Wednesday, April 9, 2014

MMD-0019-2014 - When a hacker got hacked - evil tools

The Background

With the thankfully good effort from our credited brothers, we MalwareMustDie, NPO (read: Malware Research Group & Anti Cyber Crime Workgroup) herewith disclose the existence of an evil service contains the full codes of malicious tools, in details: exploitation tools to distribute malware, hack tools, bruting tools, shell exploitation tools, spam bot tools, malware crypter, malware binary protector and binary packer, password cracking tools and its wordlists, some hacking and infection tools manuals and blackhat's howto picture and texts, that are mostly shared by the known hack group ANTICHAT.RU.The data or the contents itself is varied from 2011 and 2012 (mostly) with some new tools or manuals made in 2013.

What service?

The domain name owned and contains these data is (REDDACTED).XAKEP(.)BIZ (see the pictures snapped for the PoC) which the name explains more than words to all of us. For the law enforcement friends you will be sent email from our side contains the case's cyber crime investigation evidence which leading to the suspect ID of the site's owner. Noted the real domain name was a bit different (in purpose), is covered for law enforcement work purpose.

Please noted: Your direct access to the site is monitored by the related crook and there ARE accidents reported after accessing the site, that's why I announced the below warning:

The Shares

For security purpose the further data will be informed by mostly pictures and video as per following sections. We packed everything that we could fetch in a tarball as per snapshot in the picture below. This tarball is shared in very closed security industry ONLY via our colleague's mail list (please make sure you join the mail list, and I am sure you know what I mean if you follow our previous disclosures). So if you are in AntiVirus, Malware Filter, or Web/Proxy Attack Filtration (+IDS/IPS) industry's/entity's researchers and want to have the sample but not getting it yet, you can send request by writing comment below this post (it will be not published, explaining yourself and legit/non-free entity's email addresses will make the vetting process faster) and your request will be followed properly. The same goes to Government Security Agencies and Law Enforcements Agency's researchers.

The reason why we are limiting the shares is not for being "a picky" to whom to share the materials to, like we always do with the malware samples, but we just want to do the responsible and right sharing. This case is sensitive under below two points. (1) There is an active investigation on this case. (2) These are not malware samples to be sharable to be learned to crack/reverse/analyze to, but these are the real malware source codes, malicious tools and account hacking tools.. in ready to use form, shortly the real stealer tools! These tools are the subject against the law and order in many countries, even to just owning them can make yourself being jailed in my country. Some of these tools are still actively spotted in crime operation scene in the internet. Which means: IF these tools got leak or go to the irresponsible hands..this can be used for the VERY VERY BAD purpose and MalwareMustDie doesn't hold any responsibility or risk for it.
In some countries that we are actually living it is forbidden to pass around these kind of tools w/o strict permission to the appointed limited entities only. So we are sorry for the bummer to the researcher friends, we do want to share everything, but in this case we have to do it right. If you eager to have these materials, please kindly contact to your known security entity to contact us for you then we can discuss the legit possibility for the purpose.
Why did we post here and announce "the sharing" then? Because in reality there are many security legit entity which haven't seen these materials that actually being used by a cyber crime member, the knowledge and this awareness is a must share (to entities and to user level). We are trying to do that right here, with responsibility. So we assure you, we vetted the contacts, we monitor the download log strictly to make sure unnoticed party not to access, we don't share to unknown person and we deal with legit entity for sharing on this level to the widest reachable target in security community.

We are sorry if our share scheme is not satisfactory for some security researchers friends. For them, be free to send us comment in the below of this post with explaining the real identification then I am assuring you you will be assisted.
Thank you.

The Tarball:

Full Directory Structure

Noted: New released directories were wrapped in additional package, if you don't get it contact us.

