Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Blackhole of "/closest/" version with an infection of Trojan ZeroAccess (alias MaxPlus, Sirefef) w/Recycler Variant

[NEW!] New case infection w/same payload type & infection MO in different domain. Landing page: 3thtyjtyjcc.ns02.us/closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php Payload: ZeroAccess Exploit: Java: #CVE-2010-4476 #CVE-2013-0422, PDF: #CVE-2010-0188, CVE-2009-0927 Sorry for the report in text--> http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=HPESHngh
I am on a half way on a plane of a long trip, got many spare time so I checked some queries to malware site. I received the report to investigate a Blackhole Exploit Kit, the clue was the infected domain of 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz, I had no idea so the first try I did was requesting the domain in the urlquery and ending up with the below suspected landing page url:
33sdfguuh.mywww.biz/closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php
Got so attempted so I fetched:
--2013-02-05 21:45:24--  h00p://33sdfguuh.mywww.biz/closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php
Resolving 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz... seconds 0.00, 89.253.232.149
Caching 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz => 89.253.232.149
Connecting to 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz|89.253.232.149|:80... seconds 0.00, connected.
  :
"GET /closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php HTTP/1.0"
Referer: http://malwaremustdie.com
"Host: 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz"
  :
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.2.6
Date: Tue, 05 Feb 2013 12:45:24 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.4
Vary: Accept-Encoding
  :
200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
Saving to: "209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php"
"2013-02-05 21:45:27 (90.4 KB/s) - 209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php saved [113594]"
The inside was the common Backhole v2.x's landing Page ofuscation, which manually cracked to be plugin detect script like this -->>[PASTEBIN] Some of the highlight are below:
1. The usage of the pair of directories of /closest/ & 2. they don't put shellcode or the malware payload download in the landing page, instead scattered in the exploit file infector. 3. two pdfs, two jars and one payload.
BHEK is BHEK, by using our guideline -->>[HERE] you can get these samples: FYI the 2 PDFs urls is are as per below (this is for people who got attack by these Blackhole which mostly seeing these PDF downloads URL in their log..)
h00p://33sdfguuh.mywww.biz/closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php?dsmq=30:1n:1i:1i:33&lllsxi=3g:3a:3c&bdm=30:33:1n:1m:1h:33:30:1o:30:1h&uzz=1k:1d:1f:1d:1g:1d:1f
h00p://33sdfguuh.mywww.biz/closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php?qbzntsus=30:1n:1i:1i:33&cazv=39&alltb=30:33:1n:1m:1h:33:30:1o:30:1h&mkitrggt=1k:1d:1f:1d:1g:1d:1f
I started to get the payload from the smallest size of PDF, to find the JS/Evil/Code written in the 0x11AF-0x2768 section with text below: The red mark is the evil script, where the purple mark is the long obfuscation var/array, and the yellow mark is the deobfuscator logic. Following the usual method to decode this, we'll find the infector script burped as per first upper part below, marked area is the shellcode in text: And the lower part which having Libtiff overflow CVE-2010-0188 exploit code: *) Noted: I marked the part it checked the Adobe version. Well shortly the shellcode will look like below, contains the payload's url: Well, I just downloaded it..
GET /closest/209tuj2dsljdglsgjwrigslgkjskga.php?rjh=30:1n:%201i:1i:33&ofa=30:33:1n:1m:1h:33:30:1o:30:1h&omtvgame=1i&tdn=trnwuek&hxx=ynkt HTTP/1.0
Referer: http://malwaremustdie.blogspot.com
User-Agent: Gottcha!
Host: 33sdfguuh.mywww.biz
 :
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.2.6
Date: Tue, 05 Feb 2013 13:17:33 GMT
Content-Type: application/x-msdownload
Content-Length: 176128
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.4
Pragma: public
Expires: Tue, 05 Feb 2013 13:17:40 GMT
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Cache-Control: private
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="contacts.exe"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
  :
200 OK
Registered socket 1892 for persistent reuse.
Length: 176128 (172K) [application/x-msdownload]
Saving to: `contacts.exe'
2013-02-05 22:17:37 (84.9 KB/s) - `contacts.exe' saved [176128/176128]
Now we have the payload below: *)Noted: I marked my local time of my PC when I fetched. Nothing special about the file's looks & dull-usual name of contacts.exe

