu_sched]"
0x083c36cc  0x082a7320 0x00000008   ; "[rcu_bh]"
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Reproduce each block with the radare2 command on its first line. If your offsets differ, search the string first (izz~) and follow the cross references.

《 Appendix B. macOS self-check for Linux/EasyShell 》

Who should run this: anyone who ran a pasted Terminal command, an install one-liner or a "fix" script from an untrusted source since June 2026. Developer laptops and Macs used as build or CI runners first. A Mac only gets this implant if someone runs a shell command on it (18.3).

■ B.1 Which Macs can run it

BuildCPUMinimum macOSBuilt withConfidence
darwin_amd64Intel x86_6410.15 CatalinamacOS SDK 15.2, ld64 1115.7.3Confirmed (LC_BUILD_VERSION)
darwin_arm64Apple Silicon (M1 and later)11.0 Big SurmacOS SDK 15.2, ld64 1115.7.3Confirmed (LC_BUILD_VERSION)
  • In range: every macOS from 10.15 (Intel) or 11.0 (Apple Silicon) up to current releases. The binaries set no upper limit and link only frameworks every current macOS ships (Foundation, CoreFoundation, IOKit, SystemConfiguration, libSystem) Medium, not tested on a live system.
  • Out of range: macOS 10.14 Mojave and older. The loader refuses both builds Confirmed (static).
  • Apple Silicon with a Terminal running under Rosetta 2: uname -m reports x86_64, so the stager fetches the Intel build and Rosetta runs it Medium.

Check your own Mac:

sw_vers -productVersion     # macOS version
uname -m                    # x86_64 or arm64

■ B.2 What the implant looks like on a Mac

TraitWhat to look forConfidence
File~/Library/Caches/polkitd, or /tmp/polkitd as the fallbackConfirmed
File flagsHidden flag set (chflags hidden), all extended attributes cleared, so no com.apple.quarantineConfirmed
SignatureAd-hoc. Identifier http-beacon-implant-55554944… as served, or polkitd if the stager re-signed it (only when Xcode Command Line Tools are installed). No Team IDConfirmed
Process namepolkitd. macOS has no polkitdConfirmed
NetworkHTTPS to the C2 on tcp/8443 (chapter 12), POST /api/v2/sync with an X-Client-Id header and a Windows Chrome User-AgentConfirmed
BehaviourSilent screenshot (screencapture -x -t png), AppleScript mouse position check through System Events, sysctl hw.model, ps listing with a 12-second timeoutConfirmed (strings)
Privacy promptsFrom 10.15 on, screenshots need Screen Recording permission and AppleScript to System Events needs Automation permission. The client tells the operator to "run from Terminal once" so a prompt appears that the user may click throughConfirmed (strings)
PersistenceNone in the client: gone after logout or reboot unless the operator added somethingConfirmed (static)
[!] Any polkitd on a Mac is a strong signal: there is no legitimate binary with that name on macOS.

■ B.3 Quick check (5 minutes, read-only)

Run these in Terminal as your normal user. In check 3, w.x.y.z is a placeholder: replace it with the C2 IP in chapter 12 (written there with [.], which you change to .), or with any other IP you are concerned about. C2 addresses can change, so keep the port check as well.

# 1. The file, including hidden flags
ls -laO ~/Library/Caches/polkitd /tmp/polkitd 2>/dev/null

# 2. A running process named polkitd
ps -axo pid,ppid,user,lstart,command | grep -i '[p]olkitd'

# 3. Open connections on tcp/8443, and to the IP of concern on 8443
lsof -nP -iTCP:8443
lsof -nP -i@w.x.y.z:8443

If all three are empty, the implant is most likely not running now. Still do B.4 if you ran any command from an untrusted source: the file may already have been deleted.

■ B.4 Deeper check

# 4. Signature, hash and attributes of a suspicious file
codesign -dv --verbose=2 ~/Library/Caches/polkitd 2>&1 | grep -E 'Identifier|Signature|TeamIdentifier'
shasum -a 256 ~/Library/Caches/polkitd
xattr -l ~/Library/Caches/polkitd

# 5. Traces of the stager in shell history
grep -hE '8443/file|writeablex|polkitd|chflags hidden|xattr -c' \
  ~/.zsh_history ~/.bash_history ~/.zsh_sessions/* 2>/dev/null

# 6. Privacy prompts and use of the screenshot and AppleScript tools (last 7 days)
log show --last 7d --info --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.TCC" AND eventMessage CONTAINS[c] "polkitd"'
log show --last 7d --predicate 'process == "screencapture" OR process == "osascript"' | tail -50

# 7. Anything the operator may have added for persistence
ls -la ~/Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchDaemons
grep -rl polkitd ~/Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchDaemons 2>/dev/null
crontab -l 2>/dev/null

Known hashes (SHA-256):

darwin_amd64  fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
darwin_arm64  b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf

A different hash with the same name, path and signature traits is still a hit: the builds are prebuilt templates with a stamped config (chapter 15).

System Settings, Privacy & Security: look for polkitd, or a Terminal entry you did not grant yourself, under Screen Recording, Accessibility, Automation (System Events) and Full Disk Access.