The Pictures & Video of the Evil Contents

Various Exploit Kit's installer packages:

Web Shell in various scripts with or w/o CGI, below is PHP ones only:

Various tools of DDoS, Spammer & Bruter/Bombers:

Various Hack and Infection tools:

Various Malware Binary packers

Various Malware Binary Crypters and Protectors


Account hacking tools

DDoS/Blackhole Decoded

Botnet Installers & Source Codes

Common Proxy Tools used by Malware Crooks

And believe us, there are MANY MORE of those malicious tools than these pictures can show. The video (below) we recorded after collecting all of the content's data right before archiving will show more details:


This information is shared for the effort in suppressing cyber crime activities in the internet. We do not keep and own the malicious contents found, as experts we confirmed the information's credibility and as good citizens we follow with the share effort accordingly. Using this very precious information the filtration scheme can be applied better for the security and filtration products to protect innocent people from being abused by these malicious tool's users.

MalwareMustDie is working close and supporting to law enforcement agencies to deeper investigation upon mentioned threats. And we against any act that made our beloved internet becoming a junk places for malware, exploitations, extortion and stealing playground for cyber crime crooks.

We will continue to share important findings like this. Please support us.

Credit: Mr. Adam Ziaja of ComCERT, Poland.
Additional Credit: Mr. Mohab Ali of Synapse-Labs.
All materials checked and tarballed by @unixfreaxjp "as per it is" to support cyber crime investigation.

Stay safe always, friends. We have an uncivilized "jungle" claimed name of "internet" out there.


Thursday, April 3, 2014

MMD-0018-2014 - Analysis note: "Upatre" is back to SSL?

Latest Progress/Changes/Updates:

The background

Following the previous blog (link) of Zeus P2P Gameover (GMO) malware delivered by the Upatre trojan downloader from some encrypted form with varied file extension names. Today I found that the threat returned to previous model of Upatre downloader scheme (via SSL). Just in case I post it here, is not a new stuff, hope can help some friends:

The spam sample is like this:

*) The attached executable samples can be viewed at the bottom of this post.

The Upatre binary analysis

Some notes of the attached archived PE:

Compile Time: "0x533C67DB [Wed Apr 02 19:41:15 2014 UTC]"
Identified compiler : "Microsoft Visual C++ 5.0/6.0"
Entry Point at section: ".text"
CRC Fail: "Claimed 90984, Actual 77672"
Sigs: "Verified:Unsigned, Publisher: n/a"
Bad Entropy: ".text
              Entropy: 6.336388 (Min=0.0, Max=8.0)
              MD5: 28f4e63b3406fb9343aaf369f1897fb0"
I also use our beloved PeStudio downloaded from for the reliable alert's check:

Some suspicious/blacklisted calls used:

" GetStartupInfoW   .rdata: 0x000035D8,kernel32.dll
  GetModuleHandleW  .rdata: 0x000035C4,kernel32.dll
  _controlfp        .rdata: 0x000035B6,msvcrt.dll"

// Note about MSVCRT.DLL
is the Microsoft Visual C Run-Time Library (and MSVCPP.DLL is the standard C++ library)
 for Visual C++ version 4.2 to 6.0. It provides programs compiled with these versions o
 f Visual C++ a typical set of library functions required by C and C++ programs. These i
 nclude string manipulation, memory allocation, C-style input/output calls, etc. The msv
 crt.dll is now a "known DLL," meaning that it is a system component owned and built by 
 Windows. It is intended for future use only by system-level components.
So.. combined with the below's system's used "internals calls"... this "software" is likely never good..
"_wcmdln         .rdata: 0x0000351A,msvcrt.dll
__wgetmainargs   .rdata: 0x00003524,msvcrt.dll
_initterm        .rdata: 0x00003536,msvcrt.dll
__setusermatherr .rdata: 0x00003542,msvcrt.dll
_adjust_fdiv     .rdata: 0x00003556,msvcrt.dll
__p__commode     .rdata: 0x00003566,msvcrt.dll
__set_app_type   .rdata: 0x00003584,msvcrt.dll
_except_handler3 .rdata: 0x00003596,msvcrt.dll
_XcptFilter      .rdata: 0x00003504,msvcrt.dll
__p__fmode       .rdata: 0x00003576,msvcrt.dll" 
...But yet, some known software made by Microsoft Visual C also having the traces of them, hmm..I'll stick to "suspicious" then :

The Upatre binary contains encrypted (or obfuscated?) data in here:

.text:00401870   dd 498D10h, 0F1708305h, 0FF8B04h, 0AC7FF60h, 8D0004E8h
.text:00401870   dd 45C150CCh, 8BFFFF8Dh, 0F811082h, 4242483h, 6F006300h
.text:00401870   dd 8B01E8FFh, 40420D4h, 8D00248Bh, 0F8107D83h, 3300E8FFh
.text:00401870   dd 0F8037E01h, 48B24E8h, 2025A09h, 8B018D8Dh, 412C00h
.text:00401870   dd 0FFFF33FFh, 0DC188261h, 12401FFh, 0A00C0408h, 8BFF0104h
.text:00401870   dd 700C150Dh, 1FF2400h, 0F4F022DBh, 8B000133h, 0E17300E1h
.text:00401870   dd 2 dup(1F001Fh), 0FF00001Fh, 324B32h, 13E08D00h, 0FF1F001Fh
.text:00401870   dd 2 dup(1F001Fh), 0
.text:00401C54   dd 68014816h, 3 dup(1F001F00h), 0FF1F001Fh, 0F06492h, 2 dup(1F001Fh)
.text:00401C54   dd 0FF001Fh, 1F1FFF00h, 4026F155h, 2 dup(1F001F00h), 0A201A241h
.text:00401C54   dd 1F001Fh, 6E614865h, 1F00FF00h, 1FFFh, 2 dup(1F001F00h)
.text:00401C54   dd 0E815701h, 1C001014h, 4081804h, 100008h, 18080404h
.text:00401C54   dd 0C900F8h, 0D400EAh, 0ED00E0h, 0D000C9h, 0AA0095h, 890076h
.text:00401C54   dd 6C0093h, 83007Ch, 8F0070h, 0D100EEh, 94002Bh, 0C600F9h
.text:00401C54   dd 60079h
.text:0040229C   db 0C0h, 0  // closing chunk.
Note: I tend to call it encrypted since it needs a XOR key to decrypt it. There are some more obfuscated data in other places too (in .data, .rdata, and .rsrc), but this binary is a case of encrypted PE.

If we solve the above obfuscation (which I can not) it should give codes for method to decrypt the encrypted traffic, downloads malware from assigned hosts. If you don't have disassembly you can use the raw disassembler result from IDA free version I pasted here--> (link) to start the reversing process.

Another note: the "start" point is in .text section, it checks environment there (plus few evasion tricks) and go to wWinMain which contains the real deal of decrypting the obfuscated data. In the wWinMain I can see a below interesting checking pattern after XOR:

"deobfuscation pattern, repeated more than one..
 (three times actually with different used registers")
push    edi
pop     edx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_60]
rol     eax, 6
add     eax, 455E4A5h
mov     [ebp+var_3C], eax
mov     edx, 136C6E9Bh
mov     [ebp+var_1C], edx
mov     ecx, 7E0C0B9Ah
mov     [ebp+var_68], ecx
mov     eax, 668758F1h
mov     [ebp+var_14], eax
mov     edx, 5D1E4FCDh
mov     [ebp+var_18], edx
mov     ecx, 0FFFFFFFFh
mov     [ebp+var_C], ecx
call    sub_4015A0  [...]    <=== "xor'ed and checked"

"called checks to sub_4015A0: "
push    ebx
push    esi
push    edi
mov     ebx, [ebp-80h]
xor     ebx, 0ABED8791h  <======
mov     edx, 40000000h
ror     edx, 0Eh
cmp     ebx, edx   // the checks.
jb      sub_401464 // end stuff here...

How does it work?

This is what I saw. The Upatre during execution is communicating to below host:

kionic,com / 64,92,125,121 (Netfronts/U.S.A.)

via TLSv1 (SSL):

which fetching the microsoft certification patch's URL and Comodo's encryption certification's URL:

Next, these data will trigger each URL in the list to be downloaded by the Upatre itself as per shown below:

Some reference for you of the explanation what was downloaded from the microsoft site:

Is a patch to revoke certification, was intended to make sure the following Comodo certification can be installed successfully:

This is the one that can be downloaded successfully:

Next.. Upatre downloads a binary blob via an encrypted communication (SSL) from (

To be more viewable:

The downloaded malware is to be saved and registered (autorun) in:

// drops:
C:\Documents and Settings\%USER%\Local Settings\Temp\Ixtya (RANDOM)
2004/08/08  12:58  646,656 dyzucy.exe (random) 0929a17a3fbaf6b1eb63ab8d5edbdd45

// registry..
Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Data: "dyzucy.exe" (RANDOM), Values: "C:\Documents and Settings\kaspersky\Local Settings\Temp\Ixtya (RANDOM)\dyzucy.exe(RANDOM)"
it is Zeus P2P Gameover (GMO) with rootkit version. Upatre execute this GMO and self deleting itself. Clean cut.

Spawned malicious processes is like this:

Invoice_040314.scr (PID: 3860 MD5: C941E2997DC2A1E39515D226E1830DB4)
    tech3.exe (PID: 1192 MD5: 984A0B8A58EA60B3376CE25692B68FA8)
        tech3i.exe (PID: 3672 MD5: 5038C8E8D2B9A00327D0CBF334223E9D)
            dyzucy.exe (PID: 1404 MD5: C7BD551912375FA2312629E070AC51F2)
                1aaa970c.sys (PID: 4 MD5: BA2B9FFB336BF5AF0247313FE2509435)
            cmd.exe (PID: 4076 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c %Temp%\XNY9C82.bat MD5: AD7B9C14083B52BC532FBA5948342B98)

The Gameover

Not much to tell (kudos good people who fight this threat well!), instead is an usual installation (the batch), and drops its rootkit & hooked itself in registry, after a while it starts querying some DGA as below:

aulbbiwslxpvvphxnjij,biz                                      /
behatwdxzxelembmfahkw,biz                                     /
..and as usual it sent a POST /write HTTP/1.1 (I don't go to details on these, cheers!):

Are they really changed?

Samples, Traffic and VT

Below is the sample's snapshots:

Please download via Kernel Mode-->(link)

Matrix of stages infection's detection ratio (VT)

This time I would like to make a matrix of the detection ratio of the malware by the time I analyze this sample. I used the VirusTotal (VT) scores for the comprehensive result purpose. Please be noted that VT score is based on part of signature (not overall filtration and) detection used by AntiVirus industry, so it is just not an exact measurement, but is good enough to give the idea of how is the detection on this threat by AV industry in every form of samples (during infection stages) on this infection.

The "Stages" column explained the form of the malware during the infection process as the object to be scanned by AV products. I started from the stage 1 as the email data itself, goes to the attachment in zip, PE, PE self copied after being clicked, the downloaded GMO, self-copied GMO and rootkit downloaded/used. Feel free to comment for improvement:

Stages Malware Virus Total Score
1 EML Spam file 15/51
2 Upatre SCR in attached zip 21/51
3 Upatre fake SCR the PE file 20/51
4 Upatre Self-Copied after clicked 14/51
5 Downloaded Zeus GMO 17/51
6 Self-Copy Zeus GMO after downloaded 13/51
7 Rootkit (Necurs) 15/51

So in overall we have an average score 16.42/51 or 32.21% detection ratio for this malvertisement, not so bad :-)

Where are those Spambots??

We are lunching the Upatre Spambot monitoring, these spambots are infected PC which are scattered all over the world, like below samples I tweeted:

We recorded all of the Upatre malvertisement in session with our own SMTP honeypot. We decided to share the infected IP addresses for the ISP and CERT of each country to do the clean-up. The April 2014 Statistic for Upatre spambot infected PC was released, as per announced in below tweet, we will try to manage to update this data periodically.

Video Analysis Tips and Guide

I made & upload an HD Video as a quick way of howto analyze this threat (Upatre/GameOver sets) as per seen below. I use the different set of sample and is not describing the specific sample mentioned in this or previous post, but same threat and case:

Further "rtrace" Reversing by @nullandnull

Stay safe friends. #MalwareMustDie!