Debug investigation of the payload

So it's time to debug it to understand: 1. First the moronz encrypted the binary, see -->>[HERE] the section .text and .data was garbled, trailing the bins made me only stuck at the 0x40A209 in .text section:
0x40A209  add     esi, 1Fh
0x40A20C  pushf
0x40A20D  or      word ptr [esp], 1
0x40A212  nop
0x40A213  popf
0x40A214  wait
0x40A215  push    ebp
0x40A216  wait
0x40A217  pop     ebp
0x40A218  nop
0x40A219  rep cld
0x40A21B  jb      loc_40A49D
0x40A221  pop     ds
0x40A222  pop     ds
0x40A223  cmp     dl, bh
0x40A225  push    ecx
  : (skip)
0x40A229  var_44 = word ptr -6583D684h
0x40A229  var_42 = byte ptr -6583D682h
0x40A229  var_25 = byte ptr -6583D665h
0x40A229  var_23 = byte ptr -6583D663h
   : (skip)
0x40A2F9 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 0x40A6EF 
0x40A2F9 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 0x40A839 
0x40A2F9 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 0x40A874 
  : (skip)
0x40A2F9 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 0x40FC08 
0x40A2F9 ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 0x40FC63 
2. Shortly I figured some mistery by debugging it to find these clue: This mess loading DLL by using these methods..
LdrLoadDll
LdrGetDllHandle
Use below command to decrypt:
uncrypted.exe
Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0
Detecting/search the below programs / services:
Windows Defender
wscntfy.exe
MSASCui.exe
MpCmdRun.exe
NisSrv.exe
msseces.exe
fp.exe
 :
MsMpSvc
windefend
SharedAccess
iphlpsvc
wscsvc
mpssvc
Debugged further to find that this malware stopping these processes:
MsMpSvc, windefen, SharedAccess, iphlpsvc, wscsvc, mpssvc, bfe
PoC code in ASM here -->>[PASTEBIN] Looks also erasing/throwing off something via registry:
RECYCLER\
$Recycle.Bin\
With some more registry traces...
InprocServer32
{fbeb8a05-beee-4442-804e-409d6c4515e9}
\registry\machine\Software\Classes\clsid\{5839fca9-774d-42a1-acda-d6a79037f57f}\InprocServer32
  :
A nice attempt to use his filename to save itself..
TEMP=
\InstallFlashPlayer.exe
Internet access command -1- Get GeoIP Info & safe/get CN code..
GET /app/geoip.js HTTP/1.0
Host: j.maxmind.com
Connection: close
  :
geoip_country_code
If you simulate this into your browser, you'll get your all GeoIP data + lat/long coordinates. Internet access command -2- get the counter...
GET /5699017-3C912481A04E584CDF231C519E1DF857/counter.img?theme=%u&digits=10&siteId=%u HTTP/1.1
Host: bigfatcounters.com
User-Agent: Opera/9 (Windows NT %u.%u; %s; %s)
Connection: close
I dumped this data from memory after fetching the last URL above... ↑oh.. is an image file.. a counter↓

Behavior Analysis

So what was happened when I run it? It was as per below snapshot: The execution of CMD for self (copy+)deletion.. It requests the DNS query to the google, AND to these specific IP!↓
194.165.17.3:53  ADM-SERVICE-NET (Monaco)
66.85.130.234:53 TechEVE Ltd TE-SAFESUGAR (UK)
Except the above http, I detected UDP request to access these IP/port:
92.254.253.254:16464
88.254.253.254:16464
87.254.253.254:16464
71.254.253.254:16464
69.254.253.254:16464
1.172.141.253:16464
122.110.95.253:16464
85.86.69.253:16464
90.230.2.2:16464
115.31.23.2:16464
174.101.87.249:16464
187.74.74.249:16464
61.86.42.249:16464
194.165.17.3:123
91.242.217.247:123
94.183.234.248:16464
180.254.253.254:16464
166.254.253.254:16464
135.254.253.254:16464
134.254.253.254:16464
119.254.253.254:16464
117.254.253.254:16464
115.254.253.254:16464
126.13.87.248:16464
89.215.205.2:16464
222.109.23.4:16464
203.171.244.4:16464
109.90.149.240:16464
173.217.73.3:16464
98.26.183.2:16464
84.55.11.24:16464
116.73.35.4:16464
86.126.1.74:16464
121.242.162.55:16464
175.181.230.42:16464
190.208.75.36:16464
150.214.68.251:16464
188.6.88.61:16464
206.254.253.254:16464
190.254.253.254:16464
182.254.253.254:16464
A short session of infection goes like this: And these are the snapshot of UDP, malform DNS requests I was talking about: It sent the malform DNS with the request is like this: Any idea what is this, friends? :-) Furthermore let's see what's the file process & networking + registry-->>[HERE] Is a full run log on asession of one infection I made it on my PC :-) Please try to grep values like "RegSet" or "CreateFile", "UDP" to be more focus in understanding how this malware's work. In registry there's some changes in:
HKLM\Software\Classes\ClsId\{...some ID....}\InprocServer32\
   --→"C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\fastprox.dll"/"C:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-18\$6576a1a85f9fdb0e20568660563a58ee\n."
↑wow, looks like a setup for a deletion ... Noticing the above, I just realized that my below registry keys were deleted/gone..
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile\AuthorizedApplications
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Setup
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Setup\InterfacesUnfirewalledAtUpdate
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wscsvc
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wscsvc\Enum
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wscsvc\Parameters
..\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wscsvc\Security
Now I know why it seeked those strings of programs in debugging, to DELETE them.. Moreover saw an a fail attempt of starting the Active Directory Domain Services Database Mounting Tool or SERVICES_ACTIVE_DATABASE, binding to the localhost...

What's this mess?

So we are dealing with what malware then? 1) a trojan (for sure, by all infection MO & erasing stuffs) + staring service, but for what? I wonder what would happened if one of those request to had seccessfully established. IF it sent data then we have 2) a spyware which is having these characteristics. Let's reseacrh further, viewing the way it made changes in registry at the recycle keys/values made made me bumped to the good writing about ZeroAccess Recycler version here -->>[TigzyBlog] And UDP/16464 found it as the ZeroAccess/alias MaxPlus, Sirefef variant. Thank's to the Tigzy-RK for a useful writing -->Tigzy-RK And all of the advices I received, I thank you.

Samples

Here's the overall samples -->>[HERE] (Samples are shared for raising detection ratio & research purpose) *) Thank you to @Horgh_rce for adding the unpack version of the malware. It's really good to know that I didn't miss a thing during debugging.

Virus Total

Below is detection ratio as per detected moment of the samples in VT:
Landing page : (1/46) -->>[VT] PDF1 : (20/46) -->>[VT] PDF2 : (13/46) -->>[VT] JAR1 : (6/46) -->>[VT] JAR2 : (5/46) -->>[VT] Payload : (6/46) -->>[VT]

The Infection

I don't have time to check these all but all of these BHEK are infecting same ZeroAccess variant now. Marked the domain name & BHEK "/closest" path: The PoC of the list in the picture above is --->>[HERE] and here -->>[HERE]

Thank you for your help, advice & cooperation!

#MalwareMustDie!

3 comments:

  1. The "strange" UDP port 53 traffic seem to be installation status traffic. It's XORed with the zeroaccess standard key

    Your sample:
    encr: b232e95b8f9c9e98486a6c37b5707a62aa17a9c5
    decr: f57ca61701000000555351068f020000def35d01
    decr ascii: õ|¦?????USQ????Þó]?
    Whare you recognize contry code(US) at offset 0x8 and OS version (51) at offset 0xa

    You should also expect traffic on UDP port 123 which also seem to be c&C traffic.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hi, the XOR idea is excellent! Tested and goes well.
      Too bad can't see the UDP/123 yet, but I am taking more samples too soon. I will keep you informed via post updates!
      Regards, #MalwareMustDie!

      Delete
    2. Forgot to thank you for your excellent work! keep it up :)

      Just wanted to give you a heads up that I finally got arounf to post a Zeroaccess network traffic analysis. Check it out if you still are looking into this.

      http://malforsec.blogspot.no/

      Regards
      MalForsec

      Delete