■ B.5 If you find it

  1. Do not delete it yet. Disconnect the Mac from the network (Wi-Fi off, cable out).
  2. Collect a copy of the file, its hash, the output of checks 2, 3 and 6, and your shell history. Your IR team will need them.
  3. Then kill the process and remove the file.
  4. Rotate everything the account could reach: SSH keys, cloud and Git tokens, browser sessions and passwords used on that Mac. The client has a remote shell and file transfer.
  5. Check the other machines this Mac's keys reach. The client also has SOCKS and relay tunnels, so check for any pivot through it.
  6. If the operator had time on the Mac, reinstall macOS rather than trusting a clean-up.
  7. Report the hash and the first-seen time to your CERT or to us.

■ B.6 Limits of this check

  • No persistence means a reboot removes the running process; only the file, logs and history remain.
  • The stager runs chflags hidden and xattr -c, so Finder and Gatekeeper show nothing. Use the commands, not Finder.
  • Unified logs rotate, so older events may already be gone.
  • This checks for this implant only, not for other payloads the operator may have pushed through it.
  • The upper end of the version range is from static reading only; the payloads were not run.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • On macOS, a downloaded binary without a quarantine attribute, ad-hoc signed and hidden in a user cache folder, is a pattern worth one osquery query fleet-wide (27.1).

《 Appendix C. Revision history 》

Show the revision history (v1 to v11)
VersionDateChange
v12026-11-19First review draft: stager, l32 static analysis, cross review, CTI, vulnerability triage, YARA.
v22026-11-20Two OSINT notes verified and merged (chapters 14, 17, 19, 20). Infrastructure BGP table added (chapter 12). Chapter layout aligned with MMD-071. YARA family rule extended with two framework strings.
v32026-11-20Original stager screenshot added as evidence (chapter 2). Key points for busy readers with chapter links (1.2). Triage matrix column widths fixed with sideways scrolling (23.5).
v42026-11-20October 2026 vulnerability wave added to the timeline; hypothesis "campaign started with the wave" tested with ACH (20.1, 20.2). Web-server-to-stager Sigma rule and osquery query added.
v52026-11-20Campaign aim and the reason for macOS support (18.1, 18.2); October to November 2026 vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (23.8). macOS osquery query added.
v62026-11-20Four more payloads analysed (a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64): new chapter 15 with three radare2 style views; one shared configuration confirmed; macOS client modules documented; 18.2 R2 raised to Medium; IOC, TTP, YARA (new macOS rule), Sigma, osquery and STIX updated.
v72026-11-20l64 and l128 analysed: all seven payloads covered; correction in 15.1 (builds not compiled in one run, l128 uses rustc 1.96.0; config stamped into prebuilt templates); LoongArch note; Macs in scope raised to High; new 18.3 practical macOS infection chain; IOC, YARA, osquery and STIX updated.
v82026-11-20Stager image redrawn with each original Chinese comment followed by its English translation; Chinese glossary with pinyin added (2.2); placeholder chapter 29 for the hot forensics of a victim node; placeholder for the attacker's shell log analysis in 1.2.
v92026-11-20Released. Chapter 29 (hot forensics of a compromised host) and the attacker's shell log key points in 1.2 written; LoongArch64 note in the introduction.
v102026-11-21Review comments from IR and CERT readers applied: contradictions between chapters 18, 19 and 29 fixed and the chapter 29 link to this C2 rated; credentials, device identifiers, the victim IP and all domains in chapter 29 masked, provenance added; header block, reading map, CVE block view, scoring rules and sensitivity note, YARA condition for the signature identifier, false positive check, Appendix A text evidence; l128 loader note; copy edit.
v112026-11-21Second review round: repeated summaries removed (1.2 defender list, 17.2, 17.3, 24.1, epilogue hash block), 1.1 is the one summary and 28 a responder quick card; chapter 29 rewritten into the report structure; revision history moved to Appendix B; vulnerability triage method and matrix folded under 23.2 as context; YARA family rule tightened (EasyShell module paths instead of a crate path count, size limit 64 MB); macOS Sigma and osquery printed in 27; open questions for dynamic work listed in 16; Appendix B macOS self-check added (supported macOS versions from the Mach-O headers), revision history moved to Appendix C.

《 30. Epilogue 》

The lesson of this case is small but important. The downloader in a glimpse looked like another threat's binary (VShell, Kinsing etc), and the payload was none of them. The binary answered the question once it was read statically, and the public notes on the EasyShell framework then fitted the strings the binary already showed.

The shell history suggests that the attacker(s) installed and used agentic AI CLI sessions during the intrusion. Defenders should be alert to what such sessions can execute on a compromised host.

Not only Linux environments are targeted, macOS is too. The intention is remote access (RAT functionality), but the infection route is unclear. So yes, we have a macOS malware case here too, with no confirmed macOS infection so far.

This sample series includes a LoongArch (258) build. It is one of the earliest publicly documented LoongArch64 RAT implementations I could find in public reporting (as of 2026-11-21). In practice it targets Loongson 3A5000, 3A6000 and 3C/3D-series machines running a new-world distribution (Debian loong64, Loongnix, Kylin, UOS and so on). I have not run it, and its loader path suggests it may not load on a stock system as served. Its fingerprint is in 15.1 and 15.2.

If you are a student, take the offsets in this post and reproduce each view in radare2 (pd, px, izz) on your own copy, in an isolated environment. If you are a defender, start with the kernel-thread name check in chapter 25.

■ Related posts references

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
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@unixfreaxjp, malwaremustdie